The Russian Language Outside the Nation
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Edited by Lara Ryazanova-Clarke
To my mum Rida
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Cyrillic Transliteration System
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(adapted from ALA-LC Romanization Tables, Library of Congress)

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Introduction: The Russian Language, Challenged by Globalisation

*Lara Ryazanova-Clarke*

**RUSSIAN LANGUAGE AND THE SOCIOLINGUISTICS OF GLOBALISATION**

Globalisation has been noted to be one of the principle challenges for the contemporary study of language in society (de Swaan 2001; Calvet 2006; Fairclough 2006; Pennycook 2007; Blommaert 2010; Coupland 2010). As it sets out to develop new arguments, vocabularies and parameters (Blommaert 2010), the emerging field of sociolinguistics of globalisation redefines the relationship between language and space in the modern world (Mikhalchenko and Trushkova 2003; Gal 2010; Blommaert and Dong 2010). In recent decades, space has been a dramatic factor in defining the state of the Russian language which has experienced on the one hand, multiple physical and symbolic departures and, at the same time, has unprecedentedly stretched its segment in the linguasphere, that is the linguistic mantle ‘extended around the planet by humankind’ (Dalby 2001: 23). In addition to the fact that the end of Communism in itself engendered a deep change in the world order by triggering an intensification of the process of globalisation (Robertson 1992), the implosion of the Soviet Union had most important consequences for the sociology of Russian. Since 1991, the global distribution of the Russian language has changed beyond any expectations: it shifted from being the principal language of one state to the language spoken, apart from in the metropolis of Russia, by sizeable groups of speakers in fourteen other countries – successors of the USSR. Additionally, the introduction of relative ease of movement caused a new wave of outward migration of Russian speakers from virtually all countries of the former Soviet space to the outside world. While normally in a situation of migration, people move across the borders, in the new post-Soviet
environment, it was borders that moved across people (Brubaker 1996), leading to the diasporisation of Russian speakers who suddenly found themselves living in ethnolinguistic enclaves with rapidly shrinking domains of Russian language use. Scholars are still struggling to find an adequate term for this phenomenon, with the ‘beached diaspora’ (Laitin 1998: 29) and the ‘accidental diaspora’ (Brubaker) being the most accepted ones. However it is also true that the label ‘diaspora’ with its implication of strong links of its members with the ‘homeland’, might not be fully accurate either (Poppe and Hagendoorn 2001: 57). As the majority of the new states declared their national language to be the sole state language and launched forceful policies of derussification, members of Russian-speaking communities were compelled to adjust their linguistic repertoires, practices and narratives of identities to the new linguistic regimes. As for developments further afield, the mobility of Russian speakers accelerated an expansion of russophone communities, first of all in the Western industrial countries – the traditional destinations for Russian migrants – and also spread Russian to less conventional places.

So far there are no unequivocal and reliable statistics of Russian speakers living beyond the Russian Federation notwithstanding that, since 1964, Russian has been steadily ranked as the fifth most spoken language in the world (Ammon 2010: 109). Going by the current Russian Duma Speaker Sergei Naryshkin’s report of 2012, 160 million people in total consider Russian as their first language while more than 270 million use it as a regular means of communication (Naryshkin 2012). Given that the population of the Russian Federation, according to the latest poll, is around 143,533,000 (World Bank 2012), this means that the number of Russian speakers living abroad is almost on a par with the number remaining in the Russian ‘homeland’. Against this level of Russian language diffusion across the world, Russia has intensified its claims for the role of an authoritative linguo-cultural global ‘centre’ (Hannerz 1992; 1996). While the first post-Soviet decade was marked by a lack of interest in the plight of the Russian speakers abroad (Kolstoe 1995), in recent years, the Russian government has made energetic steps to assert its authority over the Russian language and the right to determine its standards by launching a series of language policies towards the outside world. These policies are implemented through various forms of externalisation such as the targeted international campaigns (for example, the 2007 ‘Year of the Russian Language’), the launch of international russophone media broadcasting outlets, and the establishment of Kremlin-supported humanitarian organisations and foundations. The latter are led by Russia’s Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and
International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo), and the Russian answer to the British Council – the ‘Russkii Mir Foundation’, specifically aimed at the popularisation of the Russian language across the world. As Barrington et al. note, ‘[b]ecause Russian officials perceive Russia to be the “external national homeland” of the Russians abroad, Russia has claimed a right and even a duty to monitor their treatment and status’ (2003: 290). Thus, Russian is increasingly used as soft power in order to gain influence in countries with russophone communities (Gorham 2011; Hudson 2013; Ryazanova-Clarke this volume).

This book deals with the Russian language and its speakers as they experience the process of globalisation and reconfiguration of their relationship with space. The volume explores a comprehensive set of tensions that emerged from the dislocated and deterritorialised position of Russian in the contemporary world, including the issues of language legislation and policies, construction of identities and negotiating repertoires. In order to discuss the problems posed by global Russian, a number of non-metropolitan spaces are sampled: chapters take the reader to locations which include both the post-Soviet states, specifically Ukraine, Estonia and Belarus, and the countries of the traditional ‘West’ – Italy, the US and Israel.

GLOBAL RUSSIAN IN TIME

Conventionally globalisation is attributed to the period of late modernity with its new scales of human mobility and economic, political and cultural interconnections and interdependencies between various parts of the world. It has been also noted that, in principle, there is nothing new in the phenomenon of globalisation itself (Coupland 2010: 2), in fact, today we are living in no more than the current phase of a long process that ‘has been a recurrent tendency of world capitalism since early modern times’ (Arrighi 2000: 125).

In the sense of a language used as a lingua franca for interethnic communication, the notion of global Russian may go even further, that is, to the pre-modern times of Russia’s misty beginnings. Historically, in the lands where Russian has been spoken, the transnational trend for the Russian language competed with multilingualism and tolerance towards language diversity. From the earliest time on record, East Slavic dialects close to Old Russian were either spoken or understood by multiple ethnic groups trading with and bordering Rus and, later, the Trasdom of Moscovy (Belikov and Krysin 2001). Russian was expanding the geographical areal of its speech communities from at least the sixteenth
century, when Ivan the Terrible incorporated into the Russian territories the Astrakhan and Kazan Khanates, and launched a large-scale conquest of Siberia. In Brueckner’s estimation of 1888, the rate of expansion of the empire in the period from Ivan the Terrible’s conquests to the end of the nineteenth century was 130 square kilometres or 50 square miles per day (Brueckner in Pipes 1997: 1). While the spread of the Russian language has not been calculated with such admirable precision, it ultimately followed the expansion of the land.

It has to be said, however, that before the eighteenth century, linguistic assimilation to Russian in the peripheries had a slow pace and was guided by no official language policy, leaving space for multilingualism. In the eighteenth century, multilingualism expanded along both the geographical and social axes, encompassing, together with the ethnic edges of the growing empire, the linguo-social stratification comprised of monolingual peasants and bilingual Franco-Russian nobility. In contrast to the institutionalised bilingualism, the eighteenth century also saw the formation of the Russian literary language which was essential for fomenting Russian modern secular culture (Zhivov 2009). The Russian language was steadily gaining prominence through the russophone literary and journal culture and through the establishment of language policy institutions, the first of which was the Imperial Russian Language Academy, and standardisation of the use of Russian for all official and quasi-official domains (Laitin 1998: 39). The spread of the Russian language as a means to unify the empire intensified in the middle of the nineteenth century, when, after the Polish rebellion of 1863, Russian was made the official language of the Kingdom of Poland (Pavlenko 2006: 80).

The Russian Empire over the last two centuries produced constant and fundamental contradictions of identity in its populations, with implications for their linguistic behaviours. According to Ronald Suny, one cause of those was ‘a tension between empire and the national’ (2012: 17). For its major part, the Russian empire had a rather weak ethnic element, being primarily a dynastic and aristocratic polity in which the core Russian population was exploited much more harshly than the ethnic minorities on the periphery (Lieven 2006: 21). Consequently, as Suny points out,

both the tsarist and the Soviet regimes attempted to negotiate the difficult path between the imperatives of a great and diverse state, on the one hand, and the more particular concerns of ethnic and religious communities themselves adopting and adapting the language and self-identification as nations. (2012: 17)
The Russian language, challenged by globalisation

Imperial language management was integral to these contradictions: although in the pre-revolutionary period, russification policies were, no doubt, important, they ‘were only partially conscious . . . never consistent, and definitely not long lasting’ (Pavlenko 2011: 332). Literature on the Soviet language policies equally testifies to their inconsistent and contradictory character (Brubaker 1996; Smith et al. 1998; Laitin 1998). In the early post-revolutionary phase, Lenin’s vision for nationalities was implemented through the ‘affirmative action’ indigenisation policy (korenizatsiia) which was geared towards the encouragement of use and development of the native languages in the non-Russian republics. A U-turn to a de-facto russification came under Stalin together with a reversal of the policy of korenizatsiia and the launch of the Great Terror towards selectively targeted ‘diaspora nationalities’ (Martin 2001). The Russian language became a compulsory school subject and the language to be used in the official domain in non-Russian republics, a situation which continued until the final phase of Soviet rule. In comparison with the national languages, Russian was attributed a higher symbolic value, that is, prestige, influence, reach, access to power and career opportunities. However, russification Soviet style was arguably an ‘incomplete rationalisation’ of language as well as culture within the Soviet boundaries, a tension rooted in the Soviet nationality regime which never managed to fully create a new inclusive identity (Brubaker 1996; Laitin 1998, Bassin and Kelly 2012). Instead, the Soviet Union codified and sponsored the institutionalisation of nationhood and nationality at a sub-state level being ‘at once and the same time an empire state and a state of nations’ (Suny 2012: 24). This accounted for the fact that the weakening of the Soviet state in the late 1980s was accompanied by the republics’ national movements for which the national languages became major symbols of independence.

The transnational development of Russian in the Soviet era amounted to more than russification within the borders of the Soviet state. By the middle of the twentieth century, Russian was an official language of the United Nations (Ammon 2010: 111) and, together with European colonial languages – French, English and Spanish – received the status of a ‘world language’ (Mufwene 2010: 43). The countries of the Warsaw Pact, and African and Asian countries gravitating towards the Soviet Union, encouraged the intensive learning of Russian, which had a special status as the preferred, or even compulsory, foreign language in school curricula. In other parts of the world, especially in the Western democracies, it was a language much studied by the USSR’s Cold War opponents. To take a UK example: as an answer to the threat from the Soviet Union after WWII, the Joint Service School for Linguistics was set up...
in 1951, which within the eight years of its work, turned out about 5,000 top-quality specialists in Russian (Muckle 2008: 135). During the Cold War period, Russian was also widely studied in UK secondary schools: in the early 1970s, for example, Russian was offered in 802 British schools as opposed to only 299 schools that made provision of the language in the midst of Mikhail Gorbachev’s *perestroika* which renounced the policy of the arms race (Muckle 1994: 41).

A corollary of the tensions and contradictions in the history of global Russian is the question of the applicability of the notion of the ‘colonial’ language to its imperial and Soviet past, and, consequently, of the term ‘post-colonial’ to its current condition. So far no uniform position regarding that question has been achieved. While some have no doubt that the Russian situation was no different from that of the classical colonial model of the West with regard to Ireland, South Asia and Africa (Druviete 1997; Račkevskis 2002; Kuzio 2002; 2005; Masenko 2004), others suggest a more differential approach offering more specific terms, such as ‘federal colonialism’ (Smith et al. 1998), ‘an empire of nations’ (Hirsch 2005) and ‘an affirmative action empire’ (Martin 2001; for more discussion see Pavlenko 2008: 29). The simple colonial/post-colonial dichotomy also becomes problematised if we consider that the distinction between empire and sovereignty is blurred and their features often overlap (Cummings and Hinnebusch 2011), and moreover, that a uniform, or ‘correct’ definition of empire is an illusion (Lieven 2011: 25). Additionally, the assumption of the framework of ‘decolonisation’ can shield the de-facto discrimination of minorities – something that has taken place in Estonia and Latvia where russophone minorities have been recast as foreigners (Hughes 2005: 745).

A nuanced view of a ‘three-faced empire’ has been expressed by Laitin (1998), who argues against treating Russia’s former peripheries as being equally colonised. He claims that the peripheral incorporation into the Russian state occurred historically according to three different patterns. The first – the ‘most favoured lord’ pattern – was a model of incorporation of the titular elites on equal terms with the centre, which was instantiated by Ukraine. The second was the classical colonial model exemplified by the Central Asian republics, which featured the subaltern elites and a considerable cultural difference between the periphery and the metropolis. Finally, the integralist model accounting for the situation of the Baltic states was the one in which the level of literacy and cultural integrity of the periphery exceeded that of the centre, and in which the regions could continue their social life with a minimal interaction with the Russian, or Soviet world. Laitin shows that this triple pattern correlates with the levels of trauma and assimilatory pressures that fell
after the Soviet collapse onto the ‘imperial minority’, and with the strategies of shifts in language behaviour and identity in various republics. A further calibrated analysis of the intricacies and tenets affecting the post-imperial state of Russian and the speakers of Russian in the post-Soviet world continues to be a challenge for contemporary scholarship.

RUSSIAN IN THE POST-SOVIET WORLD

While, as we have briefly shown, Russian has been a transnational language for centuries, it was the breakup of the Soviet Union and its powerful centrifugal impact that caused a remapping of languages across its political space and turned Russian into a language ‘dislodged and destabilized by globalization’ (Blommaert 2010: 2). As a result of the Soviet disintegration, 25 million Russian speakers ended up outside the metropolitan linguistic community (Hyman 1993; Brubaker 1996: 45) in other post-Soviet states. As Kolstoe (1995) notes, after 1992, the Russian-speaking communities began to move in fundamentally different directions.

Jan Blommaert (2010: 3) warns us that globalisation is capable of ‘generat[ing] a heightened awareness of the politicised identities, of ethnolinguistic nationalism and of national chauvinism’. As evidence of that, Russian, which had previously been a factor of prestige, quickly became a marker of semiotic difference converted in a number of post-Soviet states into a token of otherness and a matter of social inequality production. The majority of the post-Soviet governments launched vigorously nationalising policies with an aim to address the Soviet legacy of ethnic and language policies and in order to tackle the privileged status of Russian and the asymmetrical bilingualism associated with it. From the outset, they took resolute steps towards de-russification of public domains and the rebalancing of the language regimes towards favouring the ‘titular’ languages; in other words, they produced policies that manifested remedial language ideologies. The result was that the previously dominant and de-facto official Russian language was rapidly losing in symbolic value while its speakers were relegated to the position of ‘imperial minority’. The remedial linguistic ideologies have been promulgated most radically in Estonia and Latvia, in which, notwithstanding the high percentage of Russian speakers (30% of the Latvian population and 26% of the Estonian), Russian was resolutely declared a foreign language (Iatsenko 2008: 13).

Despite the general nationalising trend, the position of Russian has varied across the post-Soviet space. Today, apart from the Russian
Federation, Russian still has official status in Belarus (the only country in which it has the status of the state language equally with the titular Belarusian), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Transdniestria (the breakaway part of Moldova) (Ciscel 2007; 2008; Davé 2007; Orusbaev et al. 2008; Smagulova 2008; Woolhiser this volume). It is also recognised as a ‘language of multiethnic communication’ by jurisdictions of Moldova, Ukraine and Tajikistan (Bilaniuk 2005; Bilaniuk and Melnyk 2008; Ciscel 2007; 2008; Iatsenko 2008), and in Ukraine, it has an additional status of a regional language. In other countries of the former Soviet Union – Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Lithuania, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Russian has no specific status at all (Iatsenko 2008).

The non-Russian new states have emerged as highly contested linguistic spaces, in which the use of Russian has been the central divisive issue. For some groups of population, the language symbolised a history of Russian domination, linguistic discrimination and imbalances; while for others whose mother tongue was Russian, it seemed as though a basic human was drastically slipping away. In the two post-Soviet decades, the number of people fluent in Russian had shrunk by 40 to 50 million (Nikonov 2012), with half of the losses occurring in the post-Soviet states (Tishkov 2008: 35). Multiple volatile situations and crises have sprung up with regard to the Russian language: to list but a few – the ongoing frozen conflict between Moldova and the breakaway Transdniestria; the 1993 protests at the opening of the Slavonic University in Kyrgyzstan; the fistfights in the Ukrainian parliament in 2012 during the discussion of the law on the regional language; and the increased tensions in Latvia around the 2012 referendum for the adoption of Russian as the second official language.

It has been argued that a ‘national language’ is not a strictly linguistic category but an ideological object used in the construction and reconstruction of national identity (Bakhtin 1981; Woolard 1998; Joseph 2004; Busch 2010). As identified by Rogers Brubaker (2011: 1797–8), a number of primary instruments of nationalising language policies have been exercised in the post-Soviet world in order to privilege the national languages and reduce multilingualism. Among those are prescriptive rules and mandates, such as the use of specific languages in the contexts and settings designated as ‘state-related’ (the court, public administration, the media and others), rules about language tests and policies regarding the language of instruction in education. One major mechanism of linguistic control and discrimination has been the issue of citizenship. In contrast to the majority of post-Soviet states – in which the policy of an inclusive civic citizenship for all Soviet citizens resident in the state was adopted – at the outset of their independence in 1992, Estonia and
Latvia accepted the *ius sanguinis* principle of citizenship restoring the pre-Soviet era legal framework. This meant that those residents whose ancestors did not live in Estonia or Latvia before the Soviet annexation of 1940 – that is about a third of the population at the time and predominantly Russian speakers – were denied citizenship (Rannut 2008; Schmid 2008; Estonia 2013; Latvia 2013). In order to obtain Estonian or Latvian citizenship, the Russian-speaking ‘aliens’, or ‘migrants’, as they were labelled, were required to go through the process of naturalisation in which a rigorous national language test was a prerequisite, and thus a way of regulating access to privileges and statuses – not least the ability to fully participate in economic and political life. In education, changes to the Russian-medium teaching have occurred in all post-Soviet countries, while in the Baltic countries, the more stringent 60 per cent rule was introduced prescribing the percentage of the school curriculum to be taught in Russian-medium schools in the titular language (Verschik 2005; Hogan-Brun 2006; Rannut 2008; Schmid 2008). Moreover, this rule came with a warning that it was a mere ‘transitionary phase’ on the way to a universal institution of titular-only language medium education (Pavlenko 2008: 13). Following Brubaker, it can be concluded from the sociolinguistic dynamics after Communism that the trends regarding multilingualism and the maintenance of Russian in the post-Soviet states have in many ways been contrary to the general developments in world globalisation, for ‘while Western Europe seemed to be moving beyond the nation state, Eastern Europe and Eurasia appeared to be moving back to the nation–state entering not a post-national, but a post-multinational era’ (2011: 1785–6).

The challenges of the post-Soviet nationalising states have produced various shifts in the Russian-speaking identities along the choices outlined by Hirschman (1970) and Laitin (1998). In short, these are identified as ‘loyalty’, ‘exit’, ‘voice’ and ‘arms’. ‘Loyalty’ means compliant assimilation strategies which appear to be the strongest in the Baltic states. ‘Exit’ strategies can include either alienation and withdrawal from political participation (Hughes 2005; Ehala and Zabrodskaja this volume) or a departure, which may either be to Russia as the perceived mainland, or an outward migration in some other direction, for example, the large post-Soviet emigration of Kazakhstani Russian-speaking Germans to Germany and an exodus of the Baltic Russian speakers to European countries since 2009. The two final strategies indicate the choice for resistance: ‘voice’ stands for political mobilisation strategies in more tolerant societies, and ‘arms’ for an open conflict which might lead to violence against discrimination.
Throughout the twentieth century, political turmoil in Russia and the Soviet Union, the oppressive Communist regime and social traumas caused at least three waves of outward migration, which with the lifting of the Iron Curtain and opening of the Russian borders extended into a fourth wave or rather a free flow of Russian speakers, accounting for an ongoing ‘remarkable expansion of the Russian diaspora across the Western world’ (Byford 2009: 53). The first wave – about 1.5 to 2 million people in number – was the ‘White emigration’ escaping the aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution, the highly cultured ‘upper crust’ of Russian society who formed the core of the Russian communities in the Western world. The second one comprised about 3.5 million of the 9 million Soviet war prisoners, displaced persons and forced labourers; these were the people who managed to escape from returning home – which for them meant to be swallowed by Stalin’s labour camps – and remained in Europe (Tishkov 2008: 19). The third wave began as a trickle in the midst of the Cold War and grew from the 1970s when the Brezhnev regime slightly eased up and allowed some ethnically framed (mostly Jewish) political emigration. Formally the applications were made for Israel and Jewish ancestry had to be proven, but about half of those emigrants ended up in the US (Andrews 2012: 217). In sum, from 1951 to 1991, about 1.8 million left the Soviet Union, among them 1 million Jews (Tishkov 2008: 19).

As a result of the Soviet waves of emigration, sizeable Russian-speaking communities were established in France, the US, Israel, and later – since the Gorbachev perestroika – in Germany (Lewin-Epstein et al. 1997; Siegel 1997; Remennick 2007; Andrews 1999; 2012 and this volume; Isurin 2011). The Russian diaspora in the US is considered to be the most notable and powerful of all – it encompasses 10% of the total foreign-born population of the country, while 67.5% of the group fall within the well-educated and high-earning bracket (Tishkov 2008: 22).

In the post-Soviet period, the geography of Russian-speaking migration expanded and russophone communities have been rapidly developing in countries where they had little or no presence before, such as Finland (Protasova 2004), the UK (Byford 2009) and Italy (Perotto this volume). For example, in the UK only, the numbers are estimated to have reached 250,000 and growing (Byford 2009: 54 and 62 fn. 2). Provided the current level of Russia’s integration into the world’s systems, the flow of people which is sometimes counted as the fourth wave of migrants is, for the first time, multidirectional. With the burst in international travel and the distinction between the temporary and permanent stay abroad being
The Russian language, challenged by globalisation

Blurred, Russian-speaking communities now include the categories of tourists, students, temporary contract workers, property owners, dual-nationality citizens and others for whom Russia is no longer a cut-off land of eternal nostalgic longing. The trend for outward migration from Russia is expected to continue: according to the latest public opinion poll conducted in May 2013 by Russia’s sociological Levada Centre, today a fifth of all the respondents, 45% of students and 38% of professionals want to leave Russia and settle outside the former USSR (Levada 2013).

Like many modern migrant language communities, the new Russian-speaking diasporas are not so much ‘durable and reproducible forms of social solidarity’ but discursively constructed ‘networks of exchange’ and ‘performances of community’ which are fluid and virtual and emerge in the moments of enactment and interaction (Byford 2009: 56). Far from representing ethnic Russians alone, the post-multinational Russian-speaking networks appear to be supra-ethnic, incorporating all those whose origin was the former Soviet Union. Laitin calls these developing identities based on the non-ethnic shared characteristics ‘conglomerate identities’ (1998: 31). The collections of accounts, experiences, values and norms that compound the emigrants’ national identities are regularly articulated and reinforced through transnational associations in which symbolic and political borders are easily cut across (Zhukova Klausen 2011). In these exchanges, the Russian language serves as a key mobiliser for and a ‘unifying cultural marker’ of the multiethnic post-Soviet global imagined community abroad (Byford 2009: 59), demonstrating its peculiar rootedness in the Soviet Union. Ronald Grigor Suny (2012) explains the phenomenon of the ‘unifying cultural marker’ by arguing that unlike Tsarist Russia, ironically, the Soviet Union in a non-linear and partial way did succeed in providing for many peoples a homeland, a civic identity, and a kind of affective community.

Recent trends in global Russian

Both the historical and the recent trends in the globalisation of Russian provide evidence of its non-linear character. Since the millennium, the state of global Russian has proved to be highly dynamic and to be affected by not only disintegrative, centrifugal processes but, increasingly, by centripetal, integrative and mobilising ones. This fact has led some scholars to assert that after the initial period of retrenchment in the 1990s, the Russian language outside Russia has now moved to the stage of re-emergence (Tishkov 2008; Pavlenko 2012). This might mean that Brubaker’s description of the post-multinational condition as the one
that inevitably leads to the ‘one nation – one language’ outcome requires a further adjustment to the realities of global exchange.

One factor in the trend for Russian re-emergence is the deep contradiction in the Western-oriented post-Soviet societies between the accepted discourses of nation-building and the pressures for democratisation and globalisation (Janmaat 2008). To illustrate, despite a strong nationalisation trend, the position of the Russian speakers in the Baltic states has benefited from the democratic conditionality used by the EU at their accession to reinforce the adaptation of their legislation to the international standards and to improve the human rights of the Russian-speaking non-citizens (European Commission 1998–2003; EU Monitoring 2002). Arguably, the integration of post-Soviet states into the Western European organisations, including the Council of Europe and NATO, has facilitated the promotion of European values for civic nationhood and minority rights and the implementation of models of behaviour championed by those institutions. In particular, the Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages has had an impact on local minority legislation on citizenship and, at least to some extent, on the acknowledgement by local governments of the minorities’ linguistic rights and the consequent adjustment of the local policies (Galbreath 2005; Rights of National Minorities 2007; Schmid 2008, Newcity this volume). For example, under pressure from the EU and in fulfilment of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, both Estonia and Latvia have additionally accepted the *ius soli* principle of citizenship and have granted automatic citizenships to ‘alien’ children born in the countries from 1992 onwards (Estonia 2013; Latvia 2013). Against the odds, the number of people with ‘alien’ status is slowly going down: for example, in 2012 Estonia claimed only 6.8% non-citizens among its population as opposed to 32% in 1992 (Estonia 2013). In Latvia, the current percentage of non-citizens has also been reduced, standing now at 13.8% (to compare, in 2004 it was 20.8%) (UN Report 2013). To be fair, it also has to be said that the reduction has been achieved not only by naturalisation of non-citizens, but also by the ‘exit’ strategy chosen by masses of the republics’ non-citizens (Hughes 2005).

Moreover, after the initial shock, Russian speakers became more mobilised in using various measures aimed at the constructive re-establishment of their linguistic rights (the ‘voice’ identity option), and began to produce a more confident counter-discourse claiming Russian-speaking identities, demonstratively separate from those of the Russian ‘homeland’ (Cheskin 2012). From this position, they take a more assertive stance in the linguistic contestation by putting pressure on their respective governments, lobbying for a change of the local leg-
islation, conducting referenda and applying other relevant international models.

Among the recent developments in this respect was the attempt in February 2012 of the ‘Native Tongue’ movement of Russian speakers in Latvia to change the language regime in the country through a referendum which proposed to introduce Russian as the second official language. The referendum was lost – 75% of voters were against – but it also exposed the divisions in the country, and showed vividly that a significant minority – 24% of the population – supported a change of status for Russian (BBC 2012). In Ukraine, legislation has been changed in a more favourable direction for the status of Russian. Following a passionate debate, political protests and threats of resignations, on 3 July 2012 a law ‘On the Principles of the State Language Policy’ was passed by the Ukrainian parliament and was signed by Ukrainian president Viktor Ianukovich on 8 August 2012 (Prezident 2012). The law rebalances the position of the Russian versus the Ukrainian language, allowing it the status of an official regional language which can be now be claimed in the areas with at least 10% Russian-speaking population – that is in thirteen out of the twenty-seven Ukrainian regions (German 2012; see also Bowring in this volume). The new law in fact reconfirms the linguistic rights outlined in the European Charter that the Ukrainian parliament ratified in 1999; however, in comparison with the previous language legislation, the new law provides for more choice of language of instruction in education and the use of regional languages in the official domain.

The recent scholarly perspective on language as a commodity helps explain further the rise in symbolic value and the re-legitimation of Russian abroad, even in the states that have demonstrated a strong nationalising stance. Based on Pierre Bourdieu’s (1991) notion of language as symbolic capital exchangeable for material values, Duchêne (2009) and Heller (2010), among others, argue that in the new economy, language practices and linguistic attitudes deeply intersect with economic interests and the circulation of goods and money. The new assertive role that Russia has been playing in the global economy has led to the intensive commodification of the Russian language and, consequently, its revalorisation in many states that have established close economic links with Russia. While back in the Soviet period, the commodity of the Russian language was primarily linked to the export of Communist ideology, the new millennium brought for Russia new reasons for language commodification. The country entered a period of sustained oil- and gas-driven economic growth, which propelled it to the position of the fastest growing global investor and the fifteenth largest world economy (Mayant and Drahokoupil 2011). Moreover, Russia’s economic success spills over
to its neighbours as they share in the benefits from industries reliant on Russian petrochemicals (Mayant and Drahokoupil 2012). Tourism and business travel to Russia have boomed and, additionally, Russia’s growing economic prosperity and a shortage of low-qualified work force facilitated inward labour migration primarily from the former Soviet countries. In particular, in 2012, over 15 million foreign citizens arrived in the Russian Federation, and over 1.3 million work permits were issued to migrant workers (Federal’naia Migratsionnaia Sluzhba 2012). Almost 50% of those travelling to Russia from Tajikistan and about 40% of those arriving from Azerbaijan and Moldova come to Russia to seek work (Zadorin 2008: 25). An effect of economic migration, labour–remittance flow has become a significant aspect of Russia’s influence in the regional economic growth in the CIS countries, in particular, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan (Ilahi et al. 2009). In the years from 2001 to 2008, remittance outflows from the working migrants in Russia (of which 90% goes to the CIS countries) increased tenfold reaching $25 billion (Ilahi et al.: 4).

The growth of the Russian middle class and their average expendable income has generated a rise in demand for foreign tourism. Between 2006 and 2011, the year-on-year growth of Russian overseas tourism was 15%, reaching 14,405,900 in 2011 (Tiurina 2012). Consequently, increased demand for Russian in the service sector led to the emergence of its visibility in the linguistic landscapes of many European cities and holiday resorts. Also, teachers of Russian are now in demand at various top-quality resorts worldwide and new methodologies of Russian language teaching have been triggered by tourism (Protasova 2011). Pavlenko (2012) describes Russian appearing in such linguistically mediated areas of the service industry as restaurant menus, currency exchange bureaus, hotels, museums, shops, train stations and airports in a broad range of major European destinations popular with Russian visitors; and notes that in Finland, Turkey and Cyprus, Russian is omnipresent.

In many post-Soviet countries, Russian still prevails in the media, pop culture and sport (Pavlenko 2006). Russia has claimed ownership of the Soviet legacy of the ‘common information space’ and continues producing Russian-medium broadcasting for the CIS. All main Russian television channels are received in the former Soviet countries, while the broadcasting corporation Mir, specially targeting the CIS and the Baltic countries, reports 70 million viewers (Ryazanova-Clarke, this volume). The new technologies have facilitated the ‘virtualisation’ of the Russian language and its increasing use as a lingua franca of many global internet-based networks (Gorham 2011; Uffelmann 2011). By number of users – 50.81 million – Russia became in 2011 Europe’s leading internet market (Henni 2011), and as of autumn 2012, 46.8 million people in Russia used
the internet daily (FOM 2012), moving Russian to the second position after English among languages used on the internet (Smirnov 2013). The ‘death of distance’ linked with internet communication facilitates the rearticulation of Russian-speaking identity as a cyberspatial one, which in its turn redefines and ‘re-sutures’ (Laclau) the post-multinational imagined community (Saunders 2004; 2006).

Thus, the discursive regimes surrounding commodified global Russian destabilise the ‘discourses of pride’ (Heller and Duchêne 2012), which in post-Soviet states are associated with and legitimised by the ‘one nation – one language’ ideologies, promoting the view in which language, culture and identity are bound by territory, historical continuity and homogeneous culture. The national ‘discourses of pride’ come therefore increasingly into tension with the ‘discourse of profit’, which links access to the Russian language with access to a global flow of resources. The growing dominance of the ‘discourse of profit’ becomes a crucial factor responsible for producing the secondary valorisation of Russian.

As a final note to the recent trends, the intensified globalisation of Russian has raised the likelihood of the kind of international communication in which both sides are Russian native speakers, albeit using different varieties of Russian. As Mufwene points out, the world spread of a language usually takes place ‘at the cost of its structural integrity’ (2010: 43) and consequently its divergence according to the pluricentric model. The term ‘pluricentric languages’ introduced by Heinz Kloss (1952) refers to languages that have several speaking communities separated by local variants of the common language. Michael Clyne develops this notion further by stressing that the codification condition is essential for pluricentricity: for him, pluricentric languages are those that have ‘several interacting centres, each providing a national variety with at least some of its own (codified) norms’ (1992: 1). Extrapolating this onto Russian, it may be hypothesised that as the language becomes increasingly a variety used in a number of global localities independently of the metropolitan norm, its differential evolution will grow into the possibility of a number of standardised national varieties, or pluricentric Russians. Although much has been written about regional dialect varieties of Russian within Russia, Berdicevskis (this volume) begins a debate that places Russian on the scale of pluricentricity at the global level.

**THIS VOLUME**

In the literature to date, the situation around the Russian language abroad after the collapse of the Soviet Union has been discussed primarily
in relation to nation-building and nationalisms in the individual new independent states (Shlapentokh et al. 1994; Kolstoe 1995; Melvin 1995; Chinn and Kaiser 1996; Brubaker 1996; 2011; Mirsky 1997; Laitin 1998; Smith et al. 1998; Janmaat 2000; Galbreath 2005; Davé 2007; Galbreath and Muižnieks 2009, and others). Much attention has been given to the questions of language policies in the successor states, especially those in support of the titular languages (Ozolins 1994; Rannut 1994; Huskey 1995; Arel 1995; 2002; Davé 1996; Krouglov 1999; 2002; Wright 2000; Landau and Kellner-Heinkele 2001; Bilaniuk 2005; Hogan-Brun 2005; 2007; Hogan-Brun et al. 2005; 2008; Metuzāle-Kangere and Ozolins 2005; Verschik 2005, and others). In various levels of detail, the Russian language has also been discussed in relation to the bilingual and multilingual settings in specific countries (Kreindler 1997; Polinsky 1997; 2006; Kagan and Dillon 2001; Mustajoki and Protassova 2004; Protasova 2004; Mechkovskaya 2005; Pavlenko 2006; 2008; Schmitter 2000, and others), including works focusing on public sphere environments (for example, Bilaniuk 2004; Zelenin 2007; Besters-Dilger 2009; Elia 2011). Other studies have explored linguo-cultural contact (for example, Woollis 1995; Andrews 1999; Bilaniuk 2004; 2010; Taranenko 2007; Verschik 2008), linguistic and cultural attitudes (for example, Fournier 2002; Schlyter 2004; Korth 2005; Predi 2005; Ciscel 2007; 2008; Ehala 2009; Kulyk 2010; 2011), the various aspects of diaspora (Lebedeva 1995; Savoskul 2001; Münn and Ohliger 2003; Kosmarskaia, 2006, among others), linguistic human rights (for example, Druviete 1997), and other clines of investigation. With regard to the countries which have experienced several waves of emigration of Russian speakers, much of the studies concern the questions of bilingualism, language maintenance and attrition, diasporic identities, and teaching heritage speakers. Of this work, notable is the literature focusing on Israel (Niznik 2005; 2011; Fialkova and Yelenevskaya 2007; Remennick 2007; 2011; Elia 2011; Golan and Muchnik 2011; Kopeliovich 2011), Germany (Becker 2003; Struck-Soboleva 2006; Zhdanov 2006; Bakhmutova 2011), Austria (Pfandl 1998; Pfandl’ 2004), Finland (Protasova 2004; Protasova 2005; Lähteenmäki and Vanhala-Aniszewski 2010), France (Golubeva-Monatkina 1993; 1995; 2004), Canada (Schaarschmidt 2008; 2012; Golubeva-Monatkina 2010; Makarova 2012), the USA (Polinsky 1997; 2000; 2006; Andrews 1999; 2006; 2012; Bermel and Kagan 2000; Kagan and Dillon 2001; 2010; Polinskaia 2010; Dubinin and Polinsky 2012), Japan (Nikiporets-Takigawa 2009) and Belgium (Stangé-Zhirovova 1999). A comprehensive comparative analysis of self-identification in Russian-speaking migrant communities in three countries – Germany, Israel and the US – has been recently conducted by Isurin (2011).
Slightly separate stands a strand of the Russian-based linguistic research following the end of Communism that explored the specifics of archaic Russian forms and ‘deviations’ from the current metropolitan norm in the speech of the surviving émigrés from the early ‘waves’ of migration (Karaulov 1995; Zemskaia 2001; Glovinskaia 2001a; 2001b). This work was engendered by the Russian national quest of discovery in relation to the ‘other’ Russian culture developed in exile, and is slightly tinted with nostalgia for the lost heritage.

Building on the existing body of knowledge, this volume presents a study which combines chapters across the traditional post-Soviet/Western world divide, and focuses on the challenges experienced by the dislocated Russian and Russian-speaking identities in flux in various locations around the globe. In 1998, David Laitin identified the Russian speakers outside Russia as an emerging new category of identity, and a new type of community in crisis and shock. Fifteen years later, the authors of this book collectively convey the idea that the Russian language and its communities outside the metropolis continue to produce tensions and discontents, although the current stage of globalisation adds to the situation more fluidity and less inevitability than may be gaged from Laitin’s conclusions. Written within a broadly conceived socio-linguistic perspective, the volume embraces a variety of frameworks, including the perspectives of language policy, conversational analysis, quantitative study of pluricentricity, linguistic vitality and others. The chapters explore the multiple issues connected with the current state of global Russian and with the ways in which the deterritorialised identities of Russian speakers are being constructed as linguistic minorities in various socio-political configurations and parts of the world. Taken as a whole, the contributions produce an in-depth vision of Russian linguistic dislocation, pinpointing the non-linear quality of this condition and the tensions between the centrifugal and the centripetal forces framing it.

The volume consists of ten chapters presenting to the reader case studies according to five fundamental themes illustrating the current stage of globalisation of Russian. Part I deals with the tensions related to the legal status of Russian in the post-Soviet states. It opens with Michal Newcity’s chapter offering an overview of the situation of minority language rights across the former Soviet republics. Newcity estimates the level of legal protection for Russian speakers and their linguistic identities as provided by the local legislation, and places these developments within the global legal context provided by the UN, Council of Europe and European Union treaties. This is followed by Bill Bowring’s case study of Ukraine’s stormy history of implementation of the Council of Europe’s 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.
Bowring discovers a deep division between the European Charter, the underlying philosophy of which is the protection of cultural and linguistic diversity, and its application in a country in which Russian is so widely spoken. Having challenged both contemporary linguo-national myths comprising the resurfacing debates, one about Ukraine as a victim of the Russian genocide in the 1930s Holodomor, the other that Russian language is a victim of Ukrainian state-building, Bowring concludes that the European Charter is not necessarily a solution to the vexed question of the status of the Russian language in Ukraine.

Part II focuses on the tensions related to the contested symbolic value of Russian drawing on the examples of, respectively, Belarus and Ukraine. Curt Woolhiser’s study of the most Russified post-Soviet state – Belarus – explores the interface between actual language use, language attitudes and national identity. Woolhiser examines both Belarusian linguistic demographics and the metalinguistic discourses of various linguistic actors in order to identify the recurring patterns of identity construction employed not only by individuals but entire speech communities. He argues that Belarus is a post-Soviet paradox: uniquely, it displays a weak link between national self-identification and the use of titular language, in a manner similar to European countries such as Austria and Ireland rather than other post-Soviet states. However, the linguistic ideologies, especially the currently popular ‘one nation – one language’ belief, are responsible for producing a complex linguistic subjectivity and keeping the status of Russian as the national language of Belarus contested. To expand on the theme of linguistic subjectivity, in the succeeding chapter, Volodymyr Kulyk uses focus group discussions in different parts of Ukraine to reveal the explicit arguments and implicit assumptions regarding the roles of Russian. Like Woolhiser, he places language ideology in the centre of linguistic opinions and demonstrates a considerable level of congruence between the elite and popular discourses. The ukrainophone/russophone divide is expected and duly detected, but Kulyk’s argument is that everything is not as simple as it seems and that dynamics can be traced towards a balance in which, alongside a widespread acceptance of the symbolic edge for Ukrainian, there is also an acknowledgement across the regions of the equal status of Russian and Ukrainian as the two actually used languages in most of the domains.

Part III moves specifically to Russian-speaking communities and explores participants’ identity perceptions, performances and negotiations. The section begins with the analysis of the Russian-language-speaking community in Italy formed by the last wave of emigration. Monica Perotto develops David Laitin’s notion of the conglomerate,
arguing that the Russian-speaking community abroad today is global and transnational, using Russian as a lingua franca. Perotto analyses the level of language maintenance and attrition in bilingual families and correlates those to the time they have spent in Italy. As for linguistic perceptions, she concludes that in Western countries such as Italy, the Russian language might not be the key factor of identity construction as the respondents of her surveys opt for cultural and psychological elements of identification. Martin Ehala and Anastassia Zabrodskaja frame their work within the paradigm of ethnolinguistic vitality, applying it to the groups of Russian speakers in Estonia. Similarly to Perotto, Ehala and Zabrodskaja question the conventional view about the uniformity of Russian-speaking communities, and present a complex and nuanced picture of Russian–Estonian linguistic and cultural contact and developing identities within varied subgroups and clusters. The theme of identity performances is further explored by Claudia Zbenovich who has drawn attention to the context of the culture-embedded intergenerational everyday conversations in Israel. Zbenovich finds that the Soviet-born parents’ cultural assumptions, including those of the appropriate child rearing style, are brought into everyday conversations with their Israeli-born children, causing communicational tensions and clashes.

The subject of the specific linguistic features of global Russian is developed in Part IV of the book. Here, David Andrews presents a subtle analysis of the two pathways in the pluricentric Russian language’s global development evidenced by the two sites of Russian–English language contact: third-wave émigré Russian in the US, and the Russian of the metropolis exposed to English influences and borrowings. Andrews charts the semantic evolution that English lexical items undertake when they lose their sociocultural moorings and become part of a different – mainland Russian – language culture. Moreover, the shifts are also stylistic; as Andrews demonstrates, English in Russian easily changes register, moving to identify slangs and criminal argot. Conversely, the direct contact situation and bilingualism of Russian speakers in the US and the assimilationist pressures of American society are the conditions that prevent the borrowings from breaking free from their original meanings. Instead, the émigré Russian of the third generation develops a high level of semantic extension, not typical for ‘Russian Russian’. Discussion of pluricentric trends of global Russian continues in Aleksandrs Berdicevskis’ chapter, which traces lexical divergences between metropolitan Russian and Latvian Russian. Berdicevskis argues that in the situation of reduced contact with the mainland, the split between different Russian language codes has already happened. The Russian language in Latvia is rapidly developing regional divergences and moving towards
semi-endonormativity, the condition whereby the codex and models are developed predominantly within Latvia. Part V, consisting of the final chapter, by Lara Ryazanova-Clarke, rounds up the discussion of global Russian by addressing the question of how this notion is construed and commodified from the metropolis. She analyses the use of Russian language as soft power through the example of the broadcasting corporation Mir, which beams its russophone cultural products to the post-Soviet states. Ryazanova-Clarke pinpoints the tools used by the multimodal discourse of Mir in constructing a sense of homogeneity in the post-Soviet collective imaginary, and argues that the various types of knowledge frames carrying this meaning – be they the insular remnants of the Soviet cultural nostalgia or those borrowed from the globalised outside world – appear conflicting and fluid, and the success of Mir in the symbolic struggle over the post-Soviet world’s imagination is far from being a foregone conclusion.

NOTES

1. Ammon (2010: 109) provides the figures for 2005, according to which the number of Russian native speakers in the world stood at 145 million; and the number of the native and the second-language speakers of Russian as 255 million. Tishkov (2008) quotes the respective figures as 147–150 million and 113–120 million. The Head of the ‘Russkii Mir Foundation’ Viacheslav Nikonov, however, has claimed that there were more Russian speakers living abroad than in the Russian Federation (Nikonov 2012).

2. Among the peoples of the Middle Volga, Tatar was the language of interethnic communication. Supported by a strong literacy tradition, Tatar speakers were slow in adopting Russian, so that throughout the seventeenth century the Ambassadorial Department of the Russian court had on its staff Russian–Tatar translators and interpreters. The expansion of Russian to Siberia was faster and produced pidgin languages spoken by the local populations (Belikov and Krysin 2001: 239–42).

3. Under the rule of Peter the Great, German was kept as the official language of the Baltic territories, Swedish in Finland and Polish in the Kingdom of Poland (Belikov and Krysin 2001; Pavlenko 2006: 79).


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PART ONE

Russian and Its Legal Status
Many New Independent States (NIS) have experienced (but, frequently, not resolved) conflicting pressures to establish a national language as an exercise in nation building, and to protect the rights of their ethno-linguistic minorities. These powerfully competing demands have been felt to varying degrees in all of the nations of the ‘near abroad’. The legal regimes in these nations have sought to strike a balance between the need to establish and promote the use of a national language while protecting the rights of linguistic minorities – in particular, the Russian-speaking minority. The legal provisions applicable to the Russian language and the Russian-speaking communities in the ‘near abroad’ consist of a variety of domestic legislation – constitutions, laws on language, citizenship, elections, education, the media and so forth.

In addition to this domestic legislation, in a majority of the nations of the NIS there is a substantial international component. All of the post-Soviet countries are members of the United Nations, a majority of them are members of the Council of Europe, and three have joined the European Union. Each of these international organisations has adopted legally binding instruments addressing minority linguistic rights. These international instruments take on added significance because several of the former Soviet republics have adopted constitutional provisions assimilating international treaty obligations to the status of domestic law. As a result, international law on the subject of minority language rights has assumed great significance for this discussion.

In the remainder of this chapter, I will analyse how the applicable international law – primarily treaties adopted under the auspices of the Council of Europe – affects the Russian-speaking minorities in the ‘near abroad’. In doing so, I will examine in detail the experience of two former Soviet republics – Armenia and Latvia – to illustrate different ways in
which the international legal regime impacts linguistic minorities in the new states.

RUSSIAN-SPEAKING COMMUNITIES IN THE ‘NEAR ABROAD’

Before turning to a consideration of the applicable provisions of international law, a brief discussion of the Russian-speaking communities in the ‘near abroad’ is warranted. In Table 1.1, I have assembled data concerning ethnic and linguistic identity from the first post-Soviet censuses conducted in the new states. All of these nations except Uzbekistan have conducted censuses during the period from 1999 to 2004.

The census data reveal several notable features of the Russian-speaking communities in the ‘near abroad’. First, the percentage of the population that speaks Russian as its mother tongue ranges from less than one percent (Armenia) to 37.5% (Latvia). Second, the link between ethnic and linguistic identity is imperfect: in all of the nations for which data are available, the number of people who specify their mother tongue as Russian exceeds the number of people who identify themselves as Russian. This differential is especially substantial in Ukraine, where approximately 3 million more individuals claimed Russian as their mother tongue than identified their nationality as Russian (see Kulyk in this volume). In Belarus, approximately 1.4 million individuals speak Russian as their mother tongue, but are not ethnic Russians. Finally, a substantial percentage of the population in the nations of the ‘near abroad’ speak Russian as a second language or as a foreign language. In those nations where data about this category of Russian speakers was included in the census, the percentage who acknowledged speaking Russian as a foreign language ranged from less than 10% of the population (Azerbaijan – 9.32%) to more than 60% (Lithuania – 60.28%).

This census data reveals another unique characteristic of the Russian-speaking communities in the ‘near abroad’. While ethnic Russians are a minority in each of these states, Russian speakers are in a majority in several of them. Adding the census data in Table 1.1 (the total number of people who speak Russian as their mother tongue and the total number who speak Russian as a foreign language) reveals that Russian speakers constitute a majority of the population in Estonia (71.88%), Latvia (81.19%), Lithuania (68.24%) and Ukraine (58.98%), while Russian speakers account for a significant minority of the population in Georgia (35.9%), Kyrgyzstan (46.51%) and Turkmenistan (29.32%). In both Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, Russian speakers constitute less than 20% of
<table>
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<th>Nation</th>
<th>Year of census</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Number of ethnic Russians</th>
<th>Russians as percentage of population</th>
<th>Number of individuals who speak Russian as mother tongue</th>
<th>Percentage of population that speaks Russian as mother tongue</th>
<th>Number who speak Russian as mother tongue, but who are not ethnic Russians</th>
<th>Number who speak Russian as a foreign language</th>
<th>Number who usually speak Russian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3,213,011</td>
<td>14,660</td>
<td>0.46%</td>
<td>29,563</td>
<td>0.92%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>7,953,438</td>
<td>141,687</td>
<td>1.78%</td>
<td>167,346</td>
<td>2.10%</td>
<td>26,686</td>
<td>741,094</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>10,045,237</td>
<td>1,141,731</td>
<td>11.37%</td>
<td>2,420,075</td>
<td>24.10%</td>
<td>1,385,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>6,308,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1,370,052</td>
<td>351,178</td>
<td>25.63%</td>
<td>406,755</td>
<td>29.66%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>578,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>4,371,535</td>
<td>67,671</td>
<td>1.55%</td>
<td>83,007</td>
<td>1.90%</td>
<td>16,355</td>
<td>1,486,350</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>14,953,126</td>
<td>4,479,620</td>
<td>29.96%</td>
<td>4,479,527</td>
<td>29.96%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>8,193,866</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>4,822,938</td>
<td>603,201</td>
<td>12.51%</td>
<td>710,329</td>
<td>14.73%</td>
<td>107,523</td>
<td>1,533,060</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2,377,383</td>
<td>793,423</td>
<td>29.58%</td>
<td>914,915</td>
<td>37.59%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1,038,700</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3,483,072</td>
<td>219,789</td>
<td>6.31%</td>
<td>277,318</td>
<td>7.96%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>2,100,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3,383,332</td>
<td>201,219</td>
<td>5.95%</td>
<td>386,706</td>
<td>11.26%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>540,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>6,127,493</td>
<td>68,171</td>
<td>1.11%</td>
<td>69,012</td>
<td>1.44%</td>
<td>1,640</td>
<td>1,146,802</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>4,483,300</td>
<td>33,900</td>
<td>7.45%</td>
<td>348,800</td>
<td>7.78%</td>
<td>51,000</td>
<td>965,700</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>48,240,902</td>
<td>8,334,441</td>
<td>17.28%</td>
<td>11,273,070</td>
<td>23.37%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>17,177,470</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia 2003: Table 5.2.
\(^c\) Gasiuk 2001: 214–15, Table 11.1, 1.
\(^d\) Lithuania, Eesti Riiklik Statistikaamet, and Latvia 2003: 26, 37.
\(^e\) Beridze and Naughton 2004: 78–9, Tables 24 and 25.
\(^g\) Kudabaev and Abdymomunov 2000: 70, 110, 112, Table 3.1, Table 3.8, Table 3.9.
\(^h\) Lithuania, Eesti Riiklik Statistikaamet, and Latvia 2003: 26, 37, supra note 6.
\(^i\) Lithuania, Eesti Riiklik Statistikaamet, and Latvia 2003: 26, 37, supra note 6.
\(^k\) Shabozov 2005: 3.
\(^l\) State Committee on Statistics of Turkmenistan 1997: 12.
the population. The statistics available for Belarus are slightly different – 24.1% of the total population identified Russian as their mother tongue; 62.8% as the language they usually speak at home; and 17.1% as another language spoken fluently (Gasiuk 2001: 214–15). Comparable census data are not available for Armenia, Kazakhstan and Moldova.

Russian served as a lingua franca for the Russian Empire prior to the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and, after the Revolution, for the Soviet Union until its collapse in 1991 (Pavlenko 2006: 78). It is hardly surprising, then, that in the current post-imperial, post-Soviet incarnation of the ‘near abroad’, Russian continues to be spoken by a large number of individuals who are not ethnically Russian. But this characteristic makes Russian in the post-Soviet states a very atypical minority language and the Russian-speaking communities there a less-than-prototypical linguistic minority. The European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, for example, defines regional and minority languages as languages that are:

1. traditionally used within a given territory of a State by nationals of that State who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the State’s population; and
2. different from the official language(s) of that State.

The Charter also specifies that ‘regional and minority languages’ do not include ‘either dialects of the official language(s) of the State or the languages of migrants’ (Council of Europe 1992: art. 1(a)).

Under this definition, Russian (even if it is not specified as an official language) might not be considered a minority language in those nations where individuals who use Russian (that is, those who speak Russian as their mother tongue and those who speak it as a second language) constitute a majority of the population.

In the following section I will analyse the international law provisions relating to minority language rights and discuss how the anomalous status of Russian in the ‘near abroad’ affects the application of these international instruments to Russian and Russian speakers.

THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONTEXT

The protection of linguistic rights as part of the broader effort to protect minorities from discrimination has been recognised in international treaties and declarations since the post-World War I era of the League of Nations (Lezertúa Rodríguez 2010: 13). More expansive calls for the protection of minority languages and their speakers followed World
War II. The 1948 *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, for example, stated that everyone was entitled to the rights and freedoms specified in the Declaration ‘without distinction of any kind, such as . . . language’ (United Nations 1948: art. 2). Nearly twenty years later, the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* included stronger, more explicit non-discrimination provisions (United Nations 1966a: arts. 2(1) and 26) as well as an affirmative statement of the rights of members of minority linguistic groups to use their own languages (art. 27). In addition, in the *Convention against Discrimination in Education*, adopted in 1960, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation declared a right for minorities to educate their members in their own language (UNESCO 1960: art. 5 (c)).

Though many of the nations of the ‘near abroad’ are parties to these UN-sponsored resolutions and conventions, such provisions tend to be merely declarative, somewhat vague, and largely hortatory. There is no instrumentality available to enforce the rights recognised by these documents. The Council of Europe and the European Union, however, have adopted considerably more elaborate, detailed and enforceable instruments regarding minority language rights.

Nine of the fourteen post-Soviet states outside Russia are members of the Council of Europe: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. Only Belarus and the five Central Asian former Soviet republics are not members.

The Council of Europe has adopted three major documents relating to the rights of minority linguistic communities. The *Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities* was signed on 1 February 1995, and entered into force on 1 February 1998 (Council of Europe 1995). All of the former Soviet republics that are members of the Council of Europe have ratified that document, which is a comprehensive treaty, intended to protect the rights of national minorities. However, the *Framework Convention* does not impose direct legal obligations on signatory nations; direct, binding legal obligations will be created only after the domestic legislation of the signatory nations is brought into conformity with it. The *Framework Convention* does include a series of undertakings to guarantee equal rights and promote minority cultures. Several of these provisions relate specifically to the right of minorities to use their languages (Council of Europe 1995: art. 10). In addition, signatory states undertake to promote the conditions necessary for national minorities ‘to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage’ (art. 5 (1)). Signatories to the *Framework Convention* also acknowledge ‘that the right to freedom of expression of every person belonging to a
national minority includes freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas in the minority language’ (art. 9 (1)) and recognise the right of members of national minorities:

- to use their minority languages ‘freely and without interference’ in private and in public, orally and in writing, as well as before administrative authorities (art. 10 (1));
- to use their names in their minority language (art. 11 (1));
- to display information of a private nature in their minority languages (art. 11 (2));
- to display topographical names in their minority languages (art. 11 (3)); and
- to learn their minority languages and to ‘have adequate opportunities for being taught the minority language or for receiving instruction in this language’ (art. 14).

The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe is charged with monitoring the implementation of the Framework Convention by the signatory states (art. 24 (1)).

The Council of Europe has also adopted a convention that specifically addresses issues relating to minority languages, the above-mentioned European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which was signed in 1992 and entered into force in 1998 (Council of Europe 1992). Of the nations of the ‘near abroad’, only Armenia and Ukraine have signed and ratified the European Charter; Azerbaijan, Moldova and Russia have signed but not ratified it.10

Unlike the Framework Convention or the European Convention on Human Rights (see below), the European Charter does not treat the issue of minority languages as a human rights issue. Rather than conceptualising the problem as protecting the rights of an identifiable group of people, it seeks to protect languages themselves (see Bowring this volume). As such, it places certain legal obligations on signatory states. Signatory states are required to adopt certain provisions specified by the European Charter in their domestic legal systems. For example, in Article 7 (2) the parties undertake to eliminate ‘unjustified distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference relating to the use of a regional or minority language’. This provision also states that ‘[t]he adoption of special measures’ to promote equality between the users of minority languages and the rest of the population will ‘not be considered to be an act of discrimination against the users of more widely-used languages’ (Council of Europe 1992: art. 7 (2)). The European Charter also provides a series of undertakings concerning the teaching and promotion of regional and minority languages, the use of minority languages by
government agencies and authorities, and the promotion of the use of minority languages in the media and other cultural activities (Dunbar 2001; Woehrling 2005; Ó Riagáin 2008: 5; European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 2010: 8).

One of the most unique features of the European Charter is the monitoring mechanism. Signatories are required to submit to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe periodic public reports on the policies and measures they have adopted to comply with the European Charter. The first such report is required within one year from the date on which the European Convention enters into force for the reporting country; subsequently, reports are required every three years (Council of Europe 1992: art. 15). These national periodic reports are reviewed by a Committee of Experts, which in turn submits its own report to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (art. 16). Based on the report of the Committee of Experts and any comments by concerned organisations, the Committee of Ministers may make recommendations to the responsible authorities in the reporting country (art. 16 (4)).

The third major instrument promulgated by the Council of Europe that bears on the question of minority linguistic rights is the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Council of Europe 1950). All of the nations of the ‘near abroad’ that are members of the Council of Europe are parties to the ECHR as it is a condition of membership (Council of Europe 1949: art. 3). In many respects this is the most significant of the three international instruments, even if it is the least specific, because the ECHR applies to all nine of the post-Soviet nations that are members of the Council of Europe and it can provide direct – albeit limited – legal remedies.

The ECHR lists eighteen basic civil and political rights that signatories to the convention must observe. The only provision that explicitly relates to language is Article 14, which prohibits discrimination on any ground, including language. On several occasions the European Court of Human Rights, which is charged with ensuring ‘the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto’ (Council of Europe 1950: art. 19), has considered whether the nations of the ‘near abroad’ have violated Article 14 of the ECHR by discriminating on the basis of language. Other language-related cases arise under various provisions of the ECHR.

While the Council of Europe has been the principal actor in formulating and promulgating international standards for the protection and promotion of minority languages, the European Union has also had a significant impact on language law and policy in the ‘near abroad’. To date, only the three Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – have
joined the European Union, but inasmuch as one of the criteria for accession to the European Union is a ‘respect for and protection of minorities’, the treatment of the Russian-speaking communities in the Baltic states was a major cause for concern when their applications for membership were considered (Pentassuglia 2001: 11). During this period, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe was sharply critical of the language and citizenship laws in Estonia and Latvia and the Organisation’s criticisms in turn influenced the conditions set by the European Union as a prerequisite to membership (Johns 2003: 682). As a result of the Organisation’s criticisms, both countries modified their laws on language and citizenship (Ozolins 1999: 34–6).

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE LEGAL STATUS OF RUSSIAN LANGUAGE IN THE ‘NEAR ABROAD’

Assessing the legal status of the Russian language and the legal protection afforded to Russian speakers in the ‘near abroad’ requires consideration of several basic factors: (1) the ethnic and linguistic makeup of each republic (in other words, what percentage of the population speaks Russian as their first language as opposed to the titular national language); (2) provisions in the national constitution establishing a national language or languages, as well as constitutional provisions regarding the rights of linguistic minorities; (3) the provisions of various legislative acts – laws on language, citizenship, broadcast and print media, and so on – that establish the national language(s) and that affect the rights of linguistic minorities to use their languages; (4) the extent to which international treaty obligations create enforceable rights; and (5) the extent to which these constitutional and legislative provisions relating to minority language rights are adequately enforced.

The domestic (national) laws governing language generally take several different forms: constitutional provisions specifying the official national or state language; constitutional and legislative prohibitions on discrimination on the basis of language; statutes specifically adopted to determine the use of language in a variety of circumstances (what language or languages may be used in conducting official government business, how names are to be officially registered, and so on); media and education laws that specify under what circumstances these activities may be conducted in minority languages; and citizenship or electoral laws that require a familiarity with the national language as a condition of either citizenship or standing for elected office.

A review of the constitutional provisions specifying the state language
The fourteen nations of the ‘near abroad’ reveals that in only one case – Belarus – the Russian language is given the status, along with Belarusian, of the official language (Belarus 1994: art. 17; see also Woolhiser in this volume). As such, Russian would not be considered a minority language in Belarus as that phrase is defined in the European Charter. The constitutions of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan both invest Russian with an official status, while the constitutions of Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Ukraine specifically mention the Russian language in the context of stating that Russian and other minority languages will be protected. Most of the former Soviet nations also include non-discrimination provisions in their constitutions that expressly include language as one of the bases on which discrimination is forbidden. The non-discrimination provisions in the Belarusian and Latvian constitutions are open-ended and do not include a list of the categories on which discrimination is forbidden.

It is not possible in a single chapter to analyse the applicable law in each of the new states, so I have chosen to illustrate the interplay between domestic law and international law on this subject and in this region by examining the situations in two former Soviet republics: Armenia and Latvia. These two nations were chosen because they illustrate different aspects of this issue. Armenia has a small Russian-speaking minority, but is a signatory to the European Charter and is subject to its procedures. Latvia has a large Russophone minority and has been forced to defend its language policies against accusations of violating the provisions of the ECHR.

Armenia

Armenia is one of the most homogeneous of the former Soviet republics ethnically as well as linguistically, while the Russian-speaking minority in the country is relatively miniscule. According to data gathered in the 2001 census, of a total population of 3.2 million individuals, 97.9% identify themselves ethnically as Armenian and 97.7% of the population claim Armenian as their ‘mother tongue’. Of the other languages spoken in the country, only Russian and Yezidian are claimed as the mother tongue by an appreciable number of people – in both cases approximately 1% of the total population. Yezidian is spoken almost exclusively by the Yezidi, the second most numerous ethnic group in Armenia. According to the 2001 census data, there are 40,620 Yezidi in Armenia (1.26% of the population), more than three-quarters of whom identify Yezidian as their mother tongue. A total of 31,799 people – approximately 1% of the population (0.99%) – claim Yezidian as their

Ethnic Russians are the third most numerous ethnic group in the country, numbering 14,660 (0.46% of the total population). However, more than twice as many people (29,563 – 0.92% of the population) claim Russian as their mother tongue. Of the individuals who claim Russian as their mother tongue, almost half – 14,728 – identify themselves as ethnic Armenians.

The relationship between ethnicity and language in Armenia is further blurred by the fact that only 88% of the individuals who identify themselves as ethnic Russians claim Russian as their mother tongue (National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia 2003: 167). Finally, it should be noted that while Armenian is the mother tongue of the overwhelming majority of people in the Republic of Armenia, Russian-Armenian bilingualism is also extremely high. It is estimated that 90% of the adult population speak both languages (Gevorgyan 2006: 474).

Under the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, adopted in July 1995, ‘[t]he state language of the Republic of Armenia is Armenian’ (Armenia 1995: art 12). The Constitution also prohibits ‘any discrimination based on . . . language’ (art. 14.1) and provides that national minorities ‘shall have the right to the preservation and development of their traditions, religion, language, and culture’ (art. 41).

These general constitutional provisions are expanded upon in the Law on Language, adopted on 17 April 1993, which establishes the ‘basic provisions of policy of the Republic of Armenia with respect to language, regulates the status of language, and the language relations of organs of state authority and administrations, enterprises, establishments, and organizations’ (Armenia 1993: Preamble). Under this law, the state language is Armenian, ‘which shall serve all spheres of life of the republic’ (Armenia 1993: art. 1), and the official language is literary Armenian (art. 2).27

The Armenian Law on Language gives no specific, official status to the Russian language, though it contains general provisions regarding minority languages. While there are several provisions that anticipate and permit the use of minority languages, and Article 1 contains a guarantee of ‘the free use of the languages of national minorities’ (Armenia 1993: art. 1), the clear thrust of the law is to establish the centrality of Armenian in that country’s governmental, educational, organizational and commercial life. The Law also specifies that the Republic of Armenia will promote the dissemination and preservation of the Armenian language among Armenians abroad. Under the Law on Language, literary
Armenian is established as the language of teaching and education, though in minority communities education may be offered in the minority language, but only in accordance with the national policy, support, and the compulsory teaching of Armenian (art. 2). Government bodies are obliged to conduct business in Armenian; organisations of national minorities are obliged to create documents, letterhead, and seals in Armenian, though they may include parallel translations into their language (art 4). The Law also imposes certain linguistic obligations on citizens; for example, it states that ‘[i]n official speech, citizens of the Republic of Armenia are obliged to ensure the purity of the language’ (art. 3).

As a signatory to the European Charter, Armenia is subject to its monitoring procedures to evaluate how it is being applied and implemented. Those procedures call for a Committee of Experts to examine the status of regional and minority languages in the signatory state and to report to the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, which will then formulate recommendations on what changes are needed to increase compliance with the European Charter. Subsequent examinations may occur to determine how the local authorities have responded to the recommendations.

The initial monitoring cycle for Armenia began with the submission of a periodical report by the republic in September 2003. In September 2004, the Committee of Experts visited Armenia. Members of the Committee travelled to several villages, met with various government officials, and subsequently prepared a report that included a list of findings and recommendations for the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, which was submitted in November 2005. The government of Armenia was invited to comment on the report of the Committee of Experts (Council of Europe 2006a). Based on the report and the government’s comments, the Committee of Ministers formulated recommendations for the government of Armenia, which were adopted on 14 June 2006 (Council of Europe 2006b). These recommendations reflect concerns about regional and minority languages generally and several non-Russian minority languages in particular (Assyrian, Yezidi, Kurdish, Greek), but in principle, demonstrate satisfaction with the extent to which the Russian language is protected and promoted in the republic (Council of Europe 2006b).

The Armenian government submitted a second periodical report to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe in February 2008. The Committee of Experts conducted interviews in Armenia in September 2008 and submitted a report to the Committee of Ministers in April 2009 (Council of Europe 2009a). This report sought to provide information on
developments since the first monitoring cycle and to assess the extent to which the Armenian authorities had implemented the 2006 recommendations of the Committee of Ministers. In their report, the Committee of Experts commented on the general conditions for regional and minority languages in Armenia in mainly laudatory terms. With respect to Russian, the Committee of Experts reported:

The Russian language is used not only by ethnic Russians but also by members of other national minorities. The situation of the Russian language in education, the media, in relations with regional and local administration and in the cultural field is good. Complaints were received regarding textbooks, which are imported from the Russian Federation, and as a result differ from the Armenian syllabus. (Council of Europe 2009a: 36)

On the basis of the Committee of Experts’ report, the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers then formulated recommendations addressed to the Armenian government for bringing their practices more fully into compliance with the Charter. These recommendations were adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 23 September 2009, and called on Armenia to formulate concrete policies to promote the teaching and use of regional and minority languages, but made no recommendations specifically relating to Russian (Council of Europe 2009b).

Armenia’s experience as a signatory to the European Charter provides an excellent example of how international legal obligations can help shape national laws and policies towards linguistic minorities.

Latvia

In the post-Soviet era, Latvia’s policies and laws with respect to the minority language communities, principally the Russian-speaking community, have excited substantial controversy and criticism. The laws on language, education and citizenship have been viewed by many as discriminating against those minority language communities while seeking to reinforce the status of Latvian as the state language.

Latvia’s Constitution specifies Latvian as its official state language and makes no mention of minority language rights (Latvia 1922: art. 4). The government does permit education in languages other than Latvian in places where Latvian-speaking students are in a minority, though official policy calls for a gradual transition to education in Latvian (Schmid 2008: 10–11). It has adopted very strict language requirements in its citizenship law, stating that applicants for naturalisation must pass a
language test by which they must comply with the level of fluency whereby a person:

1. completely understands information of a social and official nature;
2. can freely tell about, converse and answer questions regarding topics of a social nature;
3. can fluently read and understand any instructions, directions and other text of a social nature; and
4. can write an essay on a topic of a social nature given by the Commission.

(Latvia 2013, Sections 2, 3 (b) and 20)

The national election law also requires that candidates for election to the national legislature must demonstrate competence in the Latvian language (Jordan 2003: 670).

Latvia joined the Council of Europe in 1995 and became a member of the European Union in 2004. The country signed the Framework Convention in 1995, but did not ratify it until 2005. Latvia is not a signatory of the European Charter, but as a condition of membership in the Council of Europe, it signed the European Convention on Human Rights in 1995 and ratified it in 1997. Since then, the European Court of Human Rights has decided several cases that involved challenges to Latvia’s language laws and policies.

One such case was brought in 1999 by a citizen of Latvia, Ingrīda Podkolzina, who is a member of the Russian-speaking minority. Podkolzina complained that she had been removed from the list of candidates at the general election for insufficient knowledge of Latvian (European Court of Human Rights 2002: paras 4, 8). She alleged that this constituted a breach of the right to stand as a candidate in an election, guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention (European Court of Human Rights 2002: para. 3). In 2002, the European Court of Human Rights ruled in her favour.

Podkolzina had filed with the electoral commission as a candidate for parliament in the 1998 parliamentary elections on the National Harmony Party list. After she submitted her filing papers, including a certification of her ability in the Latvian language, an examiner from the State Language Inspectorate, part of the State Language Centre, went to Podkolzina’s place of work and examined her orally to assess her knowledge of Latvian (European Court of Human Rights 2002: paras 9–10). The oral examination lasted for more than thirty minutes; during the examination, the examiner asked Podkolzina why she supported the National Harmony Party instead of some other party. The next day the examiner returned together with three individuals to act as invigilators.
Podkolzina was asked to write an essay in Latvian, which she began. ‘However, being extremely nervous, because she had not expected such an examination and because of the constant presence of the invigilators, the applicant stopped writing and tore up her work’ (para. 10). The examiner subsequently submitted a report to the effect that Podkolzina did not have an adequate command of Latvian ‘at the “third level”, the highest of the three categories of competence defined in Latvian regulations’ (para. 10).

Based on this report, the State Language Centre sent the Central Election Commission a letter certifying the level of language knowledge attained by Podkolzina and other candidates standing in the parliamentary elections. Of nine candidates whose command of Latvian was examined, according to the State Language Centre, only Podkolzina had not attained ‘a command of Latvian at the “third level”’ (European Court of Human Rights 2002: para. 12). Consequently, the Central Election Commission struck Podkolzina from the list of candidates (para. 13).

The statutory provision that was involved in this case, as quoted by the Court, provided that ‘persons who do not have a command of the official language at the third (upper) level of knowledge’ (para. 18) may not stand as candidates in parliamentary elections. What constituted a command of Latvian at the third level was indicated in the 1992 regulations on certification of knowledge of the state language, which defined the third level as follows:

Mastery of the spoken and written language is required for agents and employees whose professional tasks entail management of an undertaking and organisation of labour, or . . . frequent contact with the public, [and for those] whose duties have to do with the well-being and health of the population (for example, members of parliament, persons managing public or administrative institutions or their structural units, boards of directors, inspectorates or undertakings, their deputies and secretaries, senior specialists, advisers, auditors, employees of Latvian cultural, educational and scientific bodies, doctors, assistant doctors, lawyers and judges) . . .

This level of knowledge of the official language entails the ability to:

1. converse freely;
2. understand texts chosen at random; and
3. draft texts relating to one’s professional duties. (para. 21)

In deciding this case, the European Court of Human Rights reviewed the applicable national legislation and international treaty law, and concluded
that under the *ECHR*, ‘requiring a candidate for election to the national parliament to have sufficient knowledge of the official language pursues a legitimate aim’ and is therefore permissible (European Court of Human Rights 2002: para. 34). However, the court found that even though Podkolzina had a valid language certificate of linguistic competence, as required by Latvian law, the State Language Centre decided to subject her to a new language examination. The court questioned the procedures followed in this second exam and expressed surprise that during the second exam Podkolzina was questioned mainly about the reasons for her political orientation, which had nothing to do with the requirement that she exhibit a good command of Latvian (para. 36).

These procedures and the lack of a guarantee of objectivity in the second examination meant that the ‘procedure applied to the applicant was in any case incompatible with the requirements of procedural fairness and legal certainty to be satisfied in relation to candidates’ eligibility’ (para. 36). As such, the treatment of Podkolzina constituted a violation of her rights under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the *ECHR* (European Court of Human Rights 2002: para. 38).

Podkolzina’s case is interesting for several reasons. First, it illustrates the way in which the *ECHR* has been interpreted and applied to protect members of minority language groups. Second – and the reason I devoted so much space above to the description of the procedures and standards employed under Latvian law to determining Latvian language proficiency – is that this case illustrates the extremely detailed and elaborate procedures adopted in Latvia to ensure the dominance of the Latvian language vis-à-vis minority (primarily Russian) languages.

Another case brought before the European Court of Human Rights by a Latvian citizen illustrates that the *ECHR* will permit Latvia to promote the use of Latvian in circumstances when another nation with a different history might not be allowed to do so. *Mentzen v. Latvia* was brought by a Latvian citizen who married a German man named Mentzen (European Court of Human Rights 2004). She applied to the Latvian Nationality and Migration Service for the issuance of a new passport in her married name. Following the applicable regulations, which require the ‘Latvianisation’ of name, the new passport was issued in the name of Mencena, not Mentzen (European Court of Human Rights 2004: 1).

In her complaint to the European Court of Human Rights, Mrs Mentzen argued that the manner in which her surname had been transcribed in her passport had infringed her right to respect for her private and family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the *ECHR* (European Court of Human Rights 2004). In evaluating this claim, the court concluded that the adaptation of her name had been detrimental to her rights, but
that this infringement had occurred in furtherance of a legitimate state aim. The most fascinating feature of this judgment is the Court’s explanation of this legitimate state aim. They noted:

The Government outlined the difficulties the Latvian language had faced during the 50 years of the Soviet regime. They emphasised in particular the Latvian authorities’ continuing concerns regarding the preservation and development of the language. In the Government’s view, the situation in which the Latvian language currently found itself justified the adoption and implementation of strict rules governing correct usage. In that connection, the Court reiterates that, by reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, the authorities, especially the national courts, are in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion on the need for interference in such a special and sensitive area. (p. 26)

While the Court acknowledged that requiring Mrs Mentzen to use the written form Mencena in official documents in Latvia would subject her to practical problems and difficulties, they concluded that these difficulties were not serious enough to prevent her from exercising her rights under the Latvian Constitution and laws (p. 30). The difficulties imposed were more than offset, in the Court’s view, by the legitimate state aim of promoting the Latvian language in response to decades of Soviet/Russian linguistic domination. On this basis, Mrs Mentzen’s claim was denied.

The controversy over the role of the Russian language in post-communist Latvia reached a climax of sorts on 18 February 2012, when voters in Latvia overwhelmingly rejected at a referendum the amendments to the constitution adding Russian as a second official state language. The Native Language Society (obshchestvo ‘Rodnoi Iazyk’), an advocacy organisation on behalf of the approximately one-third of the Latvian population that regards Russian as their native language, obtained sufficient signatures on petitions to force a ballot. However, because Latvian law requires that anyone who took up residence in Latvia during Soviet occupation must pass a Latvian language examination in order to obtain citizenship, there are approximately 300,000 Russian speakers living in Latvia who are not citizens and, thus, were unable to vote in the referendum. According to the official results, 74.8% of the voters (821,722) voted against the second official language and 24.88% (273,347) voted for it.30 Thus, even if all of the Russian-speaking non-
citizens were able to vote at the referendum, it would not have received sufficient votes to be adopted.

The Russian government was critical of the conduct of the referendum, claiming that Latvia had ‘breached its international obligations’ when it refused to permit a Russian mission to observe the referendum (RIA-Novosti 2012). But the president of Latvia, Andris Berzins, characterised the referendum as ‘absurd’, stating that the government funds minority language schools for groups such as the Russians. According to Berzins, ‘[t]here’s no need for a second language. Whoever wants, can use their language at home or in school’ (BBC 2012).

CONCLUSION

The fourteen nations of the ‘near abroad’ have adopted a wide range of measures establishing their official languages and protecting the rights of minority language communities. It is far beyond the scope of this chapter to describe and analyse these various legal regimes in detail. The two countries that I have examined in some detail are extreme cases in that they have been more heavily involved with the international law of minority language rights than most of the former Soviet republics. Armenia is one of only two post-Soviet nations to ratify the European Charter. As such, it has been subjected to extensive monitoring by the Council of Europe to determine the extent to which it has implemented the document. Latvia has adopted some of the most controversial language-related legislation and regulations among the former Soviet republics, but as a member of the Council of Europe and a signatory of the ECHR, these laws have been challenged repeatedly before the European Court of Human Rights. In different ways these two examples illustrate how international law and institutions can profoundly influence domestic law and practice relating the rights of minority language communities.

NOTES

1. The ‘near abroad’ was originally a Russian phrase (ближнее зарубежье) that refers to the fourteen non-Russian successor states to the USSR (Poppe and Hagendoorn 2001; Safire 1994).
2. Ferrando points out that ‘Uzbekistan is the most populated country of the region [Central Asia] and the only one that has refused to conduct a population census since the last Soviet census in 1989’ (2008: 489).
3. The relevant data is not available for Kazakhstan.
4. The comparable percentages for the other nations of the ‘near abroad’ that included this data on their censuses were as follows: Estonia (42.19%), Georgia (34%), Kyrgyzstan (31.79%), Latvia (43.69%), Tajikistan (18.72%), Turkmenistan (21.54%), and Ukraine (35.61%).

5. ‘Russian is also widespread, particularly as a means of communication for various ethnic groups living in the countryside. For instance, over one third of ethnic Georgians can speak Russian (33.7%). The share for other ethnic groups is even higher. 77.2% for Ukrainians, 49.1% for Armenians, and 49.3% for Greeks. It is 26.5% for Azeris’ (Beridze and Naughton 2004: 77).

6. A similar non-discrimination provision was included in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which was adopted on the same day as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United Nations 1966b: art. 2 (2)).

7. All of the former Soviet nations including Russia are parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The complete list of parties to the Covenant is available on the United Nations website at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en. Ten of the former Soviet republics are parties to the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. See the list of parties to the Convention on the UNESCO website at http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=12949&language=E&amp;order=alpha.

8. The list of Council of Europe member states is available on the Council’s official website at www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=47pays1europe&amp;cl=en.

9. The list of states that have ratified the Framework Convention is available on the Council of Europe website at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=157&amp;CM=1&amp;DF=04/01/2011&amp;CL=ENG.

10. The list of states that have signed and ratified the European Charter is available on the Council of Europe website at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=148&amp;CM=1&amp;DF=04/01/2011&amp;CL=ENG.

11. The ECHR entered into force on 3 September 1953.

12. ‘Every member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (Council of Europe 1949: art 3); ‘The two basic requirements of membership are to ratify the Human Rights Convention as well as Protocol No. 6, which requires members to abolish the death penalty, except in times of war’ (Jordan 2003: 660).


14. This is one of the membership criteria adopted by the European Union at a meeting in 1993 in Copenhagen. The ‘Copenhagen criteria’ were specifically aimed at the Central and Eastern European nations interested in joining the European Union. See the European Union accession criteria as stated on its website at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm.

15. However, Belarus is not a party to the European Charter.

16. ‘In state institutions and local self-administrative bodies the Russian language shall be officially used on equal grounds along with the Kazakh language’ (Kazakhstan 1995: art. 7 (2)).
17. ‘The state language of Tajikistan is Tajik. Russian is a language of inter-ethnic communication’ (Tajikistan 1994: art. 2).

18. ‘In the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian language shall be used as an official language . . . The Kyrgyz Republic shall guarantee to representatives of all ethnic groups that make up the people of Kyrgyzstan the right to preserve their native language and to create conditions for its study and development’ (Kyrgyzstan 2010: art. 10 (2)–(3)).

19. ‘The Moldovan State acknowledges and protects the right to preserve, develop, and use the Russian language and other languages spoken within the national territory of the country’ (Moldova 1994: art. 13 (2)).

20. ‘[T]he free development, use and protection of Russian, and other languages of national minorities of Ukraine, is guaranteed’ (Ukraine 1996: art. 10).

21. See, for example, Constitution of Uzbekistan: ‘All citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall have equal rights and freedoms, and shall be equal before the law, without discrimination by sex, race, nationality, language, religion, social origin, convictions, individual and social status’ (Uzbekistan 1992: art. 18); Constitution of Azerbaijan: ‘The state guarantees equality of rights and liberties of everyone, irrespective of race, nationality, religion, language, sex, origin, financial position, occupation, political convictions, membership in political parties, trade unions and other public organizations. Rights and liberties of a person, citizen cannot be restricted due to race, nationality, religion, language, sex, origin, conviction, political and social belonging’ (Azerbaijan 1995: art. 25(3)).

22. ‘All shall be equal before the law and have the right, without any discrimination, to equal protection of their rights and legitimate interests’ (Belarus 1994: art. 22); ‘All human beings in Latvia shall be equal before the law and the courts. Human rights shall be realised without discrimination of any kind’ (Latvia 1922: art. 91).

23. The 2001 census was the first post-Soviet census conducted in Armenia (Rowland 2007: 73). Under the Armenian legislation on the census, a census of the population must be conducted every ten years. (Armenia 1999: art. 4). Data for the scheduled 2011 census was collected in October 2011. The data from this census, however, is not yet available. See the website of the National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia, at www.armstat.am/en/?nid=337.

24. The 2001 census data are available online on the website of the National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia, at www.armstat.am/ru/?nid=52. The census data were published using Armenian, Russian and English labels. The Russian label that is used in the published census reports as the equivalent of the English term *ethnicity* is *национальность*. Adults were free to specify their own ethnicity, but that of children was determined by their parents (National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia 2003: 165).

25. The Russian term used in the census reports as the equivalent of the English phrase *mother tongue* is *родной язык*. The census data does not make any distinction between the dialects of Armenian (National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia 2003: 167).

26. The Yezidi are ‘an ethnic group of Kurdish origin with an archaic religion preserving many features of Zoroastrianism – [who] strongly distinguish themselves from Muslim Kurds of the Transcaucasus. Both groups speak the same language, known as Kurmanji. Nevertheless, the Yezidis’ cultural identity is based mainly on their religion. In an ironic twist, however, many contemporary Yezidis now count language as a distinguishing factor of their group identity by claiming to speak
“Yezidi,” which, they argue, Muslim Kurds appropriated and misnamed Kurmanji’ (Abrahamyan 1998: 3).

27. As this provision implies, there are numerous flavours of Armenian: “Armenian” actually refers to several languages, including Standard Eastern and Western Armenian . . . and dozens of other mutually unintelligible variants of Armenian originally spoken in Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Georgia, Abkhazia, Russia, and Israel’ (Vaux 2006: 474–5). While the Constitution and the Law on Language do not specify which of the variants of Armenian is the standard, the version of Armenian established as the state and official language of the Republic of Armenia is Eastern Armenian (Gevorgyan 2006: 474).


29. See the list of member states of the European Convention on Human Rights on the Council of Europe website at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=1&DF=07/01/2011&CL=ENG.


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CHAPTER 2

The Russian Language in Ukraine: Complicit in Genocide, or Victim of State-building?

Bill Bowring

INTRODUCTION

This chapter tracks the fate of the Russian language in Ukraine. The fate of Russian in Ukraine, and indeed of Ukrainian in Ukraine, has been at the centre of heated political debates ever since Ukraine became independent, on the collapse of the USSR in late 1991.

On 14 February 2010 the (ethnic Belarussian, as it happens) Viktor Ianukovich was declared the winner in the presidential elections, beating Iulia Tymoshenko by just 3.48 percentage points (Polityuk and Balmforth 2010). Despite having campaigned on a promise to make Russian the second official language of Ukraine, in March 2010 President Ianukovich recognised that awarding Russian official status would be very difficult, and would require an amendment to the 1996 Constitution. Instead, he stressed the importance of implementing the Council of Europe’s 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (henceforth European Charter) (Council of Europe 2010). Boris Kolesnikov, the deputy head of the Party of Regions was reported as saying:

Taking the European Charter of Languages as a guide, we have prepared a very good law, which the President will present in the next 15–20 days. In that draft law, we give the regions certain rights [in relation to the Russian language]. If, in certain regions, they don’t want to implement that, then it’s up to them. (Masalkova 2010)

A new law was finally enacted in August 2012, and I discuss this; but it would appear that nothing has been resolved.

Ukrainian is very widely spoken in Ukraine, but many Ukrainians,
proud of their country and the fact that it has at last achieved independence, look with horror at the example of the Irish Republic (Eire). This fear has been voiced by a number of the present author’s interlocutors in Ukraine (Bowring 2009). The Irish (Gaelic) language suffered long persecution by England and then Great Britain, and was for centuries suppressed even more fiercely than was Ukrainian. Irish is of course a Celtic language, with no connection whatsoever with English. Eire only achieved independence following the abortive Dublin Uprising of 1916, and then several years of bloody warfare. The Irish language is the official (state) language of Eire, and is taught to all schoolchildren. All official signs are written in both languages, and there is broadcasting in Irish. However, outside the Gaeltacht, the small coastal areas and islands where the inhabitants are effectively paid to speak Irish, the Irish language is rarely heard, with only 7% of the population stating that they use Irish on a daily basis. English language, popular culture and media dominate. Nic Shuibhne (1999: 109) observed as follows:

It is a common feature of linguistic minorities that they strive to achieve the version of official recognition that they have not been accorded. The Irish language is unique in that its constitutional status goes far beyond mere recognition and confers upon it the privileged position of national and first official language of the State. But its de facto minority status has been largely ignored.

Of course, Ireland is no less independent because of the almost complete loss of its official language, and has become an enthusiastic member, frequently a leading member, of the EU (of which Irish is now one of the official languages). However, for those who believe that each nation must have its language, and that this language expresses the ‘national originality (samobytnost)’ of the nation (as in the Preamble to the 1989 Law ‘On languages of the Ukrainian SSR’ (Ukraine 1989)), the Irish example shows what can happen to a language which has been given the constitutional dignity of a state language. Many of the laws and policies of post-independence governments which Russian speakers find so threatening are a consequence of the not unreasonable fears referred to above.

I start this chapter with a brief account of Ukraine’s linguistic complexity, followed by a summary and critique of some key legal provisions. My approach is based on my experience over many years as a scholar and legal expert – for the EU, Council of Europe, and the Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – with regard to Ukraine (see Bowring 1998; 1999; 2002; 2005; 2006; 2009). While I am fluent in Russian, and Russian is my home language, I confess to a much lower
level of competence in Ukrainian: I can understand TV news by focusing hard, and can read Ukrainian with the aid of a dictionary. But I could not carry on a conversation. Fortunately I can use Russian with almost all interlocutors, preceded of course by an apology for my lack of Ukrainian. The languages have many similarities, but are quite different.

I analyse the main provisions of the Constitution, followed by an examination of the 1989 Law on Languages. I place this in the context of the most relevant of Ukraine’s international legal commitments, the European Charter. Next I analyse the question of genocide – or the Holodomor as it is termed in Ukraine. I turn finally to the voices which proclaim that the Russian language has been the victim of Ukrainian state-building since independence. Finally, I analyse the Law of 2012.

This chapter deliberately does not deal with other minority languages in Ukraine, which comprise 4.9% of the population. I have been specially concerned with the Crimean Tatars since the early 1990s, but the list of ethno-linguistic communities includes 275,800 Belarusians; 258,600 Moldovans; 248,000 Crimean Tatars; 240,000 Bulgarians; 156,600 Hungarians; 151,000 Romanians; 144,100 Poles; 133,600 Jews; 99,900 Armenians; 91,500 Greeks; 73,300 Tatars; 47,600 Roma; 45,200 Azerbaijani; 34,200 Georgians; 33,300 Germans; and 31,900 Gagauz (Council of Europe 2010).

UKRAINE’S LINGUISTIC COMPLEXITY

Ukraine is perhaps unique in displaying a wide discrepancy between declared ethnicity (Russian, Ukrainian or other), and actual language use. In 1995, Dominique Arel (1995: 598) wrote that Ukraine is a basically a bi-ethnic state, with 37.4 million inhabitants describing themselves as Ukrainian, and 11.4 million as Russians. In 2002, he commented that:

Any visitor to Kyiv or heavily urbanized Eastern Ukraine can attest to the fact that the Ukrainian language is seldom used in the streets. Reliable survey opinion polls conducted throughout the past decade have indicated that approximately one out of three ethnic Ukrainians in the whole of Ukraine prefers to use Russian at home. In Eastern Ukraine, the proportion is nearly one out of two. (Arel 2002: 238)

The 2001 census showed that between the Soviet census of 1989 and the Ukrainian census of 2001, Ukraine’s population declined from 51,706,600 to 48,457,020, a loss of 3,249,580 people or 6.3% of the 1989 population.
Of these, 37,541,693 described themselves as Ukrainians, and 8,334,141 as Russians. Of the ethnic Ukrainians, 31,970,728 reported that Ukrainian was their ‘native language’ and 5,544,729 reported that it was Russian. Of the ethnic Russians, 7,993,832 reported that Russian was their ‘native language’, and 328,152 reported Ukrainian (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine 2001). As I show below, this is not a report of actual language use. More than half the population of Ukraine use Russian on a daily basis. It is the experience of this author that many people switch from one language to the other without hesitation or even conscious decision.

When the first post-Soviet census was conducted in 2001, ten years after the collapse of the USSR, 77.8% of those living in Ukraine responded that their ethnic origin was Ukrainian, as against 17.3% Russian, and 4.9% other. It should be recalled that in the USSR ‘nationality’ (or ethnicity) was fixed by the nationality of one’s parents, and endorsed on the internal passport which every Soviet citizen was required to carry. This notorious requirement, known as the piataia grafa or ‘fifth point’, has now been abolished in Ukraine, and in the Russian Federation (Simonsen 1999). The number of ‘Russians’ fell by 25% in comparison with the last Soviet census of 1989. It should also be noted that according to the CIA Factbook the (shrinking) population is now 45,415,596, a considerable further reduction in the overall number of Ukrainians (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine 2001).

The Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts, considering in 2008 Ukraine’s Initial Report for the European Charter, reported that 77.8% of census respondents state they are ethnically Ukrainian, while 17.3% say they are Russian (Council of Europe 2010: 5). But this does not reflect the real numbers of Ukrainian and Russian speakers. Thus, according to the 2001 census (Ukraine 2001), 5,600,000 (15.8%) of the (self-declared) ethnic Ukrainians identified Russian as their mother tongue, and 300,000 ethnic Russians (3.9%) identified Ukrainian as their mother tongue (in fact the census used the phrase ‘native tongue’). Of the total population of Ukraine, 67.5% declared Ukrainian as their mother tongue, and 29.6% Russian. Some 99.5% of ethnic Russians consider Russian to be their mother tongue.

**THE CONSTITUTIONAL STARTING POINT**

Article 10 of the 1996 Constitution of independent Ukraine provides:

The state language of Ukraine is the Ukrainian language. The State ensures the comprehensive development and functioning of
the Ukrainian language in all spheres of social life throughout the entire territory of Ukraine. In Ukraine, the free development, use and protection of Russian, and other languages of national minorities of Ukraine, is guaranteed. (Constitution of Ukraine 1996)

This provision was interpreted in the decision of the Ukrainian Constitutional Court, delivered on 14 December 1999, clarifying Article 10 of the Constitution (Constitutional Court of Ukraine 1999). It will be recalled that Ukraine signed the European Charter in 1996; and the ruling of the Constitutional Court was sought by nationalist deputies prior to Ukraine’s (first) ratification of the Charter. Ukrainian is stated in Article 10 to be the state language. Controversially, the view of the majority of judges went further. They found that the Ukrainian language was the ‘compulsory means of communication for officials of government bodies and local self-government structures, and in other spheres of public life’ (Constitutional Court of Ukraine 1999) including education. In this decision, it is also stated that ‘local government bodies, bodies of Crimean Autonomous Republic and local self-government bodies may use Russian and other languages of national minorities along with the state language.’

There was one strong dissent, by Judge Mironenko. According to him, the Court had paid too little attention to an important sentence of Article 10: ‘In Ukraine, the free development, use and protection of Russian, and other languages of national minorities of Ukraine, is guaranteed’ (Mironenko 1999).

THE LAW ON LANGUAGES

Ukraine has a law governing language use. But the Law of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic ‘On Languages’ of 1989, as amended in 1995 (Ukraine 1989), not only pre-dates the Constitution, but (so far as it did not contradict the Constitution) remained in force until August 2012. Despite the presentation to the Ukrainian parliament of many draft replacements, there was until 2012 no viable replacement. The great significance of this law, adopted in the USSR, was the promotion of Ukrainian to the position of state language of Ukraine – even as the Ukrainian SSR. It is worth reproducing the Preamble in full:

The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic acknowledges the vital and societal value of all national languages and guarantees the
national cultural and linguistic rights to its citizens without reservation, assuming that only the free development and equal standing of national languages, the high linguistic culture are the basis of the mutual spiritual understanding, reciprocal cultural enrichment and strengthening of the friendship between people.

The Ukrainian language is one of the important factors of the national originality of the Ukrainian people.

The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic vests the Ukrainian language with the status of the state language in order to support the comprehensive development of spiritual creative forces of the Ukrainian people and guarantee its sovereign national state future.

The development of the understanding of the social value of the Ukrainian language as the state language of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Russian language as the language of the interethnic communication of peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics among citizens regardless of their national affiliation shall be the duty of the state, party and public bodies and mass media of the Republic. The choice of the language of the interpersonal communication among citizens of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic shall be an inalienable right of citizens themselves. (Ukraine 1989)

The first paragraph of the Preamble referred to ‘all national languages’ and to ‘free development and equal standing of national languages’. These formulations are not at all clear. If the word ‘national’ is used with the same sense as in the phrase ‘national minority’, then it may be presumed that ‘national’ in this context means ‘ethnic’. In the Russian language, the words ‘national’ and ‘ethnic’ are interchangeable; and I have written elsewhere on the question of the ‘nationalities’ policy of the USSR and the Russian Federation (Bowring 2010). In the context of Ukraine’s international obligations, it should be replaced by a phrase such as ‘all the languages actually spoken on the territory of Ukraine’.

The second paragraph of the Preamble contained a phrase not often used in a legal context, even in Soviet constitutions, ‘national originality of the Ukrainian people’. The word ‘originality’ is used to translate a word which is the same in both Russian and Ukrainian, samobynost’, better translated as ‘authenticity’. This formulation directly contradicted the first sentence of the Preamble of the Constitution, which refers to ‘the Ukrainian people – citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities’. The
Preamble to the 1989 Law on Languages therefore referred only to one section of the ‘Ukrainian people’ as defined in the Constitution. The use of the term ‘originality’ or ‘authenticity’ is also highly questionable, since it tends to essentialise both ethnic Ukrainians and the Ukrainian language. It also places an extraordinary burden on the preservation of the Ukrainian language. If the notion of ‘the Ukrainian people’ has the same meaning as in the Constitution, then the third paragraph of the Preamble also violates the Constitution, or it is self-contradictory. The development of the spiritual creative forces of citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities cannot be supported by vesting just one language with the status of the state language. It is very hard to make any juridical sense of the fourth sentence of the Preamble. It is not clear what is meant by the ‘social value’ of Ukrainian and Russian. And the formulation concerning Russian as ‘the language of interethnic communication of peoples of the USSR’, even in the Law as amended in 1995, is not only redundant but also hard to understand.

Several provisions of the 1989 Law not only referred to the former USSR, but were in some cases inconsistent with the Constitution. Article 1 referred to ‘Ukrainian and other languages used by the population of the Republic’, rather than to ethnicity or mother tongue. In this regard was is fully compliant with international standards. Article 2 declared that the Ukrainian language is the state language of Ukraine, and this is entirely proper. Ukraine’s right to decide on its state language is its right in international law. The third paragraph stated, commendably, that all citizens will have the means to learn Ukrainian; hopefully free of charge. Every Ukrainian citizen must of course learn Ukrainian. Article 3 dealt with the ‘use of languages of other nations’ in Ukraine, and referred to ‘national languages’, as well as to ‘citizens of another nationality’. This appeared to assume that there were distinct ‘nations’ (on an ethnic basis) in Ukraine and that each has its own language. This contradicted the Constitution and the international commitments of Ukraine. It is noted that the scheme of the Framework Convention on Protection of National Minorities (FCNM 1995) and the European Charter, as well as commitments in the context of the Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), is that there are ‘national minorities’, membership of which is a matter of individual choice rather than an ethno-political decision; and that members of national minorities may use their languages. This, of course, does not exclude that several languages may be used by one person.

Article 4 specified that in the Ukrainian SSR, Ukrainian, Russian and other languages will be the languages of interethnic communication. Furthermore, the state would provide for the free use of the Russian
language as the language of interethnic communication for the peoples of the USSR. Article 5 provided for the right of citizens to ‘use’ their ‘national’ or any other languages. Citizens were entitled to address state and other public bodies in Ukrainian or Russian; and decisions must be issued in Russian if a citizen so decides. This provision must have been superseded by the Languages Charter, and the specific level of implementation of Article 10 upon which Ukraine decides. Article 6 required all public officials as well as officials of ‘institutions and organisations’ to be or to become fluent in both Ukrainian and Russian, and, if necessary, in another ‘national’ language. This too should have been superseded by implementation of the European Charter.

Article 25 was enormously important, declaring that the ‘free choice of the language of education shall be the inalienable right’ of Ukrainian citizens. It went on that the right of each child to upbringing and education in the national language should be guaranteed, and protected by the establishment of state schools with upbringing and teaching in Ukrainian and ‘other national languages’.

This right was further explained in the following articles. For example, Article 27 provided that ‘in places of compact residence of citizens of other nationalities’ the state will establish secondary schools for children ‘in their national or another language’. Furthermore, it was provided that the study of Ukrainian and Russian was mandatory. If in fact all children in Ukraine were, in accordance with this Article, to learn both languages, Ukraine would be able to report a substantially higher level of implementation of Article 8 of the European Charter than presently appears in Ukraine’s Instrument of Ratification. A fully bilingual educational system is a splendid aspiration, but would require considerable expenditure. Furthermore, attention should in my view be given to the proven cognitive and educational advantages of bilingual education.

In 1995 Arel wrote that ‘The Ukrainian language law, passed in October 1989, was a defensive reaction of the communist old guard, which could no longer justify the status quo, since eight Soviet republics had enacted language laws earlier in that fateful year. It was adopted by the old Soviet Ukrainian parliament, which meant that deliberations during the preparation of the draft law remained secret. Public debate was lively, although it was restricted mostly to intellectual circles, and could be expressed only in a few glasnost’-breaking outlets, since the conservative authorities still maintained a tight control on the media’ (Arel 1995: 599).

Volodymyr Kulyk, more recently, interpreted the 1989 Law in the following way. On the one hand, ‘Russian was to retain its legitimacy in virtually all social practices as the language of interethnic
communication’; on the other hand, proclamation of Ukrainian as the state language, to be enshrined in the 1996 Constitution, instituted a ‘nation-state programme’, supported by Galicia and similar regions. Nevertheless, the 1989 Law has set the boundaries and the tone for all subsequent developments. As Kulyk observes, its apparent ambiguity is the direct result of Soviet policy, which while promoting Russian as the accepted language of public and private communication, at the same time ensured that ‘the Ukrainian language was by no means illegitimate. Not only was its existence as a separate language unequivocally accepted, which in itself constituted a tremendous change in comparison with the Tsarist policy of treating it as a dialect of Russian and banning its use in most public domains’ (Kulyk 2006: 291). Kulyk also points out that Ukrainian was seen as a natural ‘native language’ of ethnic Ukrainians.

His own conclusion was that this provided the ‘common-sense’ basis for ‘highly contradictory ideological messages’ with regard to the relationship between Ukrainian nation-building and the continued presence of the Russian language in so many spheres of life, which, in turn, ‘discouraged the perception of ethnonlinguistic matters in terms of human rights and adherence to the law’ (Kulyk 2006: 310).

Kulyk has recently carried out sophisticated analysis to support his argument that language identity does not necessarily correspond to the language of communication, and that language identity in Ukraine ‘is embodied in the concept of native language that was imposed by the Soviet institutionalisation of ethnicity’ (2011: 2) so that language identity came to mean ethnic belonging as much as linguistic practice. It is this feature of Ukrainian reality which has made it so difficult to enact a truly contemporary Law on Languages, which could provide a solid foundation for progressive language policy, in which the Ukrainian language receives proper recognition as the state language, while acknowledging the fact that such a high proportion of the population actually communicate in Russian.

**THE EUROPEAN CHARTER**

The European Charter has already enjoyed a complex and contradictory history in Ukraine (Bowring and Antonovych 2008). It was ratified twice, in 1999 and 2003. However, Ukraine’s Instrument of Ratification did not reach Strasbourg until 19 September 2005, and came into force for Ukraine on 1 January 2006. Almost immediately, a number of Ukraine’s regions enacted legislation declaring Russian to be their ‘regional language’; and defects in the translation of the Charter into Ukrainian
meant that the Instrument of Ratification will in due course be revised. Ukraine’s Initial Periodical Report was dated 2 August 2007 (Ukraine 2007), but the publication of the Opinion of the Charter’s Committee of Experts, although adopted on 27 November 2008, was blocked by disagreement for a considerable period, and was finally published on 7 July 2010 (Council of Europe 2010).

The European Charter is a unique instrument, which does not protect minority groups, or even members of minority groups, but rather languages as such. The underlying philosophy of the Charter is the protection of cultural and linguistic diversity. It was designed specifically for those countries such as Turkey and France which do not recognise the existence of any minority on their territory. The complexity of ratifying the Charter may be illustrated by Ukraine’s neighbour, Russia, which has signed the Charter, and is working on ratification, assisted by a €3m joint programme of the EU and Council of Europe, in which I am an expert. Russia has over 100 languages other than Russian, and 35 of them are taught in schools. There are a number of schools in Russia where Tatar is the language of instruction: the Tatars are the largest minority, some 5.5 million strong. But the second largest minority, the Ukrainians, have no schools. This is a source of considerable resentment, when there are still over a thousand schools in Ukraine with Russian as the language of instruction.

Since the issue of language policy is so politicised in Ukraine, the instruments and mechanisms to which Ukraine has now committed itself have also acquired specific political significance and symbolic weight. Reeta Toivanen (2007: 101) provides a useful analysis of these problems, and in particular, questioning whether language rights presuppose a fixed conception of such rights, applying to potentially homogenous and static groups, whose ‘genuine’ language needs protection. Upon examination . . . it becomes apparent that many of the groups treated as ‘language minorities’ are actually seeking official recognition of either their cultural distinctiveness or their difference, while language is only one element – often of varying importance – of their group identity.

She points out that language is ‘an instrumental symbol, which can easily be put to serve some of the political purposes of the minority, relying on the generalised belief diffuse in our societies that language, as one’s mother tongue, is a natural sign of one’s ethnic identity’ (2007: 105). This is strongly associated with the belief that ‘one nation speaks one
language.’ My own experience over the years has shown in various ways that Ukraine is manifestly a space in which there are several ‘nations’, and that none of them has a unique language.

Toivanen (2007: 106–7) cites Pierre Bourdieu (1992) to good effect, insisting that language boundaries, real or imagined, can easily be exploited politically – as is the case in Ukraine. Bourdieu observes the ‘phenomenon of the performative character typical of ethno-political entrepreneurs, who may live “off” as well as “for” ethnicity. By invoking groups, they seek to evoke them, summon them, call them into being.’ It has been my own observation over the years since my first working visit in 1992 that the concerns and demands voiced by ethno-nationalist leaders (sometimes self-appointed) frequently bear little or no relation to the lived reality of the people they claim to represent. For the most part the mass of the people inhabit a multilingual world without too much stress.

As regards Ukraine’s treaty obligations, Toivanen (2007: 107) notices that many of the existing minority rights instruments – like FCNM and the European Charter – ‘treat minority groups as homogenous and static groups carrying a distinct and genuine language as a permanent feature’. This essentialising of both ethnicity and language use is also, as I point out below, a significant feature of Ukrainian legislation, especially the 1989 ‘Law on Languages’ of the Ukrainian SSR.

She also points out that the European Charter ‘relates mainly to those language groups whose protection and promotion may contribute to the furthering of democracy in Europe, without however jeopardising national sovereignty and territorial integrity’, to use the words of the Preamble (Toivanen 2007: 109). Her impression after reading the FCNM is that its provisions taken together carry the message that ‘a nation, even one in a minority position, speaks one language’ (pp. 109–10). It is manifestly the case in Ukraine that ethnic or ‘national’ groups do not speak one language. There is, however, a strong view held by many political actors that they ought to.

The Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts for the European Charter, in their 2008 Report, noted that several local and regional authorities had invoked the Charter as a basis for recognising the Russian language as ‘regional in the sense of the [Charter]’. The Committee understood

that this issue is at the heart of an intense public discussion . . . There is clearly a gap between those who consider that Russian is just one minority language among many others, and those advocating that Russian must continue to play an important role
the Russian language in Ukraine

as being the language spoken by a very high proportion of the Ukrainian population and having traditionally been the language of inter-ethnic communication in Ukraine. (Council of Europe 2010: 13)

The Committee reminded itself that the status of a language is a matter of internal policy, with no clear guidance from the Charter. The Committee would not challenge the Ukrainian legislation so long as Russian receives the necessary protection. ‘However, given the number of Russian speakers in Ukraine, it is clear that the Russian language must be accorded a special position’. (Council of Europe 2010: 13)

Ukraine submitted its second Report on 10 January 2012 (Ukraine 2012), and the Committee of Experts’ evaluation report was adopted on 15 November 2012. It has not yet been made public, as at September 2013, largely because of wrangling between the Committee and Ukraine as to its content.

THE HOLODOMOR OR GENOCIDE

The highly charged politicisation of the language question in Ukraine is augmented by the discourse concerning the pre-WW II genocide or Holodomor of the Ukrainian people. I set out below the influential definition by Rafael Lemkin. I became familiar with this discourse when on many occasions I worked with colleagues at the National University ‘Kyiv-Mohyla Academy’ in Kyiv. The history of the Academy is an exemplar of the history of Ukraine. It was originally founded by the Metropolitan of Kyiv Petro Mohyla in 1615, and enjoyed its golden age during the reign of Hetman Ivan Mazepa, from 1687 to 1709. It was closed by the authorities of the Russian Empire in 1817 following Aleksandr I’s victory over Napoleon, and re-opened only following the collapse of the USSR in 1991. It considers itself to be ‘truly Ukrainian’, and it ‘strives to make the modern Academy the intellectual symbol of Ukraine in modern times’.1 It is rated the second-best university in Ukraine. The languages of instruction are Ukrainian and English, and I required a vote before I was permitted to address the Academic Council of the Law Faculty in Russian. However, I observed that many if not most of the students speak Russian, as do most inhabitants of Kyiv, outside the classroom.

The term ‘genocide’ was coined in 1943 by Rafael Lemkin, and
developed in his 1944 book *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation – Analysis of Government – Proposals for Redress* (Lemkin [1944], 2005). It was identified as a crime in the UN’s 1948 *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, which also contains a legal definition which is now part of the Statute of the International Criminal Court.

In 1953 Lemkin wrote *Soviet Genocide in the Ukraine*, in which he distinguished four characteristics: (1) the annihilation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, the ‘national brain’ of Ukraine; (2) the liquidation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous church, the ‘national soul’ of Ukraine; (3) the *Holodomor* of the Ukrainian peasantry, the repository of the tradition, folklore and music, the national language and literature, and the national spirit of Ukraine – between 1932 and 1933, 5,000,000 Ukrainians starved to death; and (4) the fragmentation of the Ukrainian people at once by the addition to Ukraine of foreign peoples and by the dispersion of the Ukrainians throughout Eastern Europe. For Lemkin, this all led to ‘the systematic destruction of the Ukrainian nation, in its progressive absorption within the new Soviet nation’ (Lemkin [1953], 2008).

In a careful recent legal analysis, Zemlian’ska (2009) does not consider that the facts amounted to genocide by the Soviet Union, especially since many of those who executed the policy of elimination of the peasantry were Ukrainians. This was in her view, however, a crime against humanity. This was also the view of the European Parliament in its resolution of 23 October 2008, which ‘recognizes the Holodomor (the artificial famine of 1932–1933 in Ukraine) as an appalling crime against the Ukrainian people, and against humanity’. The Parliament deliberately did not use the term ‘genocide’ (European Parliament 2008).

The discourse within Ukraine is quite different from that proposed by Zemlian’ska, and is well represented by Vasilenko, who often represents Ukraine in international fora. On 28 November 2006, the Verkhovna Rada, enacted the Law ‘On the Holodomor of 1932–1933 in Ukraine’ (No. 376-V). The law established that the *Holodomor* was genocide against the Ukrainian People, and that public negation of the *Holodomor* dishonours the memory of millions of the *Holodomor* victims and humiliates the dignity of the Ukrainian People, and shall be deemed illegitimate. In March 2007, President Iushchenko submitted a draft law ‘On Amendments to the Criminal and the Procedural Criminal Codes of Ukraine’ for consideration by the Verkhovna Rada, envisaging prosecution for public denial of the *Holodomor* as genocide of the Ukrainian people, and of the Holocaust as genocide of the Jewish people. The proposed punishment for public denial and production and dissemination of
materials containing a denial was a fine of 100 to 300 untaxed minimum salaries, or imprisonment for up to two years (Verkhovna Rada 2008). This draft never became law. On 27 April 2010, the ‘Our Ukraine’ party accused President Ianukovich of ‘Holodomor denial’ after he told the spring session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) that the famine could not be considered genocide as it was ‘a common tragedy of the Soviet people’ (RIA Novosti 2010). The draft PACE resolution on the famine says it was caused by ‘the cruel and deliberate actions and policies of the Soviet regime’ responsible for the deaths of ‘millions of innocent people’, not only in Ukraine, but also in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova and Russia (PACE 2010).

Pyotr Romanov (2008) shared the view of many Russians when he wrote ‘[i]nstead of blaming the Russian nation, Kiev ought to condemn Marxism and Stalinism.’ Indeed, there are texts which seek to implicate Russia in genocide. A handout for students recently produced by the Ukrainian Genocide Famine Foundation states that ‘Russia and the Soviet Union wished to eradicate the Ukrainian people as a separate ethno-cultural entity’ (Ukrainian Genocide Famine Foundation 2009). If this was the desire of ‘Russia’, then for ultra-nationalists this becomes the desire of Russians, and the Russian language itself is implicated as the bearer of genocide. I have heard on occasion just such sentiments expressed by Ukrainian nationalists, often in the context of derogatory references to moskal.

THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE AS A VICTIM OF STATE-BUILDING IN UKRAINE?

Vadym Kolesnichenko, a Verkhovna Rada deputy and chair of the All-Ukrainian Non-government Organization ‘Human Rights Public Movement Russian-speaking Ukraine’ is one of the most prolific advocates for the Russian language in Ukraine. In July 2010, when the Report of the Committee of Experts for the European Charter was published, he and his assistant Ruslan Bortnik wrote with regard to the period from 17 May 2007 to 18 May 2008: ‘the policy of the state of Ukraine regarding regional or minority languages assumed even more threatening forms and the character of notorious suppression and extrusion of these languages from all spheres of life of the society’ and ‘The list of egregious facts of discrimination and annihilation of regional or minority languages in Ukraine also grew drastically’ (Kolesnichenko and Bortnik 2010).

Here is an example. On 25 December 2007 the Minister of Education of Ukraine signed Order No. 1171 regarding external testing of school
leavers (graduates of comprehensive schools) wishing to enter higher educational institutions in 2008. The Order requires the tests to be taken exclusively in Ukrainian (with a two-year suspension). The pupils who lacked knowledge of Ukrainian for taking tests were offered some small glossary with the translation of basic terms.

Herein, currently in Ukraine the pupils are taught in Crimean Tatar, Moldovan, Romanian, Hungarian, Polish, Russian and other languages, that is, the languages protected by the Law of Ukraine ‘On Ratification of European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages Fulfillment’ No. 802-IV, dated 15 May 2003, and the schools that teach pupils in regional or minority language make up a network of more than 1,500 schools with more than 500,000 pupils. Consequently, the pupils taught in regional or minority languages in Ukraine are actually deprived of the right to higher education and discriminated against on the basis of language spoken, since they are put into knowingly unequal competitive conditions of entering the university compared with pupils who are taught in the state language.

There have indeed been dramatic changes. In 1987, in the late Soviet period, 72% of schools taught in Russian, only 16% in Ukrainian, and 12% were mixed. By 2001, 1,300 schools had switched from Russian to Ukrainian. By 8 June 2006, the second Ukrainian Report to the Advisory Committee of the Council of Europe’s FCNM, the number of Russian schools had fallen from 2,561 to 1,345, and the number of pupils in Russian language education from 2,313,901 to 525,260 (Council of Europe 2006).

But in my view, there are perfectly practical reasons why even Russian-speaking parents send their children to Ukrainian-language schools. Kulyk (2006; 2010a), as well as Anna Wylegala writing on Lviv (Wylegala 2010) and Margrethe Søvik on Kharkiv (Søvik 2010) show that the reality in most of Ukraine is of bilingualism. This was also my experience in 2009 visiting Kyiv, Donetsk, Lviv and Simferopol with the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities.

Most observers, including me, are struck by the way that Ukrainian and Russian co-exist at street level. Shumlianskyi (2010) argues that conflicts arise not in the practice of language use but rather in the presentation of abstractions by political leaders. In a recent analysis of language in the mass media, Kulyk (2010b: 96) observed that ‘On the one hand, Ukrainian appears in media discourse on language matters as the language of the state and society, the one which citizens (should) identify with and which, accordingly, the state rightly supports. On the other, Russian is presented as an acceptable language of virtually all social practices both by the non-problematizing portrayal of its use by various actors and by the language use of the media itself.’
Since independence, there has been a constant tension between the notion of ‘mother tongue’, and language actually used in private and in public. Arel (2002: 240) reported an example from the 2001 census campaign, of a Kyiv student who was fluent in Ukrainian but preferred to use Russian at home and with his friends. He had been brought up in Russian. Arel pointed out that by any definition, Russian was his mother tongue. Yet the 2001 census enquired about ‘native language’ rather than ‘mother tongue’, and the student chose Ukrainian, on the grounds that ‘I am not Russian.’ Moreover, Kulyk (2008) noted that:

Given that native language is often considered to be the language of one’s nationality rather than one’s own use, many people speaking mostly or even exclusively Russian still declare their native language to be Ukrainian. Accordingly, this declaration does not determine the respondent’s policy preference, as it may result from different patterns of everyday use and different cultural orientations . . . Even more ambiguous is the declaration of one’s Ukrainian nationality, which encompasses not only different language practices but also different language identifications (in our sample, 30 per cent of those defining themselves as Ukrainians declared their native language to be Russian or both).

Laada Bilaniuk has analysed the phenomenon (which I also frequently noted), of television programmes and interviews in which a question is asked in Ukrainian and answered, quite un-selfconsciously and without provoking any comment, in Russian. Given the rather feverish debate as to language policy in Ukraine, Bilaniuk was struck by ‘the prevalence of a practice I call “non-accommodating bilingualism”: speaking one’s preferred language, Ukrainian or Russian, when this is not the language spoken by one’s interlocutor, thereby maintaining a conversation in two languages’ (2010: 105). This leads her to a rather optimistic conclusion:

The acceptability of the practice of non-accommodating bilingualism facilitates the growing presence of Ukrainian in domains where it was previously unacceptable and marginalized, without the drastic shift that would require everyone to change established language habits. Those people who feel so inclined can choose to speak Ukrainian in spheres previously dominated by Russian, such as science, politics, and popular culture, even if others around them speak Russian. (Bilaniuk 2010: 114)
I am therefore able to conclude, on the basis of a wealth of empirical investigation and analysis, that my everyday perceptions are correct. Ukrainian men and women are for the most part thoroughly relaxed about the use of the Russian and Ukrainian languages. Even in the Ukrainian East and in Crimea, Russian speakers are able to embrace Ukrainian citizenship and cultural identity, and the Ukrainian language – even if they do not speak it perfectly, with genuine enthusiasm.

**THE REPLACEMENT OF THE 1989 LAW ON LANGUAGES**

It should be no surprise that Vadym Kolesnichenko was a strong supporter of a draft ‘Law on Languages’ prepared by Evgenii Kushnariov of the ruling Party of the Regions (Draft Law 2010), and submitted on 7 September 2010 to the Verkhovna Rada by Aleksandr Efremov of the Party of the Regions, Petro Simonenko the leader of the Communist Party of Ukraine, and Sergey Grinevitskii of the ‘Litvin Bloc’. On 8 September 2010 Mr Kolesnichenko argued that the draft would not only comply with the requirements of the European Charter, but would also define proactive measures in order to implement the status of regional languages for each of the regional languages in Ukraine and to secure the possibility for regional or minority language speakers in Ukraine to be able to use their language in the spheres of public life. In particular the draft bill removes the existing threshold for official use of the Russian language in all major areas of public life – television, advertising, film industry, local administration, courts and education. (Kolesnichenko 2010a)

In the Russian media the draft was hailed as ‘Ukraine legalises the Russian language’ (Sinelnikov 2010). The opposition were outspoken. According to the opposition deputy Viacheslav Kirilenko on 20 September 2010, the draft law if enacted would split Ukraine: ‘Parents will be compelled to send children to Russian-language classes. Higher education entities will set up for small groups for Ukrainian-speakers, and all other students will be forced to attend Russian-language groups’ (Mazurkiewicz 2010). Not only the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy but the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences opposed the draft.

During the course of 2011, the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission for Democracy Through Law (the Venice Commission) published, unusually, two opinions on the draft law (Venice Commission 2011a and...
The March Opinion, on the ‘Draft Law on Languages of Ukraine’, was highly critical: the Commission found that the Draft ‘fails to propose a sufficiently precise, consistent and balanced legal framework . . . and might . . . prove counter-productive’ (2011a: 24). In particular, the draft was unbalanced, strongly protecting the Russian language without the necessary measures to confirm Ukrainian as state language, and without protection for other languages. On 21 October 2011 the Verkhovna Rada requested an opinion on a slightly re-named draft, ‘Draft Law on Principles of the State Language Policy’. The Commission found that this was clearly based on the previous draft, and that to take account of the March Opinion, the draft’s authors had ‘introduced interesting novelties and adopted several amendments’ (2011b: 2). This seemed to the Commission to be improved and more balanced, but much more work was required, especially to consolidate the Ukrainian language as sole state language (2011b: 12).

Despite a non-stop rally outside the Verkhovna Rada protesting the fate of Ukrainian, the parliament voted the new law ‘On the Principles of the State Language Policy’ in on 4 July 2012. On 8 August 2012 President Ianukovich signed the new law (Pifer and Thoburn 2012). As before, Russian-majority cities moved quickly: Odesa voted to give Russian official status on 13 August, and Kharkiv a week later. At the same time, some regional councils in the west of Ukraine made statements declaring the law invalid on their own territories (Kulyk 2013: 304).

Kulyk commented that, prior to enactment of the new law, the situation was ‘formal priority of Ukrainian and largely unconstrained use of both languages in actual communication’ (Kulyk 2013: 302). The problem was the ‘vast gap’ between law and practice. The new law, however, in Kulyk’s view, was primarily concerned with ensuring the use of Russian, not only providing for ‘regional’ status in the east and south, but for its use throughout Ukraine, often instead of Ukrainian (Kulyk 2013: 303). His conclusion was dismal: ‘Rather than paving the way for a compromise, the new law has galvanised attempts of speakers of Ukrainian, Russian and sizeable minority groups to pursue their respective group agendas’ (2013: 304).

Indeed the issues were far from resolved, and the new law had many opponents. In October 2012 the President formed a working group with the task of developing yet another new version of the law he had only recently signed into force. The results angered Vadym Kolesnichenko, who declared that the proposed amendments would nullify the new law. He added: ‘has this law split Ukraine? Has it caused budget losses? No. In my opinion, people do not even notice that the law exists’ (ForUm 2013).
As at the time of writing (September 2013) the law enacted in August 2012 remains in force and has not been further amended. The population of Ukraine carry on as before.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I remain an optimist for Ukraine. Those on the one side who accuse ‘Russians’ of murderous genocide in the Holodomor, and those on the other who accuse Ukrainian nationalists of seeking to eliminate the Russian language in Ukraine, are a tiny minority, even if they get into print rather often. While it is possible to find countless examples of overheated rhetoric on both sides of the language policy debate in Ukraine, reality on the ground is characterised more by a relaxed and rather sophisticated acceptance of the linguistic reality, in which so many Ukrainian citizens, including those who identify themselves as ethnic Ukrainian, happily use Russian in their everyday lives. The thoroughly anachronistic 1989 Law ‘On Languages’ has been replaced, but in a thoroughly unsatisfactory manner; although the flurry of protest which greeted the new law’s enactment has for the present died away. I tentatively agree with Kulyk and with the Committee of Experts that the European Charter cannot provide the solution to the vexed question of the status of the Russian language in Ukraine. On the contrary, the Constitution of Ukraine and the relevant legislation should provide for rights which reflect the actual position of the Russian language, that is, the very large number of persons who choose to speak Russian and to use it in so many spheres of everyday life. However, the Council of Europe’s enthusiasm for linguistic diversity together with the experience of the twenty-five Council of Europe states which have now ratified the Charter (as of September 2013) must surely be a powerful basis for constructive reform. Finally, there is now a wealth of scholarly literature lauding the cognitive and pedagogical benefits of bilingual education (see, for example, Garcia 2008). This is surely an area in which Ukraine could lead the world.

NOTES

2. For a strongly argued contrary view, see Vasilenko 2008.
3. Moskal’ is a Ukrainian ethnic slur towards Russians.
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PART TWO

Linguistic Perceptions and Symbolic Values
CHAPTER 3

The Russian Language in Belarus: Language Use, Speaker Identities and Metalinguistic Discourse

Curt Woolhiser

INTRODUCTION

Belarus is widely regarded as the most ‘Russified’ of the former Soviet republics, and indeed nowhere beyond the borders of the Russian Federation has the Russian language retained such a dominant position in virtually all spheres of public life. While modest efforts were made in the first years of independence to promote the use of Belarusian in education, the media and government, since the 1995 referendum that granted Russian co-official status with Belarusian the latter has found itself increasingly marginalised. The continued dominance of the Russian language in Belarus does not, however, to the surprise of those who adhere to essentialist notions regarding the relationship between language and national identity, translate into a readiness on the part of most Belarusians to self-identify as Russians and seek their country’s annexation by its eastern neighbour. Although the ideas of restoring the USSR and/or pursuing political union with Russia had a significant following in Belarus in the mid-1990s, and were indeed among the factors contributing to the rise of Belarusian president Aleksandr Lukashenko, recent public opinion polls show a steadily declining level of support for a Belarus–Russia union state, which according to some recent public opinion surveys falls to just around 10–12 per cent when unification is explicitly defined as Belarus joining the Russian Federation and abandoning its own national institutions (IISEPS 2008).

Moreover, despite the predominantly russophone character of modern Belarusian society, in the country’s two post-Soviet censuses in 1999 and 2009, a plurality of self-identified ethnic Belarusians continued to declare Belarusian rather than Russian as their ‘native language’ (Russian родной язык, Belarusian родная мова), a term that in Soviet practice was
generally interpreted as the language of an individual’s ethnic heritage, rather than the language he or she acquired first in early childhood or in which he or she is most proficient. The dual linguistic identity of the majority of Belarusians is likewise reflected in (or, as some would say, perpetuated by) the country’s quasi-bilingual policy, where standard Belarusian functions on an official level primarily as a symbolic resource, while Russian (with varying degrees of Belarusian phonological, grammatical and lexical influence depending on the speaker’s level of education and the speech situation), is the dominant ‘unmarked’ language for both formal and informal communication for the majority of the urban population. In rural areas, Belarusian regional dialects are converging toward Russian, resulting in a continuum of mixed Belarusian–Russian varieties that have come to be known in Belarus by the pejorative term trasianka (literally ‘a mixture of hay and straw’).

At first glance, it would appear that the sociolinguistic situation in Belarus has much in common with that of post-colonial territories where the language of the former imperial metropole retains a significant, if not dominant position in prestigious social domains, but no longer functions as a marker of political allegiance to the empire and/or identification with its dominant ethnolinguistic group (Mechkovskaia 2005). However, the institutionalisation of such a ‘post-imperial’ scenario remains problematic in Belarus due to the continued dominance in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet region of the ideological trope ‘one nation – one state – one language’, the ambiguous and enduring legacies of Soviet-era nationalities and language policies, and perhaps above all, to the continued resistance to the notion of distinct, officially-recognised national varieties of Russian beyond Russia’s borders.

It is this tension between actual language use and the symbolic functions of language that is the focal point of ideological contestation between those who advocate continued Russian linguistic dominance and those who seek an expanded role for the Belarusian language in the country (Woolhiser 2001). In this chapter I will explore the relationship between language use, language attitudes and national identity in Belarus, focusing in particular on the discursive construction of Belarusians’ linguistic identity and how discursive representations of languages and their speakers are deployed by various social actors in language policy debates. I will begin with a brief overview of the language situation in the country as reflected in recent census and survey data, and will examine the complex and evolving nature of Belarusian identity and the ambiguous role of language as a marker of ‘Belarusianness’. I argue that to achieve a fuller understanding of the sociolinguistic situation in Belarus, as in any other society, it is essential to examine the discursive and ideological
aspects of the country’s ‘language regime’ (McLaughlin 2007), which encompasses not only official policies and regulations, but also informal norms, attitudes, beliefs and practices that influence language use in the public sphere. Language regimes are, to a significant degree, maintained and legitimised through metalinguistic discourse, in which deeply rooted and often unconscious ‘commonsense’ assumptions, conceptual schemes and ideological stances find their expression. Analysing the explicit metalinguistic discourses of government spokesmen, members of the political opposition, Belarusian language activists and members of the scholarly community, as well as of ordinary Belarusian citizens, I will identify a number of recurring discursive patterns that play a crucial role in constructing, in effect, entire speech communities and serve in a variety of ways to legitimise and reproduce the existing language regime in Belarus.

LANGUAGE DEMOGRAPHICS AND LANGUAGE USE IN POST-SOVIET BELARUS: CENSUS AND SURVEY DATA

A striking feature of the demographic situation in contemporary Belarus is that, despite the alleged ‘denationalisation’ of the ‘titular’ nationality, its share of the country’s population has grown steadily since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this respect, Belarus conforms to demographic trends observed in other post-Soviet states over the last two decades. In the 1999 Belarus census, the first held since independence, 81.2% of the total population identified themselves as Belarusians, while self-identified Russians and Poles accounted for only 11.4% and 3.6%, respectively (National Statistical Committee 1999). The latest national census, held in 2009, showed further gains for the ‘titular’ nation as opposed to other groups, with self-declared Belarusians making up 83.7%, while the percentage of self-declared ethnic Russians had declined to 8.3%, and that of Poles to 3.1% (National Statistical Committee 2009).

The census data on language in post-Soviet Belarus present a more ambiguous picture. On the one hand, the 1999 census showed a noticeable increase in the percentage of the country’s population claiming Belarusian as their ‘native language’ – 73.7% of the country’s roughly 10 million citizens (and 85.6% of those self-identifying as Belarusians) – as compared with only 65.6% in the last Soviet census in 1989. The 1999 census, however, for the first time included a question regarding actual language use, and here the results were far less encouraging for Belarusian language advocates: only 36.7% of Belarusian citizens (and 41.3% of self-identified ethnic Belarusians) indicated Belarusian as the
language they spoke at home, while 62.8% of Belarusian citizens (and 58.6% of ethnic Belarusians) claimed Russian as their home language (National Statistical Committee 1999). It should be noted that in the run-up to the 1999 census, Belarusian language advocates vocally opposed the inclusion of the question regarding language use, considering it an obvious ploy by the authorities to justify the ongoing rollback in the use of Belarusian in education, government and the media.

The language question again became a focus of significant controversy in the 2009 Belarus census, inasmuch as the new census questionnaire, in contrast to the one used for the 1999 census and earlier Soviet censuses, now explicitly defined the term ‘native language’ as ‘the language learned first in early childhood’. This more restrictive definition resulted in only 53% of the total population (and 60% of self-identified Belarusians) indicating Belarusian as their ‘native language’, while 41.5% identified their ‘native language’ as Russian. In regard to the language of the home, in the 2009 census 23% (out of a population of 9.5 million) claimed to speak Belarusian, with 70% claiming to speak Russian (National Statistical Committee 2009).

A significant limitation of the 1999 and 2009 Belarus censuses is the fact that ‘native language’ and ‘language of the home’ are treated as single response instead of multiple response items. Thus, the possibilities of an individual identifying more than one language as ‘native’, and using more than one language or a mixture of languages in the home, even though these are perhaps more representative of actual communicative repertoires, were automatically precluded.

In addition to national census data, the language situation in Belarus has also been the focus of a number of surveys conducted by independent polling organisations and research groups. While such surveys are not entirely free of bias, or at the very least may, like the national censuses, impose certain categories and distinctions that are not entirely congruent with local perceptions of sociolinguistic reality, they do in some cases offer a more nuanced picture of the language situation than that presented by national census data.

A recent sociolinguistic survey by a group of German researchers (Kittel et al. 2010) investigated Belarusians’ self-reported linguistic identity and language use, focusing specifically on the question of the social distribution of ‘mixed language’. In 2008 these researchers surveyed a random sample of 1,400 Belarusian citizens in seven locations (200 in each), including Minsk and six medium-sized and smaller towns, about their ‘native language’ and language use; survey respondents were divided into three age cohorts representing roughly three generations in order to examine sociolinguistic dynamics over the last half century in
apparent time. In contrast to the choice between ‘Belarusian, Russian or other’ offered under the rubric ‘native language’ in the national censuses, Kittel et al. included in their questionnaire the designation ‘mixed language’ not only in reference to language use, but also as a potential ‘native language’ (unlike in the 2009 census, ‘native language’ was not explicitly defined as the language of primary socialisation). As seen in Table 3.1, when given the option of ‘mixed language’, a sizeable percentage of all three age cohorts indicated it, rather than Belarusian or Russian, as their ‘native language’.

Belarusian citizens’ self-reported language use and language proficiency have also been investigated by a number of independent survey agencies. In Table 3.2 we see data on the dynamics of self-reported language use in Belarus as reflected in surveys carried out by the Vilnius-based Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies between 1995 and 2011. In contrast to the censuses, these surveys allowed for multiple responses, for example, ‘both Russian and Belarusian’ as well as ‘mixed language’; it seems likely that many of the respondents choosing these variants would have indicated Belarusian as their language of the home on the census. The gradual increase in the percentage indicating Russian as their language of everyday communication, from 37.3% in 1995 to 57.1% in 2011, is particularly striking, as is the sharp decline in the numbers claiming to speak mainly Belarusian, from a peak of 7.1% in 2004 to only 1.9% in 2011. While the increase in the percentage of self-reported speakers of Russian appears to be a sign of progressing linguistic assimilation, it may also reflect to some extent a change in linguistic self-perception of speakers of mixed Belarusian-Russian varieties.

Belarusian citizens’ self-reported language proficiency and frequency of language use was the focus of a survey of over 1,000 adults carried out in August and September of 2009 by the independent survey agency NOVAK, with support from the Belarusian Institute of Strategic

| Table 3.1 Self-reported native language by age cohort |
|----------------------------------|--|--|--|
|                                  | First age cohort (age 50+) | Second age cohort (children) | Third age cohort (grandchildren) |
| Mixed language                   | 33.6%                       | 42.3%                       | 36.6%                           |
| Belarusian                       | 59.6%                       | 49.1%                       | 43.5%                           |
| Russian                          | 19.6%                       | 24.9%                       | 36.9%                           |

The percentages in the columns do not add up to 100 because of multiple responses.
Source: Data from Kittel et al. (2010: 62)
Table 3.2 Changes in reported language use since 1995. Data from IISEPS national surveys, 1995–2011
Which language do you mainly use in everyday communication? (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date (month/year)</th>
<th>06.95</th>
<th>11.97</th>
<th>11.99</th>
<th>11.00</th>
<th>09.02</th>
<th>03.03</th>
<th>03.04</th>
<th>06.06</th>
<th>09.10</th>
<th>06.11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belarusian</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Russian and Belarusian</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed (trasianka)</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Studies. According to the NOVAK/BISS survey, 31.6% of respondents reported active speaking, reading and writing proficiency in Belarusian, with 42.7% claiming passive reading and listening proficiency. However, only a small minority, 2.3%, claimed to be unable to understand spoken Belarusian. In terms of frequency of language use, however, we find that the vast majority of respondents (nearly 75%) report that they use Russian constantly, while only 5.8% said the same of Belarusian, and 23% claimed to never use Belarusian at all (Budz’m a 2009). Among the majority of respondents who claim to use Russian constantly, there is a sizeable segment that still claim to use Belarusian ‘often’ (13.9%), ‘sometimes’ (26.3%) or at least ‘rarely’ (31%). In other words, the NOVAK/BISS survey results indicate that a majority of Belarusian citizens claim to use Belarusian at least some of the time. But what exactly does ‘occasional’ use of a language mean? In theory, this could refer to situational or topical code-switching from Russian into Belarusian, the pragmatically motivated use of Belarusianisms in colloquial Russian speech (metaphorical code-switching), or even pragmatically unmotivated code-mixing, that is, trasianka. Unfortunately, these survey data provide few insights as to what ‘use’ of Belarusian involves in the respondents’ actual linguistic practice.

Kittel et al. (2010) also provide important insights concerning Belarusians’ own perceptions of the language varieties they normally use in everyday communication. In addition to ‘standard Russian’ (russkii literaturnyi iazyk), ‘standard Belarusian’ and ‘mixed language’, participants in the survey were given the options of ‘standard Russian with Belarusian words’ and ‘standard Belarusian with Russian words’. As seen in Table 3.3, while virtually no respondents claimed to use ‘pure’ standard Belarusian in everyday communication, only a minority claimed to use ‘pure’ standard Russian, while over 80% of the respondents in all three age cohorts claimed to use some type of mixture, whether ‘Russian with Belarusian words’, ‘Belarusian with Russian words’, or an undifferentiated ‘mixed’ language.

National Identity and Language Attitudes in Belarus

Three Belarusian National Projects: Belarusophone European, Russophone European and ‘Creole’

Belarus is often cited in the literature on nations and nationalism as a unique European example of delayed or incomplete nation-building
What could be called the ‘Belarusian paradox’ of ethnolinguistic identity is a consequence of the interaction of specific local factors, in particular, the historical position of the Belarusian lands as part of a series of multilingual and multicultural states and empires and the historically multilingual character of local elites, a traditionally weak association of language with national identity among the majority population of the region, and the ideological legacies of nineteenth-century European linguistic nationalism and twentieth-century Soviet nationalities policies.

Indeed, it could be argued that the people of Belarus are still divided in many respects as to what it means to be Belarusian, including the country’s geopolitical identity, its national myths and the role of language as an expression of Belarusianness. However, there seems to be an increasing consensus among Belarusians of all political and ideological persuasions that they are neither Russians nor Poles, and that their country’s independence represents an important achievement that is worth preserving.

At the level of elite discourse (including both ruling elites and counter-elites), some observers have argued that in Belarus there are at present three competing national projects vying for the loyalty of Belarusian citizens, with varying degrees of institutionalisation, internal coherence and public support (Bulhakaŭ 2001; Ioffe 2007): (1) Belarusophone pro-European ‘nativist’ or ethnocultural nationalism, whose proponents assert that Belarus is historically part of the European community of nations and maintain that Belarusian language and culture are essential to Belarus’s European identity; (2) Russophone pro-European nationalism, whose adherents accept most of the cultural claims of the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.3 Self-reported language of ordinary usage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Belarusian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarusian with some Russian words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian with some Belarusian words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarusian–Russian or Russian–Belarusian mixture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data from Kittel et al. (2010: 63)
Belarusophone project, but argue that the promotion of Belarusian as an exclusive national language is not essential to Belarusian nationhood; and (3) Official Belarusian State Nationalism (or the ‘Creole’ project, using the term employed by Bulhakaŭ (2001)), which stresses continuity with the Soviet period, including the sphere of language policy, and assigns highest priority to political and cultural relations with Russia and other CIS countries. While the Lukashenko regime in its early years relied heavily on nostalgia for the USSR and the idea of re-integration with Russia, often couched in vague ‘Pan-Slavonic’ or Russophile rhetoric, as relations with Russia deteriorated over the last decade, there has been a growing emphasis in official discourse on Belarusian sovereignty and statehood. There has also been a corresponding increase in the public use of official state symbols, including the red-white-and-green Belarusian flag (based on the flag of the BSSR (Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic) adopted in 1951) and national emblem (based on the 1950 BSSR emblem). What is particularly striking about the Lukashenko regime’s new emphasis on Belarusian patriotism, however, is that thus far its primary vehicle has been the Russian language rather than Belarusian. In this regard official Belarusian state nationalism represents a unique phenomenon in the post-Soviet region.

In addition to the three competing national projects in Belarus, there is a fourth, externally focused project: Russian irredentist nationalism, which denies altogether the existence of Belarusians as a separate nation and advocates the incorporation of Belarus into the Russian state. Although it has become increasingly marginalised over the last decade, recent developments have made clear that Russian irredentism still exists as a distinct political programme in the country.

Survey data on Belarusian identity and language attitudes

To what extent do the competing national projects outlined above reflect or influence the general public’s notions of Belarusian identity and its attitudes toward the Russian and Belarusian languages? A preliminary approach to this problem is provided by the results of a number of recent surveys carried out in Belarus by independent polling agencies. According to a survey conducted in August–September 2009 by the NOVAK survey agency and the Belarusian Institute of Strategic Studies (Table 3.4), just over half of the population consider the Belarusians to be a separate nation with their own distinct history and culture, while nearly 42% consider the Belarusians to be part of a triune Slavonic nation (triedinyi slavianskii narod) consisting of Belarusians, Russians and Ukrainians. It should be noted, however, that less than
2% accept the central argument of Russian irredentist nationalism that the Belarusians are in fact simply Russians whom hostile external forces have sought to convince that they belong to a separate nation.

As regards the defining characteristics of ‘Belarusianness’ (Table 3.5), we find that in the opinion of the respondents, a Belarusian is above all a person who has been brought up in Belarusian culture and considers it his or her own (41.3%), who was born to Belarusian parents (34.1%), who loves Belarus (33.9%) and who considers him- or herself a Belarusian (30.5%). What is most striking about these findings is the very modest role played by language use: only 4.4% said that above all a Belarusian is someone who speaks Belarusian.

Thus, while Belarusian ethno-national identity in one form or other clearly survived Soviet-era assimilationist policies and has evidently been

Table 3.4 Results of nationwide survey based on a random sample of 1,010 adults conducted by the NOVAK survey agency, BISS and Budz’ma civic campaign (August–September 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belarusians are a separate nation with their own history and culture</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarusians, Russians and Ukrainians are part of a triune Slavonic nation</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarusians are an artificial construct, invented by the intelligentsia;</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarusians are actually Russians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarusians are an artificial construct, invented by the Russians; Belarusians are actually Poles</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Budz’ma (2009)

Table 3.5 Who, above all, can be considered a Belarusian?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Someone who has been brought up in the Belarusian culture and considers it his or her own</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A person whose parents are Belarusian</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A person who has Belarusian citizenship</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A person who speaks Belarus</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A person who loves Belarus</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Someone who considers himself or herself a Belarus</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A person of the Orthodox, Catholic, or Uniate faith</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A person who is like Belarusians in terms of character</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A person who lives in Belarus</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A person who looks Belarus</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Budz’ma (2009)
strengthened in recent years, the linguistic component of this identity remains in question for a sizeable part of the Belarusian population. The language apparently still serves as an ethnic symbol for a majority of ethnic Belarusians, but its active use is not generally perceived as an essential marker of membership in the nation. This is also reflected to some extent in census data, which show a majority claiming Belarusian as their ‘native language’, but only a third of the population claiming to speak it at home. In the NOVAK/BISS survey from August–September 2009 (Table 3.6), we find large percentages of the population who view the Belarusian language as a part of the national patrimony that must be preserved and respected (45.8%) and as a national symbol (35.5%), while only 12.4% feel that Belarusian is a living European language that should be spoken today. In a sense, this could be regarded as a continuation in an urbanised, modern and secularised setting of the traditional language attitudes of the Belarusian peasantry, according to which the spoken language used in everyday life served primarily as a marker of social and local identity, while in the popular understanding ‘nations’ were defined above all by the languages used in the ‘sacred’ domain of religious observance (Engelking 1999).

Public preferences in the sphere of state language policy have also been the focus of a number of recent surveys by the independent survey agencies IISEPS and NOVAK. In a survey of a random sample of 1,500 Belarusian citizens, carried out in March 2008 by IISEPS (Vilnius), respondents were asked for their views regarding the use of Russian and Belarusian in public life. The responses are shown in Table 3.7.

While exclusive use of Belarusian in the public sphere is supported by only 13.6% of the respondents, this figure is still more than twice the percentage of those who advocate exclusive use of Russian. Another

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.6</th>
<th>What does the Belarusian language represent for you?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A national legacy that must be preserved and respected</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A national symbol of the Belarusians</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One of the living European languages that must be used in modern life</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A language that is virtually useless in modern life</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The language of Belarus’s remote rural areas</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The language of the Belarusian opposition</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The language of the Belarusian intelligentsia</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It doesn’t represent anything for me</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Budz’ma (2009)
group who would appear to favour proactive measures in support of Belarusian are those who support actual equality of the languages in the public sphere, 27.2% of the total. However, the largest group – 37.2% – favour the status quo, which implies a relatively marginal role for the language in the public sphere.

The August–September 2009 survey conducted for the ‘Budz’ma’ campaign by NOVAK and BISS also showed that while there is considerable public interest in Belarusian culture and history, respondents are relatively less committed to the promotion of the Belarusian language in the public sphere. As seen in Table 3.8, only about a third of the respondents indicated that they would like to improve their knowledge of the language or have access to more television and radio programmes in Belarusian, and even fewer would like to be able to use Belarusian all the time at their place of work (13.6%) or in public places (22.4%). The survey results also show that a solid majority of the respondents (71.1%) would like to improve their knowledge of Belarusian history and culture, suggesting that for many Belarusians these aspects of national identity are more salient than language.

Table 3.7 In your opinion, to what extent should Belarusian be present in public life: in the army, in courtroom proceedings, in the state media, etc.?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The status quo should be maintained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarusian should be represented to the same extent as Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everything in the public sphere should be in Belarusian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarusian should be represented proportionally to the number of Belarusian speakers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everything in the public sphere should be in Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion/No response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IISEPS (2008 at www.iiseps.org/3-08-13.html)

Language regimes, metalinguistic discourse and language ideology

Language regimes, in the sense I have proposed, are constituted not only by language legislation, formal government regulations and infor-
mal practices or conventions, but also by culture-specific cognitive models and socially situated ideological constructs that are embedded in metalinguistic discourse. Thus, in addition to macro-level studies of the language situation based on census and survey data as well as language policy analysis, the study of language regimes also requires detailed micro-level analysis of their discursive dimension.

In the study of metalinguistic discourse, a key concept that has emerged in linguistic anthropology and sociolinguistics over the last two decades is that of ‘language ideologies’, defined by Judith Irvine as ‘the cultural (or subcultural) system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests’ (Irvine 1989: 255). Language ideologies may thus be seen as a central component of what Harold Schiffman terms ‘linguistic culture’, which he defines as

the set of behaviours, assumptions, cultural forms, prejudices, folk belief systems, attitudes, stereotypes, ways of thinking about language, and religio-historical circumstances associated with a particular language . . . [t]hat is, the beliefs (one might even use the term myths) that a speech community has about language (and literacy) in general and its language in particular (from which it usually derives its attitudes toward other languages). (1996: 5)
Linguistic culture, as Schiffman notes, is among the most important social conditions affecting the maintenance and transmission of a speech community’s language, serving as the ideological framework that informs all aspects of language choice and language policy from the level of the state to the level of the smallest social groups.

One of the key issues in the study of language attitudes and language ideologies is the way in which they serve to constitute and circumscribe a subjectively defined speech community. In social practice linguistic boundaries, and the posited relationship between them and regional or ethnic identities, are, as argued by Bourdieu (1991), above all the product of mental representations that are constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed through discursive practice. Thus, struggles over ethnic or regional identity can be regarded as above all struggles over the discursive definition of borders, over the ‘power to make people see and believe, to get them to know and recognise, to impose the legitimate definition of the divisions of the social world and, thereby, to make and unmake groups’ (Bourdieu 1991: 221).

**Semiotic processes in the construction of ideological representations of linguistic difference**

Irvine and Gal (2000) have identified a series of key semiotic processes that affect the way language ideologies discursively construct and deconstruct speech communities. For our purposes, the most important of these are what Irvine and Gal call *iconisation* and *erasure*. Through the process of *iconisation*, they argue: ‘[l]inguistic features that index social groups or activities appear to be iconic representations of them, as if a linguistic feature somehow depicted or displayed a social group’s inherent nature or essence’ (Irvine and Gal 2000: 37). For example, in territories characterised by contact between two or more cognate language varieties, presumed or asserted ‘closeness’ of linguistic structure or genetic origins may be projected iconically onto presumed relations of social ‘closeness’ and be employed to justify or challenge political unity (2000: 68–9). A second key semiotic process in the ideological construction of linguistic difference is what Irvine and Gal call *erasure*, by means of which language ideologies render certain aspects of language structure or use, or certain users of language, for all intents and purposes invisible (2000: 39). In the following analysis, it will be shown that these two fundamental semiotic processes operate in a variety of ways in the metalinguistic discourses both of political and cultural elites and counter-elites in Belarus, as well as of ordinary citizens.
Language ideologies in Belarus

Ideological contestation in the sphere of metalinguistic discourse in post-Soviet Belarus is structured by a series of interconnected ideological frameworks involving the concepts of ‘national language’, ‘native language’ and ‘standard/literary language’, which are employed both by supporters of the existing language regime and those who seek to challenge it. In the following discussion, I will examine these ideological frameworks more closely, focusing in particular on the operation of the semiotic processes of iconisation and erasure in metalinguistic discourse. In addition to the published statements of political figures, journalists, activists and scholars representing the competing national projects present in modern Belarus, I will also examine examples of ordinary citizens’ metalinguistic discourse from a variety of internet-based sources, including discussion groups and responses to online news reports.

‘As long as the language lives, so lives the nation’: the national language ideology in Belarus

The notion that a distinct, territorially delimited language is a crucial precondition for nationhood was a central trope in the ideology of nineteenth-century European romantic nationalism, influencing not only the nationalist movements of stateless peoples, but even the policies of established nation-states. By the early twentieth century the modern ideological construct of ‘one nation – one language – one territory’ had reached the Belarusians both from the West, above all under the influence of the Polish national movement (as well as of other Slavonic national ‘revivals’), and from the East, in the form of the Russian imperial policy of ‘russification’, pursued with particular vigour in the so-called ‘Northwestern Territory’ (modern Belarus and Lithuania) following the failed anti-Russian uprising of 1863–4 in the lands of the former Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. Given that the territory of what is today Belarus was the arena of fierce competition between the Polish and Russian national projects, both of which by the late nineteenth century assigned a central role to language in defining the nation, it would indeed be surprising if language were not a key component of the nascent Belarusian national movement. Yet this new model of the relationship between language and political borders was very slow to gain acceptance among the population on whose behalf Belarusian nationalist leaders claimed to speak, due not only to the low level of education and economic development in the region in the first decades of the twentieth century, as well as the persistence of religious affiliation as the dominant
traditional form of supra-local identity, but also to established patterns of linguistic accommodation and multilingualism that were among the survival strategies developed by the local population as a consequence of constant foreign invasions and frequently shifting borders.

The national language ideology, already firmly rooted in Russian and Polish linguistic culture by the late nineteenth century, subsequently became a cornerstone of Soviet nationalities policy; indeed, a central component of the Soviet institutionalisation of ethnicity was the notion that each of the officially recognised Soviet peoples possessed a distinct national language. Even as the Soviet regime sought to consolidate and ‘rationalise’ its rule in the non-Russian periphery through the promotion of Russian from the late 1930s, and particularly after WWII, the notion of Russian as the language of all Soviet citizens, and not solely the national language of the Russians, was slow to emerge in official discourse. It was only from the late 1950s, and particularly following the rise of Brezhnev, that we see the emergence of a new discursive formation associated with the concept ‘A New Historical Community – the Soviet People’. This concept, enshrined in the 1977 Soviet constitution, was accompanied in official discourse by the innovative notion of the Russian language as the ‘second native language’ (vtoroi rodnoi iazyk) of all Soviet citizens, regardless of ethnicity, that is, a key component of a Soviet ‘civic’ identity. By this time, however, the notion of a ‘natural’ division of nationalities based on language was so firmly engrained in Soviet society that non-Russians in the ‘national’ republics, even if they were more fluent in Russian than in their ‘own’ national language, continued to identify the latter as their ‘native language’.

As nationalist movements emerged onto the public stage in the non-Russian republics of the USSR in the latter part of the 1980s, it is thus not surprising that calls for expanded use of the national languages played such a prominent role. Following the lead of nationalist movements in other parts of the USSR, in 1990 the BSSR became one of the last union republics to pass language legislation, according to Belarusian the status of sole official state language of the republic with Russian remaining in the capacity of the ‘language of inter-ethnic communication’. The 1990 Belarusian Language Law, drawn up with the participation of a number of leading linguists and writers, included a preamble that stated: ‘Language is not only a means of communication, but also the soul of a nation, the foundation and most important part of its culture. The nation lives as long as its language lives . . .’ (Ab movakh 1990/1994).

In the discourses associated with the pro-European Belarusophone national project, the Belarusian language, and more specifically its standard variety, is assigned a paramount role in promoting Belarusian
national consciousness and securing Belarusian political and cultural independence. Its proponents argue that the Belarusian language is the unique expression of Belarusian national identity and links its speakers to what is claimed to be an authentically European heritage, in contrast to the ‘Asiatic despotism’ many of them associate iconically with the Russian language; therefore, they claim, Belarusian should be the sole state language in an independent Belarus.

If, in the essentialising discourses associated with Belarusophone national language ideology, there is a quasi-biological bond between members of the nation and ‘their own’ language, then those who reject it are rejecting an inalienable part of themselves, with all of the deleterious consequences that this implies. As we see in examples (1) and (2) below, non-Belarusian-speaking Belarusians are often represented as somehow ‘incomplete’, morally and intellectually stunted and highly susceptible to various forms of political manipulation. While such extreme views are certainly not shared by all Belarusian language advocates, in particular members of the younger generation, they do reflect a certain degree of frustration on the part of the Belarusophone intelligentsia at its inability to reach broad segments of Belarusian society on the language issue.

(1) A Belarusian who does not speak the language of his country has no ties to his land. He becomes a defective, second-rate person and begets more of the same type. As a result of this process of genetic selection the entire nation creates offspring that are timid and submissive, and easily influenced by circumstances.¹ (Dzitsevich 2000: 233–4)

(2) The Russian- and pidgin-speaking creoles with passports of citizens of the Republic of Belarus inevitably form the basic resource for the reproduction of the political regime created by Lukashenko. Thanks to their cultural defectiveness and the psychological instability that results from this, they are especially susceptible to ideological indoctrination and other politically motivated forms of manipulation. (Bulhakaŭ 2001)

Such discourses are not, however, confined to language activists and members of the nationalist opposition. Examples (3) and (4), taken from a pro–Belarusian language website, are the responses of a schoolboy and a music teacher to the question ‘What does the Belarusian language mean to you?’; here, too, we see the influence of the Belarusophone European project’s version of the national language ideology, according to which
only by knowing, respecting and speaking the Belarusian language can one be considered a true member of the nation:

(3) The native language for me is like the symbol, the emblem, the adornment and crown of our Motherland and nation. It is something that every Belarusian should know. And you mustn’t reject it, because what’s bad about it?! Our ancestors spoke it and we should do the same, because [if not], what kind of Belarusians are we? The native language gives me joy, confidence in life, and in general, it makes us Belarusians, because if you don’t speak it, you aren’t a real Belarusian. (Siarhei fifth-year primary school student; response to the question ‘What does the Belarusian language mean to you?’)

(4) Only with the native language did I truly feel myself to be a Belarusian. For that reason I don’t believe you can be a patriot and at the same time not know your own language. This assumption is completely refuted by my own personal experience. Only the native language gives an authentic, profound sense of your Motherland, because it is the quintessence, a concentrate of the entire Belarusian spirit, the mentality of this nation, a distinct, uniquely Belarusian worldview. The Belarusian language is the foundation, the core of all levels of our culture, folk and professional art, literature and history. It awakens in you an interest in everything that is your own, because you realise that this all of this is something kindred, a part of yourself. (Sviatlana, music teacher; response to the question ‘What does the Belarusian language mean to you?’)

Significantly, not only belarusophones, but many russophone Belarusians also subscribe to the national language ideology in their conceptions of the role of the Belarusian language, as reflected in the following statements from internet discussion fora:

(5) [In Russian] I can imagine how Russian politicians are going to howl when things really start to change in our country. But there’s one thing I can say – it’s correct. There isn’t a single country without a community of people who consider themselves a nation. There can’t be a nation without history, language and culture. Unfortunately, I realised this too late.
It would be rather difficult to switch over to Belarusian, but it’s so pleasant to hear and read the language, and it’s so sad that you can’t express yourself in what is in theory your native language. We Belarusians lack a national idea, no matter how trite it sounds, but we really need something that could unite the majority of the indigenous population and the intelligentsia... Only by inculcating in children a love and respect for the language, only by raising them on folktales and legends of Belarus can we revive our language and culture and finally become a nation. I’m not at all against Russian, I’m a native speaker of Russian myself, but I don’t like the situation Belarusian is in. Why is it that in the Netherlands, where almost everyone knows English, and sometimes German as well, the Dutch language hasn’t been driven into a ghetto? You can have several languages in a country, that’s normal, but the national language should dominate and that is the task of the government. All the more so in our case, after so many years of forced Russification. (Comment in response to the article ‘Mova ili iazyk, stsiag, al’bo flag... svoe ili chuzhoe’)

(6) If we live in Belarus, we need to know the language, or we end up with a country without a language or traditions. As if we were a part of the Russian Federation. Belarus’ intelligentsia knows and often speaks the Bel. language, but the man in the street has a extremely negative attitude toward it. I think it’s essential to change the people’s attitude in this regard. (Discussion on Russian-language news portal Open.BY of an article from Euroradio on the Belarusian government’s plan for promotion of the Belarusian language)

The iconisation of the perceived linguistic divide in modern Belarusian society in the discourses of Belarusian language advocates has led some to argue that there are in fact two Belarusian nations living within modern-day Belarus: a Belarusian nation in the classical Herderian sense, with a clearly articulated national identity based on a unique language and cultural heritage, and a Soviet Belarusian nation, at present supposedly still in the majority, which according to this view is predominantly Russian speaking or at least harbours an inferiority complex with regard to the Russian language and culture, and is characterised by a continued attachment to Soviet-era political, socio-economic and cultural
models. However, such a dichotomised view of the current situation in Belarus is a gross oversimplification, for there are many Russian-speaking Belarusians for whom Belarusian independence, democracy and ‘European values’ are just as important as for their Belarusian-speaking co-nationals, while some Belarusian speakers, in particular elderly rural residents, wholeheartedly support the project of political and economic integration with Russia and show no overt opposition to the discriminatory effects of government language policies.

Such sociolinguistic ‘anomalies’, through the semiotic process of erasure, are frequently removed from the discursive field and rendered invisible in the discourses of the belarusophone opposition. One of the effects of this erasure in the political domain has been to antagonise, at times, those groups of russophones who are supportive of the project of building an independent, democratic European-oriented Belarusian state.

Given that a sizeable portion of the Belarusian population, including a majority of self-identified Belarusians, apparently see the Belarusian and Russian languages not as mutually exclusive, but complementary, this does perhaps explain at least in part the success that Lukashenko has enjoyed in marginalising the belarusophone opposition.

Whose Russian language? Russian as a/the national language of Belarusians in Russophone European, official Belarusian and Russian irredentist discourse

In their discursive representations of the Russian language in Belarus, both proponents of the Russophone European project and of the regime’s official state nationalism adopt what might be called a ‘pragmatic post-nationalist’ approach, presenting an overt challenge to the national language ideology associated with pro-Belarusian language discourse. Emphasising that Russian-speaking Belarusians do not cease to be Belarusian, proponents of a Russophone Belarus appeal to the fact that there are many countries in the modern world that have no unique national language (Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, as well as the English- and Spanish-speaking countries of the Americas, and so on) or where the majority speak the language of the former colonisers rather than their original ‘national language’ (such as the Republic of Ireland). Example (7), from a newspaper article by the Homel’/Gomel’-based linguist Aleksandr Rogalev, is a fairly typical example of the ‘pragmatic’ orientation in the discourses of the Russophone European project:

(7) Russian-speaking Belarusians, in terms of their psychology and behaviour remain Belarusians. They know more about
the history of Russia and the world than of their own country, but remain true to the traditions, customs and superstitions of their Belarusian ancestors . . . Beginning in the 19th century, on the territory of Belarus a Belarusian variant of Russian gradually developed, its specific features being most noticeable on the phonetic and intonational and lexical levels. A local (national) variety of any given language always appears in cases where two or more nations use the same language. Thus, the English language exists in English and American variants. There are variants of German in Germany, Austria and Switzerland, of Spanish in numerous countries of Latin America and in Spain itself . . . The nativisation of the Russian language in Belarus was historically inevitable. (A. Rogalev, ‘Iazykovoe svoebrazie Belarusi: vchera, segodnia, zavtra’)

President Lukashenko’s pronouncements on the language issue, while not explicitly mentioning the examples of pluricentric languages such as English and Spanish, seem at times to reflect this ‘pragmatic’ orientation, as reflected in examples (8) and (9) below. In these statements, while asserting the ‘bilingual’ character of Belarusian society, Lukashenko suggests that the Russian language is not only the ‘property’ of the Russians, but rightfully belongs to Belarusians as well:

(8) In fact every person here gets two native languages, and this circumstance makes us a unique country. Why on earth do we have to artificially suppress one language just in order to win the approval of yet another Pazniak? [former leader of the nationalist Belarusian National Front]. I believe that one can be an outstanding Belarusian and a 100% patriot but at the same time care about the Russian language.

(A. Lukashenko, Sovetskaia Belorussiia, 8 February 1997)

(9) I always said that the Russian language is not foreign to us. Over the course of many long years we, together with the fraternal Russian nation and other nations [of the USSR] formed this language. We contributed a part of our soul to it.

(A. Lukashenko, Sovetskaia Belorussiia, 12 February 2001)

Another strand in pro-Russian metalinguistic discourse in Belarus is associated with the Russian irredentist project. Proponents of Russian irredentism in Belarus generally employ the same arguments against
Belarusian claims to nationhood that were used by the Tsarist regime and its supporters in the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries, that is, that Belarusian is merely a dialect of Russian with dubious claims to autonomy and that written standard Belarusian is an entirely artificial creation specifically designed to drive a wedge between the Belarusians and their Russian brethren. The following excerpt from an interview in January 2010 with Andrei Gerashchenko, chairman of the Vitebsk-based ‘Russkii dom’ (Russian Home) organisation and a member of the official Writers’ Union of Belarus, illustrates the basic ideological contours of the irredentist position:

(10) – Is ‘Russkii dom’ a purely Russian national organisation?
– Unquestionably. But I would like to stress that we are in fact a pan-Russian [русская] organisation, and not a narrowly ethnic association of Great Russians [великороссов]. In ‘Russkii dom’ there are also many Belarusians who haven’t forgotten that they are Russians by birth. As a matter of principle we do not present ourselves as a foreign diaspora, but rather as a public organisation of an integral part of the Russian nation that has found itself separated from Great Russia as a result of the geopolitical upheavals of the end of the 20th century. In this regard I view Belorussia more as yet another Russian state, than as a non-Russian political entity. In the relations between Russia and Belorussia it is more appropriate to employ the criteria that were used to evaluate the relations between the GDR and the FRG, North and South Korea, or for that matter, modern Germany and Austria, and Montenegro and Serbia . . . many Belarusians sincerely believe that they have in fact ‘forgotten’ their native language and seek to develop Belarusian culture. However, on closer examination it becomes clear that all this Belarusianisation is nothing more than an attempt to split up the united Russian nation and to indoctrinate Belarusians with the idea that they are not Russians, and that their future success is tied to Europe, more precisely to Catholic Poland, and not to Russia. (Materik 7)

In the discourses of Russian irredentism, the national language ideology is deployed against the Belarusophone national project: if the Belarusians do not have an independent language, then they must be Russians and the existence of an independent Belarusian state therefore is unjustified.
By iconically projecting perceived linguistic proximity or identity into the political sphere, an argument is thus made for political and cultural domination.

Speaking in May of 2011 at a conference in Moscow marking the fifteenth anniversary of the Institute of the CIS, Nikolai Sergeev, a contributor to the Russian irredentist internet project ‘Zapadnaia Rus’ (http://zapadrus.su/+), referred explicitly to the data on native language and language use from the 2009 Belarus census as proof of the essential ‘Russianness’ of the Belarusians:

(11) In formulating its policy in regard to the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation must take into account the crucial fact that Belorussia is historically a Russian country whose population is of Russian origin. This is also confirmed, in particular, by the the results of the 2009 census. Russian was indicated as the native language by 42% of the total population of Belorussia. Among ethnic Belarusians this figure comes to 36.9. As for everyday communication (‘the language that you speak at home’) the indicators of Russianness are even more convincing. In everyday life, 62.1% of the population of the republic speak Russian (and, which is important, think in that language). Of those who self-identify as Belarusians by nationality, 69.7% speak Russian all of the time. 8

While such views were previously tolerated, and to some extent even encouraged, by elements within the Lukashenko regime, with the rise of a new officially sponsored Belarusian state nationalism over the last decade, proponents of Russian irredentism are finding it increasingly difficult to reach a broader audience in Belarus. In 2010–11 a number of outspoken advocates of unification with Russia were dismissed from positions in local government and cultural organisations, culminating in the dismissal in November of 2011 of Gerashchenko from his position as District Chairman of the Department of Youth Affairs in Vitebsk.

The standard language ideology

The national language ideology in Belarus, in both its Belarusian-language and Russian-language guises, is frequently accompanied by a set of discourses that attribute to the standard language a unique authority and ontological status: the normative language of formal written and spoken usage, propagated through the educational system and the news
media, becomes, in essence, ‘the language’. This ideological orientation is termed by Lippi-Green (1994: 166) the ‘standard language ideology’, which she defines as ‘a bias toward an abstracted, idealised, homogeneous spoken language which is imposed from above, and which takes as its model the written language’. In the discourses associated with the standard language ideology, the codified standard is rarely represented solely in functional terms, that is, by referring to its utility as a means of transmitting information and cultural values across space and time within a diverse and constantly changing speech community; instead, the standard language is held to be inherently superior to other forms of language (regional dialects, sociolects, and so on), being supposedly more ‘logical’, more ‘developed’, and aesthetically more pleasing than other varieties.

There is frequently a close linkage between the standard language ideology and the national language ideology, inasmuch as in the context of a linguistic continuum, or in the case of extensive language contact and linguistic convergence, linguistic boundaries and the identities they are perceived to be iconically associated with are not always clear. As Jaffe (2007: 58) notes, this linkage lies in the fact that ‘[b]ecause language is being used in the service of a model of a bounded and homogeneous nation, that boundedness and homogeneity is projected back onto language.’

As the emphasis of Soviet language policy shifted away from the multilingual ‘Leninist’ model to portraying Russian not merely as a convenient inter-republic lingua franca but as the de facto national language of the Soviet Union (Kreindler 1982), the issue of the ‘struggle for language culture’ came to be seen as particularly urgent in the non-Russian periphery. In the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic in the 1970s and 1980s, where language shift to Russian (disguised in official discourse as ‘national-Russian bilingualism’) was particularly advanced, linguists and educational policymakers expressed growing concern about the ‘danger’ of the local variant of Russian diverging structurally and stylistically from the codified Moscow–Leningrad Soviet standard. Numerous conferences and publications were devoted to the problem of linguistic ‘interference’ from Belarusian in the Russian speech of Belarusians (many of whom were in fact by this time for all intents and purposes monolingual in Russian) and the various ways of overcoming it (Mikhnevich et al. 1985; Bulyko and Krysin 1999).

Whatever the objective differences between the language varieties termed ‘Belarusian Russian’ and ‘Russian Russian’ in the specialist discourses of linguists, a far more crucial issue for understanding their sociolinguistic significance is how citizens of Belarus themselves evalu-
ate their own speech and that of their fellow citizens, that is, how these objective linguistic facts are perceived and represented in metalinguistic discourse, and how these discourses serve to perpetuate or challenge the existing language regime.

Some Belarusians, both Russian-speaking and Belarusian-speaking, find the existence of a distinct national form of Russian in Belarus to be a perfectly normal phenomenon, with many parallels throughout Europe and the world. In scholarly discourse, for example, we encounter statements such as that of the linguist Rogalev in the previously cited example (7), who asserts almost as a scientific axiom that ‘a local (national) variety of any given language always appears in cases where two or more nations use the same language.’ Similar views are expressed by the prominent Minsk-based linguist Nina Mechkovskaia:

(12) It is significant, however, that in the areas where they occur (Lithuania and Belarus), the features of Russian speech that we have indicated here are not perceived as ‘mistakes’ in violation of the norms of the Russian language or as ‘unrefined speech,’ etc. On the contrary, they are characteristic of the speech of educated people who have an excellent command of the norms of the Russian language and thus are part of normative spoken Russian usage in these countries. While the differences between national varieties of Russian and the ‘source’ Russian language in Russia are quite minor, these innovations indicate the presence of divergent tendencies. In the future the divergence will not be intensive, as a result of the dominance in Belarus and Ukraine of media from the Russian Federation, but divergence will take place. (Mechkovskaia 2005: 62)

Another Belarusian linguist, Tat’iana Ramza, writing recently in Belaruskaja dumka, a leading official political and social scientific journal sponsored by the Presidential Administration, notes not only the ubiquity and stability of ‘Belarusian Russian’, but also its role as a marker of Belarusian cultural identity:

(13) What is remarkable in Belarus, in my opinion, is the fact that despite the dominance of the Russian language in all spheres of communication, the Russian speech of Belarusians has stable, nearly ineradicable Belarusian-language features. Perhaps this is in fact ‘an expression of a specific cultural identity’ of Belarusians. (Ramza 2010: 116)
As noted above, President Lukashenko frequently asserts that the Russian language is no less ‘native’ for Belarusians than Belarusian. For him, the Russian language in Belarus represents an important element of continuity with the Soviet past, a legacy that he deems worth preserving. Moreover, he claims that Belarusians, together with the Russians and other Soviet peoples, played a creative role in shaping the modern Russian language, imparting to it part of their own ‘soul’ (an interesting variation on the national language ideology’s trope of language as the soul of a nation), and that therefore if they reject Russian, Belarusians would in essence be rejecting part of themselves:

(14) And then, what is the Russian language? I will repeat what I said to the first, second and third presidents of Russia. When they say to me, ‘Thank you for not creating problems for the Russian language as in other (I won’t name names) countries’, I say ‘What are you thanking me for? For our, for my Russian language?’ My approach to language is to treat it as a living process and an organism that is fully alive. And since it is a living organism, it develops. And this language, which we call Russian, not Rossiian [расейским], as some people in our country call it, the Russian language – that’s where the soul of our nation has been for almost all of the last century, and probably longer. We did our share of rambling around in the Russian Empire, too. But that language was our language. We contributed a great deal to it. Why are we so quickly trying to forget something that we ourselves created? Why are we trying to get rid of it? (A. Lukashenko, press conference, 30 December 2009)

In addition to members of the scholarly community and the country’s leadership, the question of the existence of a distinctive Belarusian national variety of Russian has also elicited commentary by journalists and the general public. In the fall of 2009 the decision of the Russian Ministry of Education to approve dictionaries that included a number of forms that had previously been considered substandard, for example the neuter rather than masculine gender in the noun кофе (coffee), or the stress on the second syllable of the word йогурт (yoghurt), provoked a lively discussion on the internet among educated Russian speakers both in Russia and abroad about the nature of the literary norm, and in the opinion of many, its degeneration in the post-Soviet era. Interestingly, in Belarus this news story also occasioned a debate as to whether the Russian language is the sole ‘property’ of the Russians and
whether the norms of Russian language usage in the Russian Federation should automatically apply beyond Russia’s borders. For example, in the Russian-language tabloid Komsomol’skaia pravda v Belarusi (one of the most popular periodicals in Belarus) the author of an article about the dictionary controversy in Russia notes that not all of the rules of ‘Russian Russian’ apply in Belarus:

(15) Belarus always had its own Russian language. The Constitution, of course, says that we have two state languages: Russian and Belarusian. But guests who come from Moscow are dumbstruck when they hear in entirely Russian-speaking company the strange word шуфлядкa [Belarusian for ‘desk drawer’]. But we understand! So what if we speak Russian, all the same we’re not going to say выдвижной ящик стола [standard Russian for ‘desk drawer’]! . . . And the majority of families still haven’t acquired половники [standard Russian for ladle], instead they have good old черпаки [Belarusian черпaк/‘ladle’, standard Russian черпaк/’scoop’]. (A. Slutskaiia, ‘У belorusov budet svoi russkii iazyk!’, Komsomol’skaia pravda v Belarusi, 2 September 200910)

The discursive construction of a distinct national variety of Russian in Belarus can also be seen in the comments of one Belarusian participant in an internet discussion forum responding to a question from a Russian participant concerning the correctness of the form Белaрусь (Belarus) as opposed to Белоруссия (Belorussia). This young woman expresses sincere surprise that any Russian speaker would use a form other than Белaрусь in reference to her country or would question its correctness:

(16) I suppose that in Russia a somewhat different system of rules is in effect, although we have bilingualism and the majority of Belarusians use Russian . . . In our country there aren’t any linguistic discussions concerning the forms Белaрусь/Белоруссия (Belarus'/Belorussiia) . . . Actually, this is the first time I’ve heard even of the possibility that at present Белоруссия can be one of the variants or the only correct form . . . Basically, as I understand it, the Russian language in Russia and in Belarus is the same as English in England and the USA, that is, far from identical phenomena. (12 August 200911)
Particularly striking is the writer’s effort to ‘legitimise’ the existence of differences between ‘Belarusian Russian’ and ‘Russian Russian’ by drawing an analogy to English, with its distinct national standard varieties in England and the US.

In practice, however, the potential for ‘Belarusian Russian’ to develop as a fully fledged national variant of Russian is constrained by a number of objective and, perhaps even more importantly, subjective (ideological) factors. Objectively, as Mechkovskaia (2005: 62) rightly notes, the continued influence of the Russian Federation’s mass media and popular culture in Belarus serves to some extent to weaken the centrifugal tendencies unleashed within the language after the break-up of the USSR. Perhaps even more important, however, is the fact that the Soviet-era practice of defining the Russian language solely in terms of its codified, presumably homogeneous standard variety continues to serve, in the discourses of both the proponents of Russian and Belarusian, to delegitimise local varieties of Russian. The educational establishment, particularly at the university level, still tends to regard any deviations in ‘Belarusian Russian’ from established Soviet-era Russian literary norms simply as ‘mistakes’. For example, in a recent interview in the Belarus edition of the Russian-language newspaper *Komsomol’skaia Pravda* with Professor Vasilii Starichenok, dean of the Department of Russian Philology at the Maksim Tank Belarusian State Pedagogical University, entitled ‘Why do we speak and write ungrammatically?’, we find a typical assessment of local varieties of Russian:

(17) Interviewer: The Russian that is spoken in Belarus will probably never be the same as in Moscow. We all feel the influence of Belarusian, even if we consider ourselves Russian speakers.
V. S.: Yes, many errors, especially in speech, occur precisely because of the similarity of Russian and Belarusian. A student who has come to our country from Russia can be spotted immediately. Virtually none of our Belarusian students, even the most talented ones, will have speech that is that pure. Their pronunciation and placement of stresses will be oriented toward Belarusian. Hence the errors. (‘Pochemu my govorim i pishem negramotno?’, 12 January 201012)

While we have noted that some members of the linguistic profession in Belarus adopt a neutral or even positive stance in regard to the process of ‘nativisation’ of Russian in Belarus, other equally influential voices
warn of the potential consequences of relaxing centralised norms and allowing the emergence of distinct ‘national’ varieties of Russian. Thus, for example, Professor Boris Norman, Chairman of the Department of Theoretical and Slavonic Linguistics at Belarusian State University, in a 2010 interview on the Belarusian Internet news portal TUT.by (the most popular Russian-language internet news site in Belarus), while noting that the distinct features of Belarusian Russian give it a certain ‘national’ colour, warns that there is a ‘danger’ that standard Russian could become fragmented in much the same way as English if efforts are not taken to preserve its unity:

(18) Interviewer: What do you think about the modern language that Belarusians use? I purposely don’t say what that language is, since it’s not Russian and it’s not Belarusian, but rather a sort of mixture.

BN: People around us speak in very different ways. I have been living in Belarus more than 40 years, and before that I lived in another republic of the former Soviet Union. I try to keep my speech quite pure, when necessary I also speak Belarusian. But in our country there are very few people who clearly differentiate between these two languages. Even if a person speaks Russian well, in his speech sooner or later Belarusian words like *бульбa* [potatoes], *грошы* [money], *жонка* [wife], *ылыда* [sign] [cf. standard Russian *картошка*, *деньги*, *женa*, *вывеска*] will slip out . . .

There’s nothing wrong with that. It gives Russian speech a certain national and cultural colour and stylistic nuance. But the language may disintegrate and turn into separate varieties. For example, English in those countries where it is used (the USA, Canada, Australia, South Africa) is turning into separate so-called natiolects – national varieties of English. This involves differences in vocabulary, grammar, and sometimes in pronunciation and phonetics.

At present one can’t speak of Russian in this way, since we are trying to preserve its unity. (Interview with Boris Norman, 15 October 201013)

Paradoxically, we find that the supporters of a unitary Russian standard and Belarusian language advocates in fact share some common ideological ground. Like the supporters of de facto Russian monolingualism in Belarus who decry the effects of the Belarusian substratum on local Russian ‘language culture’, some Belarusian language advocates
strategically deploy the standard language ideology to assert that, in fact, very few Belarusians, regardless of what they themselves might believe, can be regarded as authentic Russian speakers at all. For example, the linguist and oppositional political activist Vintsuk Viachorka, in a 2003 interview, argues that the Russian literary language alone should serve as the measure for determining the ‘Russianness’ of the speech of those in Belarus who claim to speak Russian:

(19) At all levels, the Russian language experiences interference with Belarusian. Precisely for this reason, speakers of the local variant of Russian are easily recognised in Moscow . . . Thus, there exists a Belarusian variant of Russian. And so those 40–45% who assert that they speak Russian must in fact be viewed from the standpoint of the Russian literary language – where does the boundary begin, beyond which the language can no longer be considered Russian? (Matskevich, Iadviha, ‘Belaruski palihlot: mova, ‘trasianka’, iazyk’, Novy chas, 9: 14, 2003)

We find a similar argument in a recent interview with Aleh Trusaŭ, Chairman of the Belarusian Language Society, an NGO that promotes the public use of Belarusian and monitors implementation of language legislation, in response to the question ‘What is the quality of Russian at present in Belarus?’:

(20) It’s getting worse every year. Russians no longer travel or settle here, as in Soviet times. People who speak pure literary Russian in Belarus account for no more than 5%. These are people from Russia, who respect their language. The majority of Russian–speaking Belarusians speak trasianka. In Russian cities these people’s Belarusian origins give them away. (Notsun’ and Bzhezetski 2009: 99)

Thus, as represented in the discourses of Belarusian language advocates, ‘Russian-speaking’ Belarusians are in fact for the most part speakers of low-grade trasianka; moreover, those of them who seek to ‘pass’ linguistically as Russians in Russia are in for a rude awakening, as their speech allegedly marks them as ‘non-Russian’.
Ideologising language mixture: trasianka as a discursive construct

If, according to the national language ideology, every nation is characterised by a unique language that is central to its culture and identity, then the language mixture that occurs in situations of intensive language contact becomes iconically a marker of a mixed or ‘deficient’ identity. While there is no empirical evidence to suggest that there is a necessary correlation between language mixture and the development of hybrid national or ethnic identities, the power of this particular type of iconisation is so great that it has become central to the discourses of ethnolinguistic nationalism, including those of Belarusian language advocates. In the domain of language planning, the iconisation of language mixture frequently contributes to various forms of puristic intervention.

As noted by Tsykhun (2000) and Ramza (2010), mixed Belarusian–Russian speech varieties, which had of course existed for generations, first acquired the pejorative designation trasianka in the late 1980s in the discourses of the national revival movement under the aegis of the Belarusian National Front. Like its counterpart surzhyk in Ukraine (Bilaniuk 2005), trasianka as a discursive object serves not merely to describe, but to stigmatise and reprove. Moreover, in the discursive practice both of proponents of Russian linguistic dominance and of Belarusian language advocates, the notion of trasianka grew highly elastic, being applied not only to any forms of speech that deviated in some way from standard Russian or codified literary Belarusian, but in some cases even to the ‘Russified’ post-1933 Belarusian standard that was used in the state-owned Belarusian-language media.

For monolingual russophones, trasianka is a mark of peasant origins, limited intelligence and a general lack of culture. For many members of the Belarusophone opposition, trasianka has an even greater number of negative associations, including not only ignorance, but also conformism, opportunism, aggressiveness and slavish deference to authority. Very often, it is iconised as the linguistic expression of an essentially ‘Soviet’ identity. President Lukashenko’s Russian speech, characterised by a heavy Belarusian accent and occasional (generally pragmatically motivated) code-switches into Belarusian, is frequently characterised by the opposition, both Russian-speaking and Belarusian-speaking, as trasianka, and as a consequence any type of mixed language, or even merely a Belarusian accent in otherwise more or less standard Russian, tends to be associated in the minds of members of the opposition with the Lukashenko regime and its supporters.

The ideological connotations of trasianka in oppositional circles are illustrated in a series of satirical songs by the well-known Belarusian-
language rock singer and poet Liavon Volski, featuring the characters Saŭka and Hryshka. Volski’s Saŭka and Hryshka are childhood friends who have found themselves on opposite sides of the political barricades: Saŭka is an ardent supporter of Lukashenko, while Hryshka is a committed member of the pro-European opposition. In a recent song commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the break-up of the Soviet Union, Hryshka sings in standard Belarusian, while Saŭka sings in stylised trasianka (here, essentially Belarusian with numerous lexical Russianisms).15

Грышка:
А я ўспамінаю карціну:
Застой, дэфіцыт і рэгрэс.
Паўсюль аграменныя чэргі,
Дэпрэсія, шэрасть, запой...
Саўка:
Скаажы мне, Грыгорый, зачэм [навошта] ты
Мне порціш [псуеш] савецкі настрой?
Настрой юбілейны, павер мне,
Бо двaццa гaдкоў, як развaл.
А можа быць СССРaм
Сваю Белaрусь нам назвaць?
Хоці, Грышка, РБ – эта [гэта] крутa,
Саюз, сагласісь [треба згадзіцца], пакрузей [круцейшы].
І выглядзець [выглядаць] будзе, кaк будта [як быцыцам]
Ўсё эта [гэта] на благa людзей [карьсць людзям].16

(‘Saŭka dy Hryshka: SSSR’, 15 December 2011; at www.svaboda.org/content/article/24423182.html)

The denigration and ideologisation of mixed forms of speech, helping to police the boundaries between standard Russian and standard Belarusian, has been a key feature of the metalinguistic discourse in Belarus over the last two decades. As noted by Ramza (2010: 114), while Belarusian language advocates believed that the stigmatisation of mixed speech as trasianka would help promote the cause of Belarusian language revival and preserve the purity of standard Belarusian: ‘the effect was rather the opposite: Belarusians en masse rejected not Russian, but Belarusian. One of the most popular responses to the question “Why don’t you speak Belarusian?” was “I don’t want to speak trasianka”’ Trasianka as a discursive construct is thus a key means of maintaining the existing language regime in Belarus, where Russian and Belarusian are regarded by many members of the educated elite as mutually exclusive codes,
thus preventing the institutionalisation of a ‘nativised’ form of standard Russian, while the possibility of educated Russian speakers shifting to Belarusian is constrained by linguistic insecurity associated with the stigma of speaking trasianka.

CONCLUSIONS

Belarus is unique among the post-Soviet states with respect to the weak linkage between national self-identification and use of the ‘titular’ national language. There is, of course, no a priori reason to challenge the legitimacy and viability of a predominantly Russian-speaking nation beyond the borders of Russia; indeed, Austria and Germany, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, among others, provide examples of a single language shared by contiguous, independent European nations. However, the nation-state ideological trope ‘one nation – one language – one state’ remains so powerful in the modern world, and even more so in the context of Eastern Europe, that Belarus is still regarded by outsiders and even by many Belarusians as an anomaly. As a result, Belarusian society appears perpetually suspended between two poles in terms of linguistic identity and language policy: despite its functionally dominant position in society, the status of Russian as the national language of the Belarusians remains contested due not only to the continued influence of the language ideologies associated with both the Belarusophone and Russian irredentist national projects, but also to the standard language ideology’s insistence on the unitary, as opposed to pluricentric character of the Russian language. As we have seen, not all Russian-speaking Belarusians accept the notion that the Russian language ‘belongs’ solely to the Russians, or that its spoken and written norms are determined solely by authoritative institutions in the Russian Federation. However, the continued stigmatisation of local varieties of Russian, both by the defenders of a unitary, supposedly invariant Russian standard, as well as by supporters of an expanded role for Belarusian, means that the latter remains the only legitimate linguistic expression of ‘Belarusianness’ for many Belarusian citizens, regardless of whether it is their primary language of everyday communication. Thus, we see that the conceptual and ideological factors associated with ‘linguistic identity’, which as Kulyk (2011, also this volume) notes, is not necessarily equivalent to language use, are crucial components of linguistic culture, playing a key role in constituting a subjectively defined Belarusian national speech community and legitimising and reproducing the existing language regime.
NOTES

1. All translation is mine; original texts in examples 1–4, 19 and 20 are in Belarusian, in examples 5–18 are in Russian; example 21 displays mixed Belarusian-Russian.
3. At http://mova.na.by/artykuly/biel_mov1.html
6. At http://7days.belta.by/7days.nsf/last/F9B819426A5C1B3842256AB50031D796?OpenDocument
8. www.imperiya.by/rusworld.html?id=9885
9. At www.pabelarusku.com/index/pra_belaruskuju_movu/0-4
10. At http://kp.by/daily/24353/540517/
11. At www.diary.ru/~paradise1/p87982583.htm
12. At www.kp.by/daily/24422/593000/
14. At http://nchas.iatp.by/arhiv/14/artyk/11.html in Belarusian
15. Lexical and grammatical Russianisms in Saŭka’s verses are indicated in italics, with their standard Belarusian counterparts shown in square brackets.
16. Hryshka:
   I remember the picture:
   Stagnation, shortages and regression
   Everywhere enormous queues,
   Depression, greyness, and binge drinking . . .

   Saŭka:
   Tell me, Hryhoriy, why are you
   Spoiling my Soviet mood?
   A jubilee mood, believe you me,
   Since it’s been 20 years since the break-up.
   Maybe we should call
   Our Belarus the USSR?
   Although, Hryshka, the Republic of Belarus is cool,
   You have to admit a Union is even cooler.
   And it will look as if
   It’s all for the benefit of the people.

REFERENCES


Despite some decrease in its use in the wake of the breakup of the USSR and the promotion of Ukrainian as the only state language of independent Ukraine, Russian continues to be widely used in most practices of Ukrainian society. Its presence in those practices stems from different and often coexisting roles which, however, are rarely explicitly articulated in everyday or institutional discourses. Moreover, the legitimisation of its use in one role can pave the way for the use in another. First and foremost, Russian is the native language for a large part of the Ukrainian population, and for an even larger part, it is the main language of everyday communication. It is these two roles that primarily serve to justify the presence of the language in many social domains, including the media and popular culture, and to open the possibility for its use beyond the scope these roles require. This makes Russian part of the language repertoire of virtually all Ukrainians thus, in turn, helping to maintain its role as a language of everyday communication in society and, moreover, one not (quite) foreign in a cultural or even political sense. At the same time, Russian is also used and perceived in Ukraine as the main language of a neighbouring country, the primary language of international communication in the post-Soviet area and a window on the rest of the world whose other languages most Ukrainians still do not master.

These roles persist in spite of their glaring discrepancy with the legal status of Russian as one of the minority languages and even lead a considerable part of the population, both elites and ordinary people, to call for an upgrade of this status. Although the persistence has partly to do with the authorities’ failure to ensure compliance with the legal norms, the primary reason seems to be the widespread perception of these roles as legitimate or at least established, which makes people act – that is, speak and react to others’ speech – in accordance with the assumed roles rather
than prescribed norms. Actually, it is this perception of many members of the ruling elite that contributes to the lack of a determined policy to implement the law. It is true that many people, particularly those supporting wider use of Ukrainian, consider the persistence of some roles of Russian inappropriate and call for the strict observance of the legal norms, or even revisions of these norms, which would further limit the presence of what they primarily perceive as the language of the former Soviet empire. Others, however, challenge the perception of Russian as externally imposed and argue instead for its domestic origin, voluntarily acquisition and current legitimacy as one of the two main languages of Ukrainian society. The competing arguments in discourses of the elites exert an unquestionable influence on popular beliefs, but the internalisation of these arguments is conditioned by people’s own experiences and perceived interests.

While the elites’ arguments regarding the social roles of the Ukrainian and Russian languages have been extensively analysed as part of political and intellectual discourses on the matters of language, ethnicity and identity, popular beliefs remain virtually unexplored. This chapter will contribute to filling the lacuna by analysing explicit arguments and implicit assumptions regarding the roles of Russian as presented/embodied in ten focus groups’ discussions in different parts of Ukraine with participants from different age groups. These arguments and assumptions will be juxtaposed with those found in the discourses of politics and the media which I have analysed earlier (Kulyk 2006; 2010a; 2010b). This will enable an assessment of the level of congruence between the elite and popular discourses which is particularly important in view of the claims of politicians and the media to express opinions of the people in general and their respective constituencies and audiences in particular. Prior to an empirical analysis, I will present a theoretical discussion of the social roles of language varieties and a summary of the widespread elite arguments regarding the roles of the Ukrainian and Russian languages in contemporary Ukraine.

THE SOCIAL ROLES OF LANGUAGE VARIETIES

Language plays a numbers of roles in human life and in the operation of society, but not all language varieties are used for all roles. Some, usually more prestigious, roles are reserved for those varieties called languages and denied to others having a lower status as dialects, mixtures and the like. However, the recognised (‘labelled’) languages are also subject to functional specialisation. On the one hand, certain languages are primar-
ily used by certain groups of people; in particular, each language is the mother tongue of a language community which is defined by this relation. On the other hand, specific purposes are more likely to be accomplished by means of some languages than others. The two dimensions – ‘the users and uses of language’, to adjust Halliday’s (1968) formula – are obviously interrelated. For example, the perceived role of Russian in Uzbekistan ‘as the language of the most educated part of the population’ is largely due to that language’s predominant use in the Soviet period in higher education and those prestigious domains where college graduates worked. In turn, the primary reliance of this elite group on the Russian language perpetuates its post-Soviet predominance in these domains and gives it a clear advantage in newly found uses such as the online media (Mirovalev 2003).

The use of a language by some group as its main medium of communication often leads to its appropriation for some purposes by other groups with which it interacts; given unequal relations between the groups, often it may be more appropriate to speak of imposition. In many cases, one language becomes a lingua franca, that is, ‘the medium of some activity or activities which the different language communities perform in common’ (Halliday 1968: 143). In the past such appropriation/imposition took place primarily on a local level, even if one party in the interaction consisted of outsiders such as foreign traders or imperial administrators, but with the intensification of long-distance interaction the functional specialisation of languages acquired a national and then a global dimension. A vivid manifestation of the latter dimension is the widely accepted role of English as a ‘global’ or an ‘international’ language, which combines its predominant use in international communication and its increasing presence in certain internationalised domains of particular societies such as science, business, entertainment media, and so on. As Moritoshi (2001: 4–5) argues, since ‘proficiency in English . . . enhances one’s leisure and career choices and opportunities’, this language comes to be accepted as ‘the language of mobility’, that is, it is ‘perceived to open doors which local languages cannot or do not’. This perception not only gives English a priority in most countries’ foreign-language learning (Crystal 2003: 3), but also leads many people to learn and use it at the cost of local languages. While some authors bemoan the pernicious impact of the spread of English on indigenous languages and cultures as ‘linguistic imperialism’ (Phillipson 1992), others suggest ‘a division of labour’ wherein English ‘seems best suited to social development’ and ‘social and cultural maintenance are probably best performed by the local language’ (Moritoshi 2001: 14).

The above examples demonstrate both the abundance of social roles of
languages referred to in the scholarly and lay discourses and the diversity of criteria for isolating these roles. To arrive at a tentative typology, we can proceed from the above-mentioned dichotomy of users and uses. Halliday (1968) intended it primarily to account for the functional specialisation of varieties of the ‘same’ language used within a language community, which he conceptualised as determined by the groups of people using the language, on the one hand, and by the contexts in which they use it, on the other. The first dimension comprises different dialects spoken by different groups, the primary determinant being the region of origin whose impact is, however, modified by class which leads many people to acquire a different dialect, most frequently the standard language. The other dimension differentiates registers of the language used in different situations, which Halliday further classified according to the nature of the event of which the language activity is a part, the medium of that activity (two main types being written and spoken language) and the relations among the participants (for example, casual, intimate or deferential). This typology can also be applied to the functional specialisation of different recognised languages in a society consisting of two or more language communities whose members, in addition to their respective mother tongues, may also use other languages. In such a society, the likelihood of choosing a certain language varies both with the ethnocultural and/or regional group, and with the communicative situation.

Fishman, who sought to explain ‘who speaks what language to whom and when in those settings that are characterised by widespread and relatively stable multilingualism’, argued that taking into account numerous dimensions of the communicative situation makes a typology too complex to be effective. As he was dealing with ‘intragroup multilingualism’, in which ‘a single population makes use of two (or more) separate codes for internal communicative purposes’ (1965: 67), he basically limited his typology to different uses by the same users. While not questioning that different aspects of the situation (the group the speaker is identifying with, the style of interaction he or she considers appropriate, the topic under discussion, etc.) influence habitual language choice, he believed that such aspects are too many and each of them explains too little to keep all of them as separate dimensions of a typology. Instead, Fishman used the concept of ‘domains of language behaviour’ such as the family, the school or the church, which were intended ‘to designate the major clusters of interaction situations that occur in particular multilingual settings’ (1965: 73). He viewed domain as ‘a socio-cultural construct abstracted from topics of communication, relationships between communicators, and locales of communication, in accord with the institutions of a society and the spheres of activity of a culture’ (1965:
The distribution of languages across domains gives a rough idea of their specialisation according to uses, which for our purposes should be supplemented by an account of the language preferences of major groups of users in the society under consideration, as defined, for example, by ethnicity, region or class.

In order to transform a typology of habitual uses of different languages in a society into an account of their assumed social roles, we should add, or rather emphasise, another dimension – the perceptions – which both Halliday and Fishman mentioned but, in view of their respective purposes, downplayed. Not only is the situational or conventionalised perception that ‘a certain kind of language is appropriate to a certain use’ (Halliday 1968: 150) crucial to language choice in a particular situation taken as an instance of that use, but also the stable perception that a certain type of situation ranks high among the actual uses of a language/variety leads to the ascription of a respective social role. In their allocation of roles, individuals and groups can gloss over some widespread uses of a variety or highlight some aspects of the typical situations of its use rather than others. In addition to emphasizing either a group of users or a context of use, the allocator defines them in a certain way, including the very categorisation of a speech pattern as an instance of a certain recognised language, dialect or mixture. Thus, a language can be related either to the whole population of an eponymous country or only to its ethnic majority or educated class, while a dialect can be recognised as authentic speech of a particular region or lumped together with other deviations from the standard as impure language.

Prevalence within a certain institutional domain – defined in a particular way – constitutes an important criterion for the allocation of social roles to languages and substandard varieties, although the typified usage within a domain can be further subdivided according to the groups of users, role relations and so on. Alternatively, this usage can be perceived as a particular case of a more general division of labour between the varieties in a society’s repertoire, for example in a dichotomous pattern that sociolinguists call diglossia (Fergusson 1959) whereby one of the two varieties is predominantly used in the ‘high’ sphere and the other in the ‘low’ sphere. Across the domains runs the differentiation of language according to its general functions, distinguishing first and foremost between communication and identification, with the latter function performed by the national language or a local variety. The repertoire of thus perceived roles of a language variety is conceptually close to the so-called social meaning which is defined in sociolinguistics as the ‘attitudes engendered or symbolised by a language [variety]’ and is assumed to be derived ‘from the group whose language variety it is, or the situations
in which it is used’ (Downes 1998: 65). I prefer to speak of social roles because I want to emphasise the various functions with which a language variety can be associated, rather than an aggregate thereof and the individual perceptions, rather than crystallised meanings, even though the line between the two aspects is of course blurred.

It should be noted that allocating a certain role to one variety often means denying this role to another variety with which it interacts and thus, in effect, giving it a different role. As argued above, the perception of English as the language of mobility in various countries across the world implies that local languages do not give the career opportunities that it does. Similarly, the designation of Russian as the language of the most educated part of the population in Uzbekistan contrasts it with Uzbek as the language of a less educated part. Therefore, the intended examination of the social roles of Russian in Ukraine will also shed light on those roles assigned to Ukrainian and, contrariwise, the beliefs regarding the roles of Ukrainian should be taken into account when assessing the perceived roles of Russian.1

UKRAINE’S LANGUAGES AND PERCEPTIONS OF THEM BY THE ELITES

The diversity of perceptions of the social roles of languages in contemporary Ukraine results from divergent assessments of the country’s post-Soviet political and ethnocultural transformation, which is itself ambiguous and contradictory. Moreover, some contradictions in the perceived roles of the two widespread languages were inherited from the Soviet times. As one of the so-called union republics within the USSR, Ukraine experienced, on the one hand, the development of the titular language and its introduction in various social domains and, on the other, the increasing imposition and voluntary acquisition of Russian which was used not only in inter-republican communication but also in many prestigious domains within the republic. Although the latter process became dominant in the post-World War II decades, the regime did not completely give up the earlier priority of promoting the Ukrainian language, at least in symbolic and cultural practices. Accordingly, the roles of Russian as the language of union-wide communication and of social mobility in Ukraine itself coexisted in public discourses and popular beliefs with the perception of Ukrainian as an important characteristic of the nation and ‘its’ republic and, on an individual level, as the ‘native language’ of ethnic Ukrainians, even those who used mainly Russian in their everyday life (Kulyk 2006). This ambivalent ‘division of labour’
was accompanied by a pronounced regional differentiation, with Russian ever more dominant in the east and south and Ukrainian largely retaining its positions in the west. Moreover, Russian dominated the cities, except for the western region, while Ukrainian remained prevalent in the countryside with which its use became increasingly associated, particularly among urbanites.

As in other republics of the former USSR, the nationalist mobilisation of the late 1980s and the early 1990s in Ukraine aimed at bringing (back) the titular language to the role of the main language of all social domains. The main legal means of the proposed change was the elevation of Ukrainian, similarly to the titular languages of other Soviet republics, to the status of the only state (official) language of the Ukrainian SSR. This status was introduced in 1989 by an amendment to the republic’s Constitution and a concomitant law ‘On Languages in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic’ (Ukraine 1989) which prescribed the predominance of Ukrainian in all domains, albeit in an ambiguous coexistence with Russian designated as ‘the language of interethnic communication of [the] peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’ (Ukraine 1989, preamble). With the subsequent dissolution of the USSR, Russian lost this status which had entitled it to virtually unlimited use. As the independent Ukrainian state patterned itself in ethnopolitical domain on European nation-states, Russian was not entitled to any special status determined by its actual prevalence and became, in legal terms, a minority language just like those with a number of speakers dozens or hundreds times as low. This new status was fixed the 1996 Constitution, even though its language article separately mentioned Russian as one of the minority languages, which reflected the perception of it as a special case (Constitution 1996, Art. 10; also see Bowring in this volume).

The implementation of these norms was, however, far from comprehensive and consistent, leading to widespread perceptions of the languages’ roles which differ significantly from those prescribed in the law. The only domains where Ukrainian clearly prevailed over Russian were education and the government, albeit with a clear distinction between the usage in classes and during breaks in the former case and between documentation and oral communication in the latter. At the same time, in both domains there was a striking difference in the regional language policy patterns which both reflected and reinforced divergent popular preferences inherited from the Soviet times. While in the western and, to a lesser extent, the central regions Ukrainian predominated, in the east and south Russian remained the language of instruction of about a half of schoolchildren and the main language of oral discourse of most officials, including the national leaders during their visits to those regions. In other
domains Russian was much more widespread, often to the point of complete marginalisation of Ukrainian. In particular, the Russian language retained its leading position in industry, tourism, sports, popular music and other domains as well as establishing itself as the main language of new important uses such as business, the internet and others. In the print media the dominance of Russian even increased after the abolition of the Soviet regulation of the language regime of outlets, while in broadcasting the requirements on a minimal share of total airtime in Ukrainian did not prevent the predominance of Russian in prime time on the on-air channels as well as in alternative cable television networks and on the DVD market (Besters-Dilger 2009; Pogrebinski 2010). Russian had a great market advantage not only due to its use in a number of countries, but also due to its acceptance by most Ukrainian speakers, some of whom even preferred consumption of media and cultural products in Russian as they had become accustomed to in the Soviet times.

The Ukrainian state’s toleration of Russian in many practices responded to preferences of a large part of the population and, at the same time, perpetuated such preferences. To be sure, the perception of Ukrainian as a national language led to a slight decrease in the share of people declaring Russian their native language during the post-Soviet years, even if it remained much higher than that of ethnic Russians, the respective figures in the 2001 census being 29.6 and 17.3 per cent (Vseukraïns’kii perepys naselennia 2001). At the same time, as surveys indicate, at least half of the population preferred the Russian language in everyday communication, including an overwhelming majority of the eastern and southern residents (Khmelko 2004). Moreover, Russian remained somewhat better known than Ukrainian, notwithstanding the latter language’s predominance in education. Perhaps the most striking evidence of the persistence of Russian was its particular popularity among the young generation which was raised in independent Ukraine and increasingly educated in Ukrainian (Shul’ga 2008; Vyshniak 2008).

No wonder different political and intellectual groups assessed this situation very differently, in accordance with the assumed interests of the language groups they identified with and the norm of language relations perceived in such a way as to back those interests. Their perceptions of the actual and appropriate roles of Ukraine’s languages corresponded to their general beliefs regarding language and its social use, which many scholars nowadays call language ideologies. The supporters of wider use of Ukrainian, whose language ideology I call Ukrainophone in view of its primary preoccupation with the interests of Ukrainian speakers, subscribed to the norm of nation-state and, therefore, viewed Ukrainian as the national language and Russian as a minority language.
obvious deviation from the nation-state norm in post-Soviet Ukraine, namely, the use of Russian in many domains where the titular language is exclusively used in most nation-states, was perceived to result from the tsarist and Soviet policies of Russification and, therefore, had to be remedied by a determined effort of the Ukrainian state. Accordingly, the Ukrainophone discourse often referred to Russian as the language of a neighbouring state, the designation emphasising the appropriateness of that language’s use in Russia and, by the same token, inappropriateness of its more-than-minority use in Ukraine. Moreover, the references to the imperial roots of the current prevalence of Russian implied its role as the language of the former empire or even, in view of the strong support of many speakers of Russian for the restoration of political unity of Ukraine and Russia, the language (as a weapon) of the empire which has not yet become a thing of the past and can still strike back.

In contrast, those supporting the retention of the uninhibited use of Russian in all domains grounded their claim on the perceived role thereof as the language of (more than) half of Ukraine’s population. Their Russophone ideology (as I call it, based on the group whose interests it defends) demanded an equal treatment for the two halves, in particular equal statuses of the two languages. Unlike the ukrainophones who assumed the priority of ethnicity in an individual’s identity and thus called for policies encouraging Russian-speaking Ukrainians to ‘return’ to their ‘native language’, Russophones considered language preferences at least as important and objected to any attempts at changing them.4 While the former ideology referred to historical injustice as a reason for present disparity, the latter only cared about the prevention of current discrimination which its opponents argued meant the perpetuation of the disparity. Moreover, the Russophone discourse often referred to the role of Russian as a language which all Ukrainians know well and which, therefore, can be used beyond the community of its mother-tongue speakers. In particular, this discourse argued for the continued use of Russian as a means of inter-group communication and a window on the world, that is, the easiest means of access to information and culture from other countries whose languages most Ukrainians do not know. Finally, given the current knowledge of Russian by nearly all Ukrainians, the Russophones extended its role as the main language of Russia to justify its continued use for bilateral relations with that country and even multilateral relations in the post-Soviet space where it remains widely known. The Ukrainophones resented these roles brought about by imperial rule and wanted Ukrainian to become the main language of both inter-group communication within the country and acquisition of information and culture from abroad, as well being used, via translation, in international relations.
While present in some public discourses, the Ukrainophone and Russophone ideologies were largely marginalised due to the growing influence of so-called centrism, which presented itself as a non-ideological position based on common sense and thus shared by virtually all members of society. Unlike their ideological rivals, the centrists sought to defend the interests not of one particular group but rather of the entire population, whose interests they saw as not determined by linguistic, ethnic or any other group identity. As far as the language issues were concerned, the centrists allied with the Ukrainophones in that Ukrainian should be the only official language but shared the Russophone view that Russian should be accepted as, along with Ukrainian, a language of most public practices. This ideology supported the role of Ukrainian as the national language but treated it as a symbolic rather than communicational one, while in terms of communication accepting the roles of Russian as the language of a large part of the population and a language all Ukrainians know well. The centrist ideology thus accepted and normalised the ambivalence of many Ukrainians’ attitudes toward language matters and, at the same time, downplayed these matters by contrasting them with others, allegedly more important for ordinary people, first and foremost those of wellbeing and stability. Given its dominance in public discourse, it is this ideology that could exert the greatest influence on popular beliefs as revealed, in particular, in focus group discussions.

**Popular Beliefs Regarding the Social Roles of Russian**

The data I use to analyse popular perceptions of the social roles of Russian stem from focus group discussions administered by the *Hromadska Dumka* sociological centre in November 2006. These discussions, which were part of a research project on language policy in Ukraine, took place in five cities in different parts of the country, namely Donetsk, Kyiv, Lutsk, Lviv and Odesa. In each city, separate discussions were held with people from four different age groups, of which the youngest (18–30 years) and the oldest (56 years and older) are included in the present analysis. There were no direct questions about the roles of languages; such questions were not expected to lead to adequate answers as most people do not think about languages in terms of clearly defined roles. Instead, I have checked the full transcripts of the ten discussions for arguments and assumptions pertaining to the reasons for using Russian by the participants themselves and other people in their locality, region or the country in general. Although the range of roles mentioned or
implied by the participants was affected by the questions the moderators asked, the discussion was long and free enough to enable the expression of various opinions and reflect both priorities in individual thinking and differences among the categories of participants.

Russian as the language of the east and south

The role most frequently referred to in all groups was that of Russian as the (main) language of the east and south of Ukraine. The participants from different regions and different age groups agreed in their belief that the residents of ‘the east’ or ‘eastern Ukraine’ predominantly speak Russian, with very few mentions of internal differentiation such as the prevalence of Ukrainian in the countryside. This belief was either expressed explicitly or embodied in statements on other matters, most frequently those localising the use of Ukrainian elsewhere, first and foremost in the west (the centre could be related to either language but references to its speaking Russian were more frequent). The division of uses was often related to that of attitudes, as in the following interaction in the southern city of Odesa:

Excerpt 1: Odesa, age 18–30, in Russian⁶
M: What is the attitude of Ukrainian residents towards the Ukrainian language today?
#6: Fifty-fifty.
M: Why?
#6: Because there is a very big division. In the west of Ukraine, I think, everybody perceives the Ukrainian language very well, in the east and south the Russian language; I think, [Ukrainian here] exists only in the form of linguistic . . . well, document language, that is, it pertains only to documents. In principle, all communication in colleges, at work, simply between people takes place in Russian.
#3: I think that Ukrainian is, in principle, our state language, everywhere it is perceived normally, that is, there is no barrier, it is just that certain regions communicate in the Russian language but, in principle, everywhere it [Ukrainian] is treated satisfactorily.
M: Loyally, in principle. Who has another opinion?
#5: I think, not everywhere loyally. It seems to me that in Crimea now they do not want to speak Ukrainian, categorically, and in Donetsk, I think, not much either. It is Odesa that can speak either language.

Similarly, many participants from the western cities were convinced that the failure of easterners to adequately learn and use Ukrainian was
caused by, or at least amounted to, disrespect for the language, which they considered all the more unacceptable because of its status as the state language. Even more unpleasant for them was the perceived predominance of Russian in Kyiv, given its special role as the capital of the Ukrainian state. Moreover, many westerners argued that their own Ukrainian was often met with hostility in the east and south. More frequently, however, western participants explained the easterners’ Russian by mere lack of conditions to learn and use Ukrainian in their regions, particularly in Soviet times. This explanation was not unlike that of many elderly easterners who thereby justified their exclusive reliance on Russian but argued that the youth in their region would know Ukrainian well and, therefore, use it far more frequently. In contrast, most young easterners took their reliance on Russian for granted and saw no reason to switch to Ukrainian, even if admitting the need to know it. They wanted their western compatriots to accept their different language and often complained about westerners’ alleged unwillingness to do so as manifested by hostile reaction to easterners speaking Russian on visits to the west. The residents of all cities were thus similar in contrasting their own supposedly tolerant attitude toward other language(s) with intolerance elsewhere, often even within the same ‘half’ of the country.

Most participants in Donetsk and Odesa as well as many in Kyiv explained the dominance of Russian in their respective regions by the high concentration of ethnic Russians, a supposedly unchangeable fact which, in their view, predetermined the continued use of that language and dictated the need to grant it an official status: ‘I believe that so many Russians live in Ukraine that there should be two [state] languages’ (Kyiv, age 56+, in Russian). To be sure, most agreed that Ukrainian should occupy a special place as the national language, similar to those of other countries, an attitude exemplified by the statement of a Donetsk man (age 56+, in Russian) that ‘a country without [its own] language is not a country.’ However, they did not want this symbolic status, even if translated into legal status as the sole state language, to limit their right to use Russian in all communicative domains. In contrast, people in the western cities of Lviv and Lutsk, including some Russian speakers, tended to view the language division of Ukraine in terms of different influences from abroad: ‘This is because we are closer to Europe and seek to support our native language. And the eastern Ukraine is under influence of Russia, [so] they speak mostly Russian there’ (Lutsk, age 18–30, in Russian). They saw Ukraine’s future as becoming more like European countries and, therefore, wanted Ukrainian to become the national language not only in a symbolic but also in a communicative sense. Given the widespread preference for Russian in the east and south, the western-
ers did not mind the use of that language for informal communication or in parts of the media, but insisted that only Ukrainian should have an official status and be used for official purposes.

**Russian as the language of certain social domains**

Another role the focus group participants mentioned or implied rather frequently was that of the main or at least an important language of certain social domains. The most evident references to this role were to be found in western participants’ complaints about the use of Russian in those domains where they wanted none or at least not so much of it. On the one hand, they believed that only the state language was appropriate in such symbolically important uses as in the parliament, similarly to other European states whose experience they referred to. In the words of a young man from Lutsk (in Ukrainian):

> one [a deputy] who speaks and writes in Russian and cannot write a word in Ukrainian is not a representative of the state, as a member of the Parliament should be. (This is the face of our state and not just a badge [znachok].)

On the other hand, many westerners, particularly in the younger groups, referred to the supposedly dominant role of Russian in the media and popular culture, either directly or in their complaints about the marginal position of Ukrainian in those roles. For example, a young participant in the Lviv discussion pointed (in Ukrainian) to a lack of Ukrainian-language popular music: ‘Almost everybody sings in Russian in our country.’

For their part, the easterners took the predominance of Russian in most social domains for granted and, therefore, only mentioned those practices where they were supposedly unable to use their preferred language. For their cities/regions, this meant first and foremost documentation, particularly forms which every person had to complete in various public and private organisations from municipalities to banks. Half a dozen sentences later, the discussion quoted in Excerpt 1 took the following turn, which vividly demonstrates the unwillingness of many Russian speakers in the east and south to use any Ukrainian whatsoever, notwithstanding their declarations of a positive attitude towards that language:
Excerpt 2: Odesa, age 18-30, in Russian

#9: The Russian language is native, one is already accustomed to it, one speaks in Russian [all the time]. If necessary, of course, [one speaks] in Ukrainian, but one is used to speaking in Russian. The language in which one thinks, it . . .

#6: Well, I cannot speak Ukrainian at all.

#8: Maybe you did not try.

#9: You cannot [or] you don’t want to?

#6: Well, I neither want nor am able to.

#1: You just have not had an opportunity.

#6: Maybe. No, there are opportunities and every day at that, in principle.

#6: Therefore, you can speak in Russian [on all occasions].

M: Let us say, you can avoid speaking Ukrainian.

#6: Yes, I can avoid speaking Ukrainian, in principle, [but] it does not pertain to documentation. It would be very good if one could keep documentation in Russian.

#5: I agree that it is very hard to write documentation in Ukrainian because, firstly, we all know Ukrainian – we watch movies, programmes but to compose documentations . . . I think that [even] children who now learn at school, it is not clear whether they will be able to fill in documents [in Ukrainian] correctly.

Different expectations for the language used in a certain domain were related to different definitions of the place of that domain in society. Thus, while most residents of the east and south viewed documentation as not only a function of the state but also one of communicative practices of the citizens, westerners tended to locate it in the former realm and endow it with symbolic importance, which led to the absurd situation when ‘[this is] a state document but it is in Russian’ (Lviv, age 18–30, in Ukrainian). A similar difference in localisation was to be found in perceptions of language practices of the media, albeit with the dividing line being primarily linguistic rather than regional. Most Russian speakers were convinced that in this domain the consumer should have complete freedom of choice and thus bemoaned the increasing imposition of Ukrainian on nationwide television stations at the time of the discussions, particularly when it led to the translation of programmes from Russian rather than languages which most viewers in Ukrainian did not understand. In contrast, a young Ukrainian-speaking woman from Lviv lamented the supposedly predominant use of Russian on some stations as inappropriate for their status as ‘national channels’, which she located among the symbolically important practices: ‘If all programmes on the Inter channel are in Russian, then why is it national, it is then not a national channel.’ Of particular interest is the position of young Kyivans who preferred Russian in their everyday life but recognised the
importance of the state promotion of Ukrainian. On the one hand, they fully supported the exclusive use of the state language in documentation which they contrasted with interpersonal speech: ‘Let them speak as they wish but only Ukrainian should be official and used in documentation’ (in Russian). On the other, they did not accept limitations on the language choice on television, at least as far as private stations were concerned. Education, in popular perceptions, occupied an interim position between these two domains. Most westerners located it within the realm duly subject to state regulation and, moreover, considered it particularly important for the acquisition of Ukrainian, which they viewed as a crucial precondition for its use in various practices. Therefore, they criticised the superficial introduction of Ukrainian in schools in the predominantly Russian-speaking regions, whereby it was used only during the lesson but immediately dropped when break started. Easterners tended to agree both with the localisation of education in the official domain and its role in the acquisition of Ukrainian, but did not want the state to Ukrainianise the schools up to the point of excluding Russian altogether or reducing it to the level of a foreign language.

**Russian as the language of the former USSR**

The role of Russian as the (main) language of the former USSR was referred to in most groups, albeit less frequently than the two roles dealt with above. The primary reason for the evocation of the Soviet past was to explain the reliance on and/or competence in the Russian language which resulted from its predominance and mandatory teaching in that period. Not surprisingly, this evocation was much more frequent among the elderly people than among the youth. Moreover, it was to be found primarily in the west and Kyiv, maybe because it was there that Soviet practices and attitudes contrasted more sharply with post-Soviet ones and thus seemed to warrant an explanation. For elderly Russian speakers, particularly those who had come to Ukraine from Russia, the reference to the predominance of Russian in the Soviet times served as a ‘not guilty’ plea for not knowing Ukrainian and, therefore, using only Russian even in the Ukrainian state:

*Excerpt 3: Lviv, age 56+, in Russian*

We are just not to blame. We are already in our sixties; we came to live here when everything was in Russian. All documents [were] in Russian, absolutely everything. Because there was not particular need to learn [Ukrainian]. I worked all my life with Ukrainians. They spoke Ukrainian among themselves. If I could not, they spoke Russian to me. By the highest standards, I believe of course that everybody who
lives in a country must know the language of that country. I am just not to blame, it was the case that in Ukraine Russian was [dominant] for many years, many decades.

This claim of personal innocence was not accompanied in Russian speakers’ contributions by blaming the Soviet regime for the imposition of the Russian language to the point of excluding Ukrainian. Not only did they fail to admit the imposed nature of the predominance of Russian, which seemed to have dominated by itself as manifest in Excerpt 3, but also many of them, particularly in the east and south, contrasted the supposedly natural and unavoidable domination of Russian in the USSR with the forcible imposition of Ukrainian in post-Soviet Ukraine. This belief was to be found even among the younger generation of easterners, as demonstrated by the statement of a Donetsk man (age 18–30; in Russian) that ‘the Ukrainian language, in principle, was not subjected to prohibitions during the communist times; it was normal. And now, it seems to me, one should not prohibit Russian.’

In contrast, the Ukrainian speakers from the west repeatedly pointed to the imposition of Russian in the USSR. Some mentioned it in accounts of their personal experience; for example, an elderly man from Lutsk mentioned (in Ukrainian) how he had come in the late 1950s to work at a mine in Ukraine’s south-eastern region of Donbas without any knowledge of Russian, but had to learn it ‘within a week’ as it was out of the question to consistently speak Ukrainian which would have been perceived there as a manifestation of Ukrainian nationalism. Another participant in the same group related the current salience of the language problem to the post-Soviet deportation of intelligentsia from (western) Ukraine to Siberia and subsequent large-scale relocation of people from Russia to Ukraine, whereby ‘ours became Russians [in Russia] and Russians remained Russians here’ (Lutsk, age 56+, in Ukrainian). Moreover, the predominance of Russian in the USSR was sometimes presented as an argument for the similar predominance of Ukrainian in independent Ukraine, as in the following explanation of a Kyivian participant of how she understood the notion of state language:

Excerpt 4, Kyiv, age 56+, in Ukrainian with a Russian quote
For me the state language is that of the state in which the person lives. We live in Ukraine, [hence] it should be Ukrainian. It occurred to me now that when there was the complete Russification – ‘My address is neither a house nor street, my address is the Soviet Union’ [a popular Russian-language song in the 1970s] – Kazakhs spoke in Russian, Ukrainians mostly, it was the state language because we wrote business documents in it, well, all nationalities there were in the Soviet Union.
Russian as the language of Russia

The role of Russian as the main language of the Russian Federation was referred to in several different lines of argument, depending on the speaker’s attitude toward the language and the country. Russian speakers, particularly in the east and south, evoked Russia in the discussion on the language situation in Ukraine primarily to reinforce their argument for the continued maintenance of Russian in their own country which, they believed, had and would have intense contacts with its eastern neighbour both on personal and official levels. In a discussion of the languages of education in Donetsk, one participant rejected another’s suggestion that whereas Russian must be taught in their predominantly Russian-speaking region, it might be unnecessary in the west. He believed instead that the language of ‘a country with greatest resources, with everything [we] are tied to’ (age 56+, in Russian) must be taught throughout Ukraine, alongside the titular language. Accordingly, some Russian-speaking participants resented the authorities’ supposed striving for the eradication of Russian rather than English or other languages and explained that in terms of the authorities’ perception of Russia as ‘the primary enemy’ (Odesa, age 56+, in Russian).

For their part, Ukrainian speakers countered the statements of the primary importance of Russia for Ukraine by pointing to other neighbouring countries whose languages they considered no less worth learning, especially in those regions bordering on and, therefore, having particularly intense contacts with them. In Lviv and Lutsk, the Russian-speaking participants’ arguments for the widespread teaching of Russian provoked a discussion in which the idea of the special importance of Russia vis-à-vis Poland was problematised in terms of both intensity of ties and cultural proximity. Moreover, one man in Lviv unequivocally denied the very value of ties with Russia: ‘We are only tied by the grave past’ (age 56+, in Ukrainian). In tune with this denial, young Kyivian participants argued that the influence of Russia was a reason not for the promotion of Russian in Ukraine but for the limitation of its official use. This is how they explained their critical attitude towards attempts at making Russian an official language in eastern and southern regions (Kulyk 2009):

Excerpt 5: Kyiv, age 18–30, in Russian
# 4: It’s already politics; it is very bad.
M: One should not do so?
#2: This is what I want to say, because Ukraine is now anyway, in effect, under Russia.
Another line of argument referred to Russia’s defence of its interests in general and to its protection of its national language in particular and suggested that Ukraine follow the example. Not surprisingly, this line was mainly supported by Ukrainian speakers in the west who objected to the elevation of the status of Russian by referring to Russia’s failure to officially recognise Ukrainian or any other minority language (the official use of the autonomies’ titular languages was either not known or not taken into account). However, a Russian-speaking participant in Odesa also resorted to it to counter the suggestion that there was no real need to learn Ukrainian:

**Excerpt 6: Odesa, age 18–30, in Russian**

#7: No, I do not mean that Russian is not needed but we live in Ukraine, [and] if only for the documentation we must know Ukrainian and must speak Ukrainian in schools.

#5: Know it, sure.

#6: And why is it needed, at the end of the day?

#7: Because we live in Ukraine.

#4: Okay, and what’s the point?

#3: Why don’t they make Ukrainian [official] in Russia? . . .

The two perceptions – Russia as a partner to accommodate or Russia as a pattern to follow – ran counter to each other in discussions of a seemingly marginal topic which was nevertheless raised in several groups, namely the use of an interpreter by Ukrainian high-ranking official Valerii Ivchenko in his negotiations with Russian partners in Moscow in 2005. This exceptional incident was vehemently denounced by many participants in both eastern and western cities who did not spare words such as ‘moronic’ (Odesa, age 56+, in Russian), ‘disgusting’ and ‘shame-
ful’ (Lutsk, age 56+, in Ukrainian). The critical assessment of Ivchenko’s behaviour as an unfriendly rejection of the language which he knew and which had traditionally been used on such occasions projected the special role of Russian in the USSR onto the post-Soviet relations between its successor states. However, this assessment was countered in two groups by references to the role of the official as a representative of the state who is obliged to use its official language and thereby assert its dignity: ‘The prestige of the Ukrainian language, I must communicate, [in relations] between the states, I must communicate in my native language’ (Odesa, 56+, in Russian). Moreover, it was pointed out that the use of the other party’s language would not be feasible in relations with other states whose languages Ukrainian officials do not master. The matter, in the final analysis, was the place of Russia as either a special, ‘brotherly’ country or a country like any other.

A related aspect of this dilemma was the use of Russian as the language of international communication in the post-Soviet space which was sustained both by a lack of knowledge of English but also by Russia’s insistence, at least in interactions with its participation on the continued use of Russian. In the discussions under analysis, references to this role were rare and, somewhat surprisingly, coming primarily from western participants who thereby seemed to set a limit on the dominance of Ukrainian they otherwise argued for. The easterners may have been less inclined to mention this limit because they called for many other, ‘domestic’ ones such as the use of Ukrainian primarily in the west rather than the east and south and in the public rather than private sphere. Remarkably, in the only two cases of an explicit argument for the preservation of Russian in communication with other post-Soviet countries, it was Ukrainian and not English that was mentioned as an alternative used for this purpose (in business correspondence with partners in Georgia and Latvia, respectively), which the speakers considered obviously inappropriate. While these speakers in their sixties could hardly imagine mastering and using English or even extensively travelling abroad, younger participants referred rather routinely to their foreign trips. Actually, some elderly people also mentioned their relatives’ or acquaintances’ work abroad, both in Russia and Western Europe, and admitted that in each case Ukrainians had to speak the language of the host country and/or English. This experience of globalisation undermined the special place of Russia and the Russian language, which led a young Kyivian to explicitly equate that language with those of other foreigners which he might encounter in his city and should, in his view, first address in Ukrainian and then switch to a language the foreigner understood: ‘I mean that Russian should be precisely such a language’ (in Russian). It
is worth pointing out that this attitude was held by a person who spoke mostly Russian in his everyday life and did not even consider it necessary to switch to Ukrainian in a discussion of the appropriate language use (as some participants in different groups did), which provides a vivid illustration of the widespread ambivalence of popular beliefs regarding language matters.

**Russian as a language all Ukrainians know well**

The role of Russian as the language virtually all Ukrainians know or at least understand well was referred to first and foremost by Russian speakers in their arguments for the continued use of that language in most social domains. Numerous participants argued against the audio and even subtitled translation from Russian into Ukrainian on television on the ground that ‘everybody understands Russian’ (Odesa, age 56+, in Russian). This perception must have pertained to the whole of Ukraine given that some of the channels mentioned in the discussion broadcast nationwide. Similarly, many Russian speakers from different parts of the country presented as both typical and appropriate interpersonal communication whereby they could speak Russian even to those speaking Ukrainian, such as in the following statement: ‘It is easier for me to speak in Russian, I [speak] in Russian; if a person [speaks] in Ukrainian, I [speak] in Russian [anyway], we understand each other’ (Kyiv, age 18–30, in Russian). Here Ukrainian appears to be as widely understood as Russian, which is also the case with Russian speakers’ statements on their performance in many other communication practices such as watching television or taking college classes. At the same time, competence in Ukrainian was often presented as pertaining to comprehension but not to one’s own speech, as exemplified by Excerpt 3 and the last contribution in Excerpt 2. Moreover, some participants posited such an asymmetry on the level of society as a whole: ‘Virtually everybody understands Russian, 99 per cent [of the population]. As for Ukrainian, there are people who do not understand it’ (Donetsk, age 18–30, in Russian). One man in Odesa even referred to the supposedly better knowledge of Russian than Ukrainian across ethnic groups to argue that ‘for this [post-Soviet] transitory period, it is no problem if Russian continues to be the language of such inter-nationality communication’ (age 56+, in Russian). The argument was that this more-than-minority role should be formalised in the status of Russian as an official language, either nationwide or at least in regions of its particular prevalence.

Most Ukrainian speakers also explicitly or implicitly recognised their knowledge of Russian in references to practices such as watching
television or reading books as well as to interpersonal communication in which many were even ready to accommodate their Russian-speaking interlocutors, at least if the interlocutor did not understand Ukrainian. A participant in the Lviv youth group went as far as generalising that whoever knows Ukrainian, they know Russian too, you can even ask any kid, for example, a freshman at any college or something, everybody knows Russian, everybody can [speak it], but all those who know Russian, for them it is already more difficult to speak Ukrainian, it is much easier for us, we can know the two languages, we know the two languages from the beginning, one can say (in Ukrainian).

However, such an explicit embrace of Russian among those preferring Ukrainian was rather exceptional. On the one hand, as mentioned in the previous section, some elderly participants referred to constrained circumstances of their acquisition of Russian as the second language. On the other hand, many resented its widespread use in independent Ukraine by many ethnic Ukrainians and members of non-Russian minorities as the first language of everyday use and the language of interethnic communication. They would like to see these roles, or at least the latter one, performed by Ukrainian as clearly expressed by an elderly man in Lviv (in Ukrainian): ‘Here Tatars live, why doesn’t he speak Tatar, why it is in Russian that he wants to speak? Let him speak in Ukrainian, as he is in Ukraine.’ While not renouncing the knowledge of Russian, many Ukrainian speakers, in effect, wanted to redefine the scope of its appropriate use and, therefore, its social value.

CONCLUSION

The analysis of the focus group discussions has shown, on the one hand, that members of different regional, linguistic and generational groups of the Ukrainian population had rather similar perceptions of the social roles of the Russian and, by extension, the Ukrainian languages and, on the other, that they evaluate these roles in divergent ways and, accordingly, refer to them for divergent ideological purposes. The discerned patterns of referring to certain roles in the discussions of ordinary people revealed considerable influence of the elite discourses on language matters, whose main tenets in this respect I presented prior to the analysis of the focus group data. The Russian speakers in the east and south mostly subscribed to the Russophile view of Russian as an actual
and/or appropriate language not only of the ‘eastern half’ of the country but also of most social domains and interethnic communication in the entire Ukraine as well as the language used in the country’s relations with Russia and other countries of the former USSR. In contrast, the Ukrainian speakers in the west followed the Ukrainophone discourse in that they saw an appropriate role of Russian primarily as the language of the Russian minority within Ukraine and, at least for the time being, of international communication in the post-Soviet space. Moreover, they perceived its other current roles in Ukrainian society as imposed by the imperial Russification. Traces of the elite discourses can also be discerned in the implied localisation of certain social domains within the public or private realm and in the definition of Russia as a special, not quite foreign, country or a country like any other. It is in such popular negotiations of their arguments that the influence of elite discourses is revealed.

At the same time, participants’ statements demonstrated significant deviations from tenets of the Ukrainophone and Russophone discourses. The most striking demonstration was the nearly unanimous recognition by the Ukrainian speakers of the role of Russian as the language of the east and south and its acceptance as a long-term social fact, even if an unfortunate one. Although most participants insisted that Russian speakers must know Ukrainian and be able to use it, they did not seem to expect them to come to speak it as the first language, thus implicitly accepting Ukraine’s irrevocable difference from those ‘normal’ states to which they favourably referred. Moreover, while complaining about the dominance of Russian in domains such as the media or popular music, Ukrainian-speaking participants argued for increased presence of Ukrainian in those domains rather than for the marginalisation of Russian in accordance with the nation-state standards. The Ukrainophone ideology thus proved to be losing ground, with its key tenets largely rejected by those whose interests it seeks to defend. However, the Russophone ideology was also found to be not quite successful in shaping the views of the Russian speakers. Many members of the group, notably among the youth in Kyiv, did not extend the scope of the appropriate use of Russian up to the point of its full equality with Ukrainian, nor did they want the widespread use of Russian to justify integration or special relations with Russia. But then their support for national independence and the acknowledgement of their own Ukrainian identity did not lead them to change their everyday language, even if they were ready to use it in certain practices.

It appears that both Ukrainian and Russian speakers have largely accepted the centrist combination of the symbolic priority of Ukrainian
and the actual coexistence of the two languages in most social domains. However, their acceptance is fragile and can be undermined by political forces seeking to instigate popular discontent for their electoral purposes, as was the case in the eastern and southern Ukraine after the Orange Revolution of 2004 (Kulyk 2009). That instigation must have affected popular attitudes revealed in the focus group discussions that I analysed. Even more destabilising is likely to be the intended elevation of the status of Russian in the wake of the anti-Orange revenge in the presidential election of 2010, which would ruin the legal basis for the symbolic priority of Ukrainian as the national language and cause its further disadvantage in actual usage.

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NOTES

1. In principle, this is also true of Ukraine’s minority languages, but my data contain few references to their roles (as, actually, does public discourse on language matters), so I cannot infer much about Russian. In contrast, numerous references to the mixed Ukrainian-Russian language tell much about the perceived roles of the two standard languages with which it was directly or indirectly contrasted. In this chapter, however, I focus on the perceived relationship between these two languages rather than between the standard and substandard varieties.

2. The remainder of the section is based on my analysis in Kulyk 2010a, section 3; Kulyk 2010b, section 7.2.

3. Hereafter, I italicise the social roles of Russian posited in the elite discourses which I will later juxtapose with those discerned in the focus group discussions.

4. Hereafter, I use the terms ‘Ukrainophones’ and ‘Russophones’ to refer to supporters of the respective ideology rather than members of the group it defends.

5. The project ‘Language policy in Ukraine: anthropological, linguistic and further perspectives’ was implemented in 2006–8 by an international team of scholars of which I was part. I acknowledge the financial support for the project provided by the International Association for the promotion of co-operation with scientists from the New Independent States of the former Soviet Union (INTAS) as well as its permission to use the project data in further work of the participants.

6. When quoting discussions, I mention the city and age category of the group, the language of the excerpt which is otherwise lost in translation and, for interactions involving several speakers, the index numbers of the participants as indicated in transcripts provided by the Hromadska Duma centre (although arbitrary, the
numbering makes it possible to distinguish the participants from one another). In the
dialogues, M = Moderator.

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PART THREE

Russian-speaking Communities and Identity Negotiations
Although Russian travellers are known to have visited Italy from the fifteenth century, a significant migration process only dates back to the beginning of the twentieth. The first wave of Russian emigration was mainly represented by the noble classes and intelligentsia, making a great contribution to the spread of Russian culture in Italy.

Nowadays, representatives of the third generation of the first Russian emigration wave live all over Italy, but only a few continue to speak Russian. For instance, Maria Volkonskaya, one of the last descendants of the Volkonsky family of princes, lives in Rome, works as a translator and teaches Russian. In an interview, she admits that, for her generation, its Russian origins remain primarily in family memories. Despite the fact that for the first émigrés the Russian language was a precious resource for surviving, in Italy it was mainly limited to family life and this still seems relevant today.

The latest massive wave of migration can bring new hope to the Russian language, as in some countries like Israel, for example, it is represented more than it had been in the Soviet period, producing different contact processes. As Mechkovskaia (2004: 240) states, ‘in the modern world, the expansion and extension of school education, intensification of informational processes, as well as globalisation processes lead to the intensification of language contacts, which speeds up linguistic changes.’

In Italy and other European countries, as well as in the United States and Israel, speakers of Russian form a diverse group, described by David Laitin as a ‘conglomerate’ (1998: 31). This group includes people who use Russian as their native language, and those who use it as their second native language or as a lingua franca (migrants from the Former Soviet
From this point of view, they can fairly be regarded as a speech community, united by the common usage of the Russian language.

For the Russian-speaking conglomerate, the Russian language is still a means of interethnic communication as indeed it was in the Soviet period. However, the concept of conglomerate is more related to the cultural and ethnic composition of this migration flow than to its linguistic habits or numeric relevance. In fact, although the migrants are scattered and isolated in many cases, they often show common cultural features and values. If in the US most Russian-speaking immigrants from the first three waves of the twentieth century were Russian and Ukrainian Jews (Simon 1997), nowadays post-Soviet migration is characterised by a multinational composition and secularity. These features are typical to all segments of the latest ‘transnational diaspora’ (Remennik 2007), including the recent wave of repatriation to Israel (Ben-Rafael et al. 2006: 24).

The Russian-speaking groups are often distinct in their atomism and individualism, especially in Italy, where the number of Russian speakers is not large enough to be able to request social and economic status or more attention towards their language needs. The ‘horizontal’, i.e. synchronous, analysis of the latest wave of Russian-speaking migrants and minorities in various countries shows that they choose a ‘conglomerate identity’ to avoid assimilation. The only exception is Israel, where the high proportion of Russian speakers represents a substantial cultural force that has become a real drive in social change over the past few decades.

It has been shown that the new identity of the Russian conglomerate is formed on the basis of their diaspora-living experience. Laitin defines it as ‘a common denominator among a set of identity groups that share some characteristics that are distinct from those in the dominant society in which they live’ (1998: 31). According to Daniel Rancour-Laferriere, the multi-language and multiethnic configuration of diaspora causes the transformation process of a Russian identity into a Russian-language identity (2000: 79).

Analysing language contact phenomena in my bilingual informants, this chapter intends to show the role of language in their new identity perception and the process of language attrition characterising the Russian-speaking conglomerate in Italy. Though it seems to be difficult to predict the future of the Russian language in the post-Soviet Russian-speaking diaspora in Italy, it is possible to present some trends in defining this small community against global patterns.
RESEARCH METHODS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE

The Russian language in a diaspora setting can be considered from a number of angles including sociological, cultural, linguistic and sociolinguistic. In Russian scholarship, Karaulov (1992), Glovinskaia (2001), Golubeva-Monatkina (2001) and Zemskaia (2001) studied Russian abroad from the point of view of linguistic variation mechanisms, seeing it as a specific variant of the standard language derived from the displacement of its native speaker. They paid special attention to the language loss process, while all the contact signs characterising a bilingual migrant’s speech, like code-switching (CS) or code-mixing (CM) are, in their opinion, related to the formation of a ‘macaronic discourse’, the term they use to define the mixed Russian speech of the last wave of émigrés (Zemskaia 2001: 126). Perotto (2009) contrasted this position regarding contact phenomena in Russian-speaking emigration with works on the subject produced in Western scholarship (Polinsky 1995; 2006; Endrius 1997; Osipova 1999), pointing out the need to include linguistic analysis in a more complex model which takes into account the results of recent psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic studies.

This chapter reports the results of a five-year research project, examining written and spoken language produced by Russian-Italian bilingual speakers of the first generation of migrants. A survey of 100 informants representing the latest migration wave aged over 15 (88 women and 12 men) living in Italy for at least five years was conducted. A five-year period has been chosen following recent neurolinguistic studies on bilingual production. Goglia et al. (2004: 130) argue that this period is required to gain a minimal level of fluency in oral speech and bilingualism used in everyday life. Our research excluded informants under 15, because experience shows that identity is a difficult concept for them. The imbalance in the selection of informants’ gender truly reflects the real gender composition of migrants from some post-Soviet states (see Table 5.1).

Table 5.1 shows that the current number of Russian-speaking immigrants is relatively small. Their dispersion around the country did not allow us to carry out full-scale quantitative research, so a decision was made to adopt a combined approach which included 100 written questionnaires in Italian based on the ‘snowball’ sampling method and in-depth oral interviews with a sample of 16 informants. During the interviews, people were asked to express their attitudes towards Russian language and culture maintenance. The relatively free wording of the questions and the informal environment of the interviews were intended to encourage participation.
All respondents were native Russian speakers, most of whom (60 people) were ethnic Russians, while the rest were representatives of other nationalities (24 Ukrainians, 9 Belorusians, 1 Moldavian, 4 from Central Asia and 1 from the Caucasus). One responded to the question ‘Where are you from?’ naming the USSR as his country of origin.

The data analysis demonstrates that these people feel united not only by the Russian language, but also by the fact that they belong to Russian or Soviet cultures. In most cases, when speaking to an Italian they define themselves as Russians, despite their different ethnic origins. In some cases, when speaking about ethnicity in a broader sense, they choose Russian identity for reasons of convenience or prestige. In fact, Italians seem to perceive Russians more positively in comparison to other Slavic groups, as they are associated with great achievements in Russian culture. At the same time, Italians tend to associate other migrants from former Soviet countries, especially Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, with poverty, insecurity and lack of culture (Perotto 2009).

**Socio-Demographic Results**

Analysis of the sample showed that, for most Russian speakers (and for Russians in particular), the reasons for immigrating to Italy were based on family circumstances (43 out of 60), while about half of the Ukrainians (13 of 24) specified financial reasons. The questionnaire results demonstrate that Russian women rarely move to Italy without a job secured in advance or stable marital status. Young people rarely come to Italy alone, mainly due to the difficulty of getting a visa, which means that the majority of Russian-speaking youngsters there are heritage speakers.

Most of our respondents were educated people (86% were university
graduates) and 71% were employed. In many cases, the informants were able to use their qualifications in their employment. The majority of the respondents lived in mixed families (in 61 cases, a typical configuration was an Italian husband and a Russian wife); 18 families consisted of Russians only and 19 women informants were single.

According to Nikolaeva (2011: 161), monoethnic Russian families have greater problems integrating into Italian society: 12 informants out of 100 in her study gave a negative assessment of this process while most of them (90%) live in monoethnic families. Russian women over 55 in particular reported problems with integration. This probably explains the wish, mainly expressed by informants over 50, to meet up with other Russian-speaking compatriots (see Table 5.9).

We also tried to understand the informants’ interest in maintaining their Russian identity, culture and language, by observing not only how often they take part in associations or other forms of aggregation, but how much they share their ideas and needs in online Russian language forums.

SOCIOLINGUISTIC RESULTS

Most of the Russian-speaking émigrés in our sample were Russian/Italian bilinguals, but 36 spoke three different languages, and 7 spoke four languages. The majority of youngsters who had arrived from former Soviet countries in recent years spoke the national language of their respective state, which is different from the Soviet period when the national language was usually the second language after Russian. According to the diglossia model, during that time Russian was a high-prestige language and the national languages of the republics were low-prestige domestic varieties. In Italy though, Russian and Italian are not used according to this model because Italian is the dominant language. However, not all Russian émigrés speak Russian at home or in other domains.

Table 5.2 shows the data on the spread of Russian and Italian in different spheres of communication. According to our study, women speak more Italian at home and prefer to speak Russian with their friends, while the behaviour of men is more balanced and they speak Russian more often at home (27% of the informants speak both languages at home). As explained later in this chapter, this has an effect on their offspring’s linguistic balance, as children invariably spend more time with their mothers.

The dominance of Italian in almost all spheres of social life stimulates
the use of calques and loans, especially by the Italian–dominant migrants. As Donald Winford notes, ‘bilinguals who gradually shift to an L2 and use it as their primary language often impose features of the L2 on their L1 to compensate for their loss of proficiency in the latter’ (2008: 131). These shifts can be seen in the following examples:


2. *большая зеленая зона ‘large green area’, used instead of много зелени ‘a lot of green’, from Italian grande zona verde;

3. *помидорный соус, instead of томатный соус ‘tomato sauce’, in Italian salsa di pomodoro;

4. *делать душ ‘to do a shower’, as in Italian, instead of принять душ ‘to take a shower’;

5. *услышимся, following Italian ci sentiamo, ‘talk to you soon’, instead of до скорого;

6. *возьму поезд ‘I will take the train’, as in Italian prendo il treno instead of the Russian поеду на поезде.

Notably, some of these shifts are common to Russian–speaking émigrés living in other countries. For example, the verb иметь (to have, to own) is commonly used in the expressions such as *я имею насморк ‘I have a cold’, instead of у меня насморк; *она имела двух детей ‘she had two children’, instead of usual у нее было двое детей (Zemskaiì 2001: 97). In our sample, the identified universal forms of interference do not appear regularly, except for the confusion between если and ли hypo-
thetical conjunctions noted by Niznik (2005: 1709): *Он меня спросил, если завтра я поеду к нему, instead of Он меня спросил, поеду ли я завтра к нему (He asked me whether I would go to visit him tomorrow).

The presence of Italian loan words or syntactic calques, however, is a limited phenomenon in Russian adult speech. We can consider it a form of attrition, or imposition, due to language contact, but not a kind of language loss, because the grammar system, as we will see, remains stable and resistant to embedding and change. In adults’ oral or written texts we have observed no erosion of the case system, or simplification of verbal aspect or punctuation, which do occur in children’s or adolescents’ language, examined in contemporary scholarship (Polinsky 1995; 2006; Polinsky and Kagan, 2007; Perotto, forthcoming). For the majority of our informants, Russian remains an important resource which is often used in employment. This is why we cannot agree with Zemskaia’s (2001: 34) argument that Russian speakers of the fourth immigration wave integrate fast and undergo linguistic assimilation as they are not bilingual and have a low level of education.

Our respondents say that they choose the language which allows them to communicate most effectively in specific contexts, looking for compromises and adopting CS and CM strategies (Table 5.3). At the same time they indicate that they reflect on their language and do not always approve CS and CM, as demonstrated in Table 5.4.

When answering the question ‘Do you ever mix Russian and Italian?’, most respondents admitted that CS and CM occur in their speech, although many responded negatively to the question whether they like doing that. The use of the word ‘contamination’ in two answers reveals certain purist attitudes when reasoning about language. It can therefore be concluded that the informants show a level of pragmatism in their language use, while at the same time they are rather conservative in their language attitudes.

Zemskaia also notes that it is specific to the fourth wave émigrés to insert ‘abundantly in their Russian speech the loans from the language of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only during my early life in Italy</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3 Do you ever mix Russian and Italian?
the country in which they settled’ (2008: 620). She offers a detailed analysis of every possible kind of loan, as well as its use in different domains, but disregards the notion of CM and defines her examples as ‘macaronic discourse’. She identifies only three reasons for the migrants’ use of loans, namely, nominative, expressive and self-assessment (Zemskaia 2001: 184–99). In contrast, our study of CM and CS shows more reasons for their use by Russian-speaking immigrants in Italy, including sociolinguistic, contextual, creative and psychological reasons. CM and CS are primarily used for denotative, expressive, metaphorical and situational functions and can express solidarity, complicity and an emotional state (Perotto 2003; 2009: 107–20).

The ‘macaronic’ phenomena that some Russian scholars see as a sign of linguistic ‘decay’, is possible to explain in a different way. When analysing our informants’ CM and CS strategies, we applied Pieter Muysken’s theory concerning the three levels of mixing, that is (1) insertion, (2) congruent lexicalisation and (3) alternation (2000: 3–6) in order to show that both CS and CM frequency and nature of use correlate with the speaker’s dominant language and the length of his or her period of residence in Italy. This dynamic seems to be in line with some recent neurolinguistic studies which affirm that ‘a high degree of exposure to a language determines more automatic and less controlled use. A lower effort of activation of the dominant language can facilitate linguistic commutation’ (Brambati 2004: 155).

It was determined that, as a rule, the process of bilingual development corresponds to the progressive integration of Italian language items into the matrix of the Russian language. The term ‘matrix’ indicating the system of the recipient language, which is more activated in the switch, became very popular thanks to Carol Myers-Scotton’s matrix language frame model (Myers-Scotton 1993; Myers-Scotton and Jake 2001: 87) – the main framework for the study of CM – and was adopted by Muysken

Table 5.4. Do you like to mix the two languages?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive answers: I like it, it’s funny, normal, natural, essential</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative answers: I don’t like it, prefer not to</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It’s contamination</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It does not matter at all</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I try to avoid it</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It depends on the context</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not know</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

...
to explain insertion and congruent lexicalisation. He claims, though that ‘In the case of alternation, there is a true switch from one language to the other . . . and the notion of matrix language plays no role’ (2000: 5).

For Russian speakers who are just beginning to learn Italian, an asymmetrical relation usually occurs between the two languages. Examples (7) and (8) below demonstrate the type of CM whereby there is no integration of Italian words:

(7) Финансы ему не позволяют, но все равно каждое утро он ходит в бар пить кофе с cornetto.18 (I. L., Russian-language dominance, seven years in Italy)

(8) Муж моей сестры работает как muratore, а ей не хочется, чтобы сын стал, скажем, ignorantе, как он.19 (N. R., Russian-dominance, seven years in Italy)

(9) Телефон у меня rascaricarsi.20 (V. U., Italian-dominance, twelve years in Italy);

(10) Я уже шесть лет работаю в regole.21 (K. M., Russian-dominance, twelve years in Italy).

In both (7) and (8) an Italian word follows the pattern of an ‘insertion of an alien lexical item or phrasal category into a given structure’ (Muysken 2000: 3). The inserted items in our case are frequently nouns or adjectives embedded in the structure of the dominant matrix Russian language. They tend to take the form of free morphemes or content words, which are easier to combine than bound morphemes or function words (functional, syntactic elements).22 Examples (9) and (10) are cases of congruent lexicalisation, that is, ‘a situation where the two languages share a grammatical structure which can be filled lexically with elements from either language’ (Muysken 2000: 6). Here we can see inserted L2 stems with the native affixes: the stem of the reflexive Italian verb scaricarsi is combined with the Russian prefix ‘ras-’ and the reflexive postfix ‘-sia’ to form the verb on the model of the Russian разрядился. In example (10), the Italian feminine noun regola is integrated into Russian grammar taking on the prepositional case ending taken after the Italian expression lavorare in regola. Both speakers modify the embedded item on the basis of the matrix – the Russian morphology.

So-called flagged switching, normally used to introduce a particular word, quotation or idiom without adaptation, is exemplified in (11) and (12):
In (11) there is no apparent adaptation of the Italian expression to Russian, while (12) is a sort of doubling, where the Russian is a *calque* of the Italian phrase, followed by a switch to Italian. In both cases the speakers use the indicators of switching: тaк сказaть, скaжем тaк. Random insertions occur if the period of residence is short and the bilingualism not completely balanced. If for the speakers Italian is dominant after a fairly long period of living in Italy, morphological adaptation occurs more frequently. Also, some examples of phrases in which function word insertion occurred both in the Russian and/or Italian matrix occurred in Italian-dominant speakers who have lived in Italy continuously for several years without speaking Russian (13, 14).

Russian and Italian in contact share the same word order, and notably, concordances of the verbal forms are maintained in both languages and resultant utterances are syntactically full and quite understandable for bilingual Russian–Italian speakers. It is not clear though which of the two is A. K.’s base language: in (13) it seems to be Russian, in (14) Italian and in (12) the doubling produces a balance of the two.

Our analysis of the CS and CM forms in the speech of Russian migrants in Italy demonstrates their ability to manage the two languages, the majority of the data showing that they maintain their mother tongue as the matrix language and follow what Muysken called the ‘government restriction’ or ‘constraint’.27 Italian items are usually embedded in Russian utterances according to the morphological and syntactical rules of Russian grammar. This appears to fall into Myers-Scotton’s definition of CS as: ‘the selection by bilinguals or multilinguals of forms from an embedded language (or languages) in utterances of a matrix language during the same conversation’ (1993: 3).

Though frequent, the use of CM and CS in our informants’ speech is not systematic or regular enough to create a common code, a sociolect or ethnolect which they could use in communication with their compatriots.28 These language strategies are significantly different from the
extended forms of CS and CM between the Brighton Beach (New York) Russian and English, sometimes called ‘Runglish’, widespread among specific age groups. 29

LANGUAGE MAINTENANCE

The respondents we interviewed did not express any particular concern about Russian language preservation. Most of them (68%) were not concerned about losing their native language. This may occur because many of them (61%) regularly keep in touch with their homeland, 38% go back from time to time and only one respondent has never been back. They try to keep themselves up-to-date with modern Russian life by reading books, magazines, following the news and watching films and TV shows in Russian (Tables 5.5 and 5.6).

Globalisation of the mass media protects migrants against the total isolation from which the first wave of émigrés suffered. Most adult informants’ answers show that they prefer reading in Russian to watching Russian TV. 30 Russian books and newspapers are often sold in large bookstores, while films on videotapes or DVDs are easier to find in specialised Russian shops. Two bilingual newspapers containing useful information for Russian migrants are distributed throughout the country: Nasha gazeta (‘Our newspaper’) and Slovo (‘Word’), published in Naples and Varese. Also available is the Russian-language internet resource Italia. 31

Table 5.5 In which language do you read books and newspapers?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I only read in Russian</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I only read in Italian</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I read both in Russian and Italian</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I read more in Italian than in Russian</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I read in Russian, Italian and English</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I read books in Russian and newspapers in Italian</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.6 Do you watch films or TV in Russian?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I watch Russian TV</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not watch Russian TV</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I watch Russian films on videotape or DVD</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The survival of Russian language and culture is, however, a topic of particular concern in the families of the Russian intelligentsia, represented by a very small group in Italy today. As Lora Krejdlina, the wife of the famous scriptwriter Tonino Guerra and a friend of Federico Fellini, told me in a private interview, for them, the main concern is the danger of becoming inarticulate, ‘to reach a state of complete cultural stupefaction’ (Perotto 2009: 62).

The transmission of Russian to immigrants’ children turns out to be a challenge. Among our informants, sixty-six have children. Many of them declared that they did not receive any support from schools or the social system in language integration of their children, which is why their school results are not always satisfactory. According to experts, children’s early bilingualism or monolingualism is determined to a great extent by how parents use language at home (Romaine 1982: 183; De Houwer 1999; Chirsheva 2000: 109; Protasova and Rodina 2011: 30). Therefore, Russian-language maintenance depends significantly on the mothers’ efforts. However, the main hurdle in cultivating bilingualism among children, especially those born in Italy, lies in their mothers’ inclination to speak Italian or CS. Our data confirmed that children’s answers do not always correspond to their parents’ expectations as demonstrated in Table 5.7.

Table 5.7 demonstrates that there is a correlation between the parents’ linguistic choice and the language of children. The importance of this choice is confirmed by Chirsheva: ‘The bilingual child progressively acquires as background knowledge the orientation to a correct code choice according to the language spoken by his or her interlocutor, to the place, time and aim of communication’ (2001: 23). Thus, speaking Italian certainly does not help maintain the dominance of the Russian language at home.

That Russian Saturday schools have opened in some Italian cities (Milan, Rome, Verona and Gorizia) is another factor in Russian-language

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parents speak to their children in R 39</th>
<th>Children answer in R 25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Children answer in R, I 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Children answer in I 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No answer 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents speak to their children in R, I 17</td>
<td>Children answer in R, I 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Children answer in I 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Children answer in R 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents speak to their children in I 7</td>
<td>Children answer in I 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Children answer in R 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
maintenance among children. These schools offer various programmes – from simple Saturday play meetings and elementary lessons in Russian, mathematics and music to courses which follow a full standard senior school curriculum of the Russian Federation, as, for example, in Pushkin school No. 1 in Milan (Simanovskaia 2009). The teachers at a Russian Consulate school in Rome commented that children usually happily attend the Russian-language schools at a younger age, when they see this as fun. However, when they reach school age their motivation significantly weakens as the amount of work they are set by Italian schools grows. If children do not have a group of Russian friends, it is extremely difficult for their parents to persuade them to continue studying Russian.

Until not long ago, the Italian school system had been mostly monolingual and teachers took little interest in bilingual children. Indeed, bilingualism in children was often considered as a possible hindrance to studying Italian. In most cases, parents in mixed families reported that they were unable to find at school and in the pre-school education system professional assistance in raising bilingual children. Parents were often convinced they should abandon their native language when communicating with their children in order to be able to simplify their integration at school.

However, in recent years the attitude to bilingualism in Italy has begun to change. Although the country is de facto monolingual in most parts (leaving aside local dialects), some respondents expressed their intention to preserve the practice of Russian communication at home. One of them said that, after the birth of her second child, she realised the importance of bilingualism and decided to stick to Russian while bringing up her children.

A few years ago, Suzanne Romaine pointed out that in multiethnic societies there is a need to pay particular attention to bilingualism ‘as a starting point to build on and as a resource across the school curriculum . . . Bilingual education needs to be reconceptualised as a strategy for all students and not as a special instructional program for disadvantaged minorities’ (1999: 68). Following this and other influential work on the bilingual and intercultural education of immigrants’ children (Demetrio 1997; Demetrio and Favaro 1997; Favaro 2004 and others), new school programmes are being created in today’s Italy. However, only a limited number of parents have a guaranteed, legal right for their children to attend bilingual primary and secondary education (Morelli 2006: 18). This concerns the languages of historical minorities living in Italy within very close-knit, sometimes large communities. Italy’s language policy does not include protection of the so-called ‘immigration languages’ which means that funds are not always available for running
specific programmes for these languages. Although Italy signed the 1992 *European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages* in 1998, this has yet to be ratified (Brezigar 2006: 148). The absence of national programmes for developing immigrants’ languages at school does not encourage preservation of Russian as a native language among children, leading them to gradually assimilate the dominant language, that is, Italian.

**SOCIAL INTEGRATION AND THE NEW IDENTITY**

As mentioned above, the majority of Italians perceive Russians positively. Indeed, 60% of the respondents claimed they enjoy being a Russian in Italy, as Italians are curious about them (85%) rather than hostile (15%) (Perotto 2009: 52). In mixed families, only 5% of Italian husbands tend to oppose to their wives and children communicating in their native Russian, so the choice of the native language versus the dominant one depends on one’s own personal motivation. This can pull in different directions: the ‘pragmatic usage motivation’ may occur when members of a minority group choose the dominant language in order to simplify everyday life for themselves and their children or to achieve better and faster social development. But also bilinguals can choose to speak the dominant language for reasons of prestige, for example, with friends or schoolmates (prestige within the in-group), or if they want to show their competence in the dominant language (prestige within the out-group) (Vakhtin 2001: 233–51).

Language is described as the main factor in the construction of individual or collective identity (Giles and Byrne 1982; Pavlenko and Blackledge 2004). In order to understand the role of the Russian language in defining Russian-speaking conglomerate identity we asked our informants the question, what it means to be Russian (Table 5.8). This table shows that for the respondents language is not a marker of Russian identity, but rather it has the function of integration of different ethni-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.8 What does it mean for you to be Russian?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language, Culture, Mentality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other answers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
cal indicators, culture and what is interpreted as ‘mentality’ (Guboglo 1998: 33). They also stressed the primary role of Russian ‘spiritual’ and cultural values and were critical of the materialistic principles of Western life. One of the answers was: ‘I cannot speak about food and cars all the time.’

An interest in preserving the group identity through the use of Russian as a lingua franca can be seen in a person’s wish to contact and socialise with fellow migrants. To the question ‘Do you seek the company of other Russian speakers?’, more than a half of the respondents answered ‘yes’ (58% of males and 53% of females), but we also noted different positions within the Russian-speaking conglomerate (Table 5.9).

Although most respondents were positive about seeking the contact of other Russian speakers, it seems that the informants from Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries were more enthusiastic than Russians and Belarusians. This also seems to be more pronounced in older people (64%). Also, despite the respondents’ declarations of a certain interest in joining a Russian-speaking community, they do not show intentions to get actively involved in it. This can be seen in the communications of Russian speakers on the RussianItaly electronic forum, where guests and members have the chance to express their opinions on various forms of joint activity freely and informally. In the discussion ‘Russian Diaspora: its Present and Future’, which posed the question: ‘Would you like to join an organisation of Russian fellow-countrymen in Italy?’, the highest percentage of the respondents (28%) said that it was enough for them to be part of an informal organisation. The Russian speakers preferred to socialise with others and take part in lofty communication, without having to pay for this. Some 23% said that they would take part in the work of the organisation if it met their expectations, while only

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 5.9 Do you seek the company of other Russian speakers?</th>
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<tr>
<td>Type of speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians (60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarussians (9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ukrainians (24)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other ethnic groups (7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>15–30 years of age (20)</td>
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<td>41–50 years of age (20)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Over 50 years of age (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No age declared (3)</td>
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10% said they would pay the fee and take an active part in all the activities. A further 8% said that they needed no such thing.

In the Russian-speaking conglomerate, identity seems to be ranging from recognition of one’s Soviet origins to the complete adoption of the host country’s lifestyle.\(^{35}\) This can be explained by the fact that identity in migration often means a process of evolution in thinking and acting and involves both ‘self construction’, ‘intra-construction’ and, in addition, ‘extra-construction’ which is identity imposed by official language policy (Guboglo 1999: 291).

In answering the question: ‘Have you ever felt that you are Italian?’, 60% of the respondents acknowledged that they sometimes notice what they see as signs of an Italian identity. The examples they give include missing good Italian coffee in Russia. Answers, however trivial, indicate the respondents’ desire to confirm their dual identity (‘I would like to represent the best side of the two cultures’) and attempts to avoid feelings of inferiority (‘after twenty-five years in Italy my mentality is no longer Russian, I feel as if I’m Italian with a few small flaws’).

As mentioned in the answers to the electronic forum, Russians are not particularly interested in different forms of self-organisation, with the exception of some members of the intelligentsia, who seem to value more the events and initiatives aimed at maintaining Russian culture and language. A significant number of cultural events are organised in a number of Italian towns: festivals, concerts, literary readings.\(^{36}\) An increasing role is played by the Orthodox Church in creating a consolidated community among Russian-speaking immigrants. Despite financial difficulties, it attempts to revive its mission of providing spiritual and cultural support for migrants, something which was part of Russian community work in Italy back in the nineteenth century. At that time, regardless of the difficult relations with the Roman Catholic Church, the Orthodox Church was the backbone of Russian-language communities, bringing together not only pilgrims and believers, but anyone in need of social help (Talalai 2011). The Church’s activity ceased after the Bolshevik Revolution when the Soviet regime suspected it a form of support for emigration and of providing an asylum for ‘the enemies of the people’. Some hostility towards the Church was noticeable among the Russian émigrés themselves: the first atheist migrants Bakunin and Gorky were opposed to their conservative, deeply religious compatriots. This ideological and cultural division into two camps is still noticeable in the behaviour of some Russians today: as it appears, their absence of interest in joint activities has deep historical roots.

In recent years, Orthodoxy has become the main faith among Christian immigrants in Italy: among Christians, who are 49.8% of the total immi-
grants in Italy, 28.6% are Orthodox (Perego and Gnesotto 2010: 207). Orthodox parishes still remain places where migrants meet and receive spiritual support and arrange cultural events and schools for Russian-speaking children, where they can study both Russian and religion, thus contributing to the maintenance of some elements of cultural identity in the new generation of migrants.

CONCLUSION

Unlike other parts of the world, in Italy, the last post-Soviet migration wave is not massive but it forms a Russian-speaking conglomerate with specific linguistic traits, common values and identity dynamics. Members of this ‘transnational diaspora’ use the Russian language as a lingua franca inside the conglomerate national groups, but seem not to be orientated towards formation of a distinct, autonomous community, living scattered throughout the peninsula and showing a good level of integration in the dominant society. For the first-generation members of this migration wave, the integration process is easier if they are quite young and live in mixed families. However, in any case, total assimilation of Russian speakers into Italian society seems to be infrequent.

Migrants cite Russian and Soviet ways of life, cultural values and traditions as part of their identity. We found it interesting that our informants did not recognise the Russian language as an element of their identity, but rather bound it to culture and ‘mentality’. This is accompanied by their pragmatic attitude towards language use: although the respondents show a concern for maintaining their first language and its ‘quality’, they cannot avoid using CM and CS strategies.

As for the Russian language, it is difficult to forecast its future in post-Soviet diaspora in Italy, as it depends on a range of factors. On the side of maintenance, we have outlined the high level of education of its speakers, the prestige of Russian language and culture, and the established contacts with the homeland. Conversely, factors such as the relatively small number of Russian speakers, the low level of their unity and the dominance of Italian in many spheres, including home, preclude Russian from being perceived as a basic element of the immigrants’ identity. Without the support of a strong community, the prospects for the Russian language in Italy will depend fully on the individual will and life experiences of its speakers.

Research conducted in Italy shows that the appearance of language attrition is a reality leading to a possible loss of Russian in the second generation of the Russian-speaking immigration. This is not only linked
to the interests of the parents and the way they raise their children, but also to the limited access their children have to the native language at home and in society, and the absence of both a protective linguistic policy in Italy and special programmes drawn up for the development of this language for its native speakers. Today we can only hope for the more active participation of Russian and Italian institutions in cultural associations for émigrés, which could involve both first- and second-generation migrants, in order to reinforce the development and transmission of a bilingual and bicultural identity.

NOTES

1. Limited material of this chapter, including Tables 2 to 9, was published in Perotto, M. Lingua e Identità dell’Immigrazione Russofona in Italia, Napoli: Liguori 2009.
2. See results of the cross-university project ‘Russi in Italia’ developed by a group of Italian experts in Slavic languages and cultures, at www.russinitalia.it/index.php.
3. The first wave of Russian migration dates back to the period of the Bolshevik revolution, the second to the 1930s, the third began in the 1970s when mostly dissidents and Jewish people left the USSR, and the fourth began at the end of the 1980s, during the period of perestroika. Zemskaya describes the features of the four emigration waves (2001: 35).
4. Where not specified otherwise, translation is by the present author.
5. In the Soviet period all the peoples of the USSR developed ‘unilateral (asymmetrical) bilingualism’ (national/Russian language), sometimes speaking Russian better than their first language. Some, mostly Slavic language speakers, considered Russian as a ‘second native language’ (Lewis 1972; Isayev 1977: 23, 406).
6. Labov, Gumperz, Dorian, Romaine and Milroy are among scholars who have contributed to defining the concept of ‘speech community’. A classical definition of speech community is given by Fishman as ‘a community whose members share at least a single speech variety and the norms for its appropriate use’ (1971: 28). Following the ‘post-Labovian approach’, Romaine (1982: 13–24) explains that a speech community can be very heterogeneous in using the same language, in spite of its speakers’ class or social status.
7. Analysing the situation of Russian-speaking diaspora in the Baltic States, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, Laitin argues that ‘the term “Russian-speaking population” has clearer boundaries and is a more powerful identification in the Baltic States than it is in Ukraine or Kazakhstan. In the former cases it could well evolve into a new form of national identification, in competition with assimilation’ (1998: 263–4).
8. Our work was carried out with the assistance of colleagues from several Italian universities and Centres of Russian Language and Culture.
9. The sampling is named ‘snowball’ because as more relationships are built through mutual association, more connections can be made. It is a useful tool for recruiting informants who are difficult for researchers to access (Corbetta 1999: 350).
10. The results of our enquiry match official data, presented in the last Dossier Caritas/Migrantes 2010, which showed that in 2009, 60.6% of the Russian-speaking
migrants came to Italy to join their family and only 35.5% came to find a job (Ricci 2010: 68).

11. A low number of Russian students come to Italy to study at their own expense, with the exception of those who receive a grant for a study period in Italy. Currently there are 914 Russians studying in different Italian universities, 80.4% of whom are women (Ricci 2010: 66–71).

12. ‘Heritage speakers’ (or ‘heritage learners’) is a notion first used by Guadalupe Valdés to refer to individuals raised in homes where a language other than English is spoken and who are to some degree bilingual in English and their family language (Polinsky and Kagan 2007). On the second generation of Russian-speaking immigrants in Italy, see Perotto (forthcoming).

13. Proposed by Ferguson, the diglossia model is ‘a relatively stable language situation in which . . . there is a very divergent, highly codified (often grammatically more complex) superposed variety, the vehicle of a large and respected body of written literature . . . used for most written and formal spoken purposes but not used by any section of the community for ordinary conversation’ (1959: 435).

14. ‘Imposition is a quite general type of transfer that can be observed in contact situations where one language dominates the other in bilingual individuals’ (Winford 2008: 133).

15. In her later work, Zemskaia (2008) takes a less rigid stance, admitting that there are some highly educated people among the Russian-speaking migrants of the fourth wave and that many maintain their Russian language and culture.


17. Brambati uses the term ‘bilinguismo bilanciato’ with the same meaning as Romaine’s ‘balanced bilingualism’ whereby ‘the bilingual is considered to be equally fluent in both languages’ (1982: 15). If the speaker is more competent in L1 rather than L2, for Brambati it is ‘bilinguismo dominante’ (dominant bilingualism) (2004).

18. ‘He can’t really afford it, but every morning he goes to a bar for coffee and a croissant anyway.’

19. ‘My sister’s husband works as a builder, but she doesn’t want her son to be an ignoramus like him.’

20. ‘My phone’s battery has run out.’

21. ‘I have already been working legally for six years.’

22. Content words are elements of an open lexical class with their own meaning, while function words belong to a closed syntactic class and have an abstract meaning that depends on the context (Muysken 2000: 157).

23. ‘I am, so to speak, having a nervous breakdown.’

24. ‘It annoys me, so to speak.’

25. ‘Even if I sometimes guess something is wrong.’

26. ‘Well, I put [a word] in, spontaneously.’

27. Muysken explains that: ‘the relation between a head and its syntactic environment, as circumscribed by government, was assumed to constrain possible code-mixes . . . The government restriction on CM predicts that ungoverned elements, such as tags, exclamations, interjections, and most adverbs can easily be switched’ (2000: 20–1).

28. A sociolect is a variety of language typical to a particular social group, age group or socioeconomic class, while an ethnolect is a variety spoken by a certain ethnic group.
29. Perotto and Ambrosi (2009) observed that a special code was used amongst the Brighton Beach youngsters, which differed from the language of adults who rarely switch or only speak Russian.

30. In more recent research about the second generation of Russian-speaking immigrants in Italy, the results show that young people are more interested in watching Russian films or TV and listening to Russian music than reading Russian books or newspapers. They mostly read materials on the internet, so their main source is the oral language (Perotto forthcoming).

31. www.italia-magazine.ru/

32. Simanovskaia provides information about Russian schools around the world, but for Italy, she lists only two schools in Milan although in fact there are more in the country. For more comprehensive information, see Nikolaeva (2011).

33. Law No. 482 of 15 December 1999 recognises the following minority languages in Italy: German, spoken in Alto Adige or South Tyrol; French, Occitan and Franco-Provençal (Piedmont and Aosta Valley); Ladin, Slovene, Friulian Croatian (Friuli-Venezia Giulia); Catalan and Sardinian (Sardinia); Albanian and Greek in the South provinces of Molise and Puglia. This law defines which measures should be undertaken to defend these endangered languages. Law No. 482 is available from the site of the Italian Parliament at www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/99482l.htm

34. www.russianitaly.com


36. 2011 was announced the year of Russian language and culture in Italy and Italian language and culture in Russia. In Naples, Rome, Milan and Florence exhibitions of contemporary Russian art were organised in this year (Predstavitel’tvo Rossotrudnichestva 2011). A cultural programme also runs at ‘Fontanka’ Centre in Florence (www.fontanka.it/index.html), including the VI Russian émigré poetry competition ‘Wind of Adventures’, under the patronage of Princess Elena Volkonskaya.

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Ethnolinguistic vitality ‘is that which makes a group likely to behave as a distinctive and active collective entity in intergroup situations’ (Giles et al. 1977: 308). It was suggested that groups that have little vitality are likely to cease to exist as distinctive collectives, while those that have high vitality are likely to survive. Traditionally, ethnolinguistic vitality is divided into objective and subjective vitality (Bourhis et al. 1981). Objective vitality is determined by three structural variables: demography, institutional support and status (Giles et al. 1977); while subjective vitality is understood as ‘group members’ subjective assessment of in-group/out-group vitality’, which ‘may be as important in determining sociolinguistic and interethnic behaviour as the group’s objective vitality’ (Harwood et al. 1994: 175). In this chapter, ethnolinguistic vitality is understood as a perception of ‘groupness’, together with emotional attachment to this group and readiness to act collectively as a group (see Ehala 2008a, 2010b); thus our approach is social psychological in nature and close to traditional subjective vitality studies, although the framework is considerably extended.

As a social psychological phenomenon, vitality is tightly connected to ethnic/linguistic identity. According to Omoniyi and White ‘the sociolinguistics of identity focuses on the ways in which people position or construct themselves and are positioned or constructed by others in socio-cultural situations through the instrumentality of language and with reference to all the variables that comprise identity markers for each community’ (2006: 1). In this chapter, we concur with Bendle (2002) that identity construction is an ongoing, lifelong project in which individuals constantly attempt to maintain a ‘sense of balance’ that depends on the...
context in which they live. In the Estonian setting, micro-sociolinguistic factors (language aptitude, attitudes towards an official language and experience in studying it, an exposure to language policy matters, and knowledge of history) and macro-sociolinguistic factors (the prestige of the first and second (= official) languages, the language planning climate, attitudes between majority and minority language groups, and so on) certainly influence how informants exploited different issues during the interview for the purpose of self-identification. Through this relationship to the context, Russian speakers’ identity construction in Estonia is certainly intermingled with their own acculturation orientations, as well as with the acculturation orientations of the members of the majority group.

The purpose of the present study is to analyse ethnic and linguistic affiliations and identity construction by Russian speakers in Estonia by triangulating the results of a quantitative study of ethnolinguistic vitality with the data obtained from focus group interviews about Russian speakers’ reflections on their ethnic and linguistic identities and intergroup relations in Estonia. The quantitative data disclosed several subgroups amongst the Russian-speaking community in Estonia, characterised by variable perceptions of Russian speakers as a group and their own attachment to this group. Qualitative analysis of the interviews revealed some of the reasoning behind these perceptions, together with the ways people maintained the ‘sense of balance’ in their identity positioning.

The chapter is organised as follows. First, the theoretical background for ethnolinguistic vitality is formulated along with a refined vitality model (see Ehala 2008a, 2010b), which was used as a main theoretical framework. The chapter continues with an explanation of the Estonian sociolinguistic situation. Then the methodologies of both the quantitative study and focus group interviews are addressed. Finally, we present the results of the quantitative study of the ethnolinguistic vitality of Russian speakers in Estonia. The results are combined with the analysis of the qualitative interviews, which aim to further our understanding of ethnolinguistic processes among Russian speakers.

MEASURING ETHNOLINGUISTIC VITALITY: INTRODUCING THE V-MODEL

Over thirty years have passed since the introduction of the notion of ethnolinguistic vitality. During this time, a large body of research has accumulated, though the vitality framework has not yet managed to establish itself as a genuine field of study bridging sociolinguistics,
cultural studies and social psychology (see Hogg 2006; Taylor and Usborne 2007). Although the concept of vitality is intuitively clear and has remained attractive for researchers, it is very hard to operationalise. Therefore, vitality studies have not led to the refinement of the theory, despite the severe criticism the theory has occasionally attracted (see Husband and Saifullah Khan 1982). To overcome this weakness, Ehala (2005; 2008a; 2010a; 2010b) has been developing a formal model of ethnolinguistic vitality that can be used to obtain directly comparable data from distinctive interethnic contact situations – the V-model. Relying on the social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979) and previous models of ethnolinguistic vitality (Giles et al. 1977; Sachdev and Bourhis 1993; Allard and Landry 1994; Landry et al. 1996; Bourhis 2001), this model specifies the structural relationships between its four key variables that affect the vitality of ethnolinguistic groups: (1) perceived strength differential (PSD) between the in-group (‘us’) and the most prominent out-group (‘them’); (2) the level of intergroup discordance (D); (3) perceived intergroup distance (R); and (4) the level of utilitarianism (U) in the value system of the group studied.

All these factors are socio-psychological, and they reflect group members’ perceptions, attitudes and beliefs about their own group and the interethnic relations in the setting where they are living. The mathematical V-model is operationalised in a way that makes it possible to assess these factors on a scale, so that each respondent is characterised by a vitality score. By calculating the average score for the sample and/or finding subgroups with different vitality scores, it becomes possible to assess the vitality of a given group, that is, its readiness to act as a collective entity in intergroup relations. Below we will characterise each of the subcomponents of the V-model in more detail.

**Perceived strength differential (PSD)**

The driving force behind language shift is the power difference between dominant and minority groups. Language and identity maintenance depend on the opportunities and rewards, real or symbolic (including positive social identity), that the competing groups can provide for their members. The sum of these factors can be called the perceived strength of the group.

However, for group vitality, the crucial factor is not perceived strength itself, but the perceived strength differential between the in-group and the most prominent out-group. The reason is that groups exist in their socio-historical settings and the perception of the strength of the ‘us’ group depends on the relative strengths of the ‘them’ group
(see Figure 6.1). In general, if the PSD is small, the benefits from shifting one’s group membership do not outweigh the emotional and social costs. The more the PSD is in favour of the out-group, the more toward the beneficial it would seem to shift identity. Thus, provided that the influence of all other factors is zero, the V of the group would be equal to the differential of the perceived strengths (S\textsubscript{we} and S\textsubscript{they}) of the minority (in our case, Russian-speaking) and majority (Estonian-speaking) groups. Mathematically, this can be formulated as follows: 

\[ V = \text{PSD} = S_{\text{we}} - S_{\text{they}}. \]

If \( V < 0 \), then the group has low vitality; in other words, it has a low potential to act as a group, a condition that may lead to identity and language shift. If \( V \geq 0 \), then the group is vital, i.e. it is able to function as a group and to maintain its identity over time.

**Intergroup distance (R)**

Although PSD is the driving force behind identity and language shift, it is certainly affected by other factors that either hinder or enhance this tendency. One such factor is intergroup distance (R). This is a complex factor that relates to the extent of the intergroup contact and the distinctiveness of features characterising the group.

The resistance to intergroup contact expresses a group’s disposition to maintain its in-group networks, while the environment offers opportunities for the development of a different network that unavoidably weakens the heritage network (Landry et al. 1996). Sanders (2002) discusses several cases where ethnic entrepreneurship was able to provide resources for the community, thus reducing the need for contacts with outside communities. Thus, a disposition to maintain segregative minority networks would enhance the V of the group, despite a large negative PSD.

The network structure, in turn, is heavily related to language usage: as the intergroup contact often involves two languages, network structure determines language usage patterns. The more numerous the contacts of the minority group with the dominant out-group, the more the dominant
language is used. This means that the language usage pattern is often a good indicator of the extent of intergroup contact.

Besides language, intergroup distance can also be marked by other features, such as religion and other cultural practices (Myhill 2003), as well as racial features. Sanders (2002: 342) refers to a number of studies indicating the inhibitory effect that individuals’ distinctive racial features have on their choice of possible ethnic identities. For example, dark-skinned West Indian children living in New York City have severely limited options with regard to ethnic identity, as they are persistently identified as African Americans (Waters 1994). Also, second-generation Asian Indians with dark skin are not able to avoid racial marginality in the United States (Rajagopal 2000), whereas lighter-skinned groups, particularly biracial children who have one Asian parent, have more choices (Xie and Goyette 1997).

Ultimately, the intergroup distance is dependent on the symbolic and discursive factors that establish the norms concerning the acceptability, extent and nature of intergroup contacts; this is also related to ethnic distinctiveness (see Figure 6.2). Thus, all factors being equal, the less intergroup contact takes place and the more distinct the groups appear – that is, the larger the intergroup distance – the higher the V of the group. Mathematically, the relationship of intergroup distance to the other factors can be expressed as: $V = (S_{we} - S_{they}) / R$.

Let us assume that the minimal value for R is 1. This would correspond to the minimal intergroup distance, both in terms of social network and cultural distinctiveness. It would mean a very strong interconnectedness of social networks and a high cultural similarity between the groups. Such a situation may be characteristic of dialect or regional language groups in relation to standard language speakers (Ehala and Niglas 2007). In such cases, it is very easy to shift from one group to the other, and R has no impact on vitality, which is determined only by the PSD. When R is larger than 1, this starts to reduce the effect of the negative PSD, because of the costs that are associated with the shift from one group to another. Thus, the larger R gets, the closer V gets to zero, in other words, the point where the benefits of identity shift are cancelled out by the costs. At this point, there would be no motivation

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**Figure 6.2** Interdependence between group vitality and intergroup distance
for identity shift by the minority group members, and thus the minority group would remain sustainable.

**Utilitarianism (U)**

U is a value system that justifies pragmatic and economically beneficial courses of action. Scollon and Scollon (1995: 116) describe the basic principles of utilitarian discourse as follows: (1) humans are defined as rational economic entities, (2) ‘good’ is defined as that which will provide the greatest happiness to the greatest number, and (3) values are established by statistical (that is, quantitative) means.

Each culture, though, functions as interplay of rational and emotional motivations, and utilitarian principles are balanced by what can be called the traditionalist discourse, according to which: (1) the essence of humanity is emotional; (2) the notion of ‘good’ is set by the moral authority; and (3) values are defined by tradition. The traditionalist discourse expresses the group members’ commitment to their cultural practices and values. In a balanced culture, utilitarian and traditionalist values are in modest conflict, the two sides of which are rational efficiency and tradition, which is a characteristic of many well-functioning societies. This opposition is well recognised by the major theories of human values, such as Schwartz (1992; 2006) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005), although all authors use their own terminology.

As the utilitarian principles are discursive, different groups may vary in respect to the salience of the utilitarian and traditionalist values in their culture. Although the level of utilitarianism and traditionalism can form different combinations (Ehala 2012), two of them are directly relevant to language and identity maintenance. Groups which are very low in utilitarianism while holding strongly traditionalist values tend to be highly committed to their social identity (see Figure 6.3). For example, some religious groups (such as the Amish or the Russian Old Believers in Estonia) are so traditionalist that they hardly assimilate at all, despite their supposedly large negative PSD with the mainstream society. This value configuration would support language and identity maintenance. If the group tends towards utilitarian values while traditional values are disfavoured, the group members are more predisposed to abandon heritage traditions, as maintaining them seems costly, meaningless and/or backward. Such a value configuration would reduce V. For example, Sue Harris Russell (2000) reports the case of the New Guinean Gapun, whose speakers adhere to a value system oriented towards inter-individual competition, which promotes a shift towards Tok Pisin as a tool to raise one’s status in Gapun society. Lewis’s (2000: 95) analysis
shows that those Guatemalan Mayan communities that were more open to innovations and economic development were also the most affected by language shift. If the utilitarian and traditionalist values are balanced, U does not have an effect on V.

The index U captures this regularity. It is calculated as the differential between adherence to utilitarian (ut) and traditional (tr) value systems: \( U = ut - tr + 1 \). It is higher than 1 when the group tends to be utilitarian, while displaying a low level of traditional values, and lower than 1 when the group is low in utilitarian and high in traditional values. Therefore, the higher the U, the more it reduces vitality. Given this, utilitarianism can be included in the formula in the following way: 

\[
V = U \cdot \left( S_{we} - S_{they} \right) / R.
\]

This means that if the value of U is 1 (balanced utilitarianism and traditionalism), its impact on overall vitality can be disregarded. If the value of U falls below 1, it starts to reduce the negative value of PSD. When U reaches 0, the whole equation becomes equal to 0, meaning that the group is so traditional that it has no inclination for identity shift towards the majority. If the value of U is greater than 1, the effects of PSD start to increase, causing the V value to drop.

**Intergroup discordance (D-factor)**

D-factor expresses the perceived illegitimacy of intergroup power relations, as well as distrust towards the dominant majority. Although legitimacy and distrust are clearly distinct concepts, they are interrelated. It is well known that some low-status groups tend to show out-group favouritism, i.e. a minority group member’s tendency to see the dominant majority in a more positive light than his/her own group (Sachdev and Bourhis 1991), and that the perception of a more powerful group is dependent on the degree of the perceived legitimacy of their power (Zelditch 2001). This would imply that the more the intergroup power relations are perceived as legitimate by the low-status group, the more positive their perception of the high-status out-group is. Batalha et al. (2007) offer empirical support for this hypothesis, showing how the dominant group with legitimate power is perceived as being more
intelligent and responsible. There is also some empirical indication that the larger the perceived illegitimacy of the situation, the higher the level of distrust towards the dominant out-group: for Russian speakers in Estonia, the correlation between perceptions of illegitimacy of the power position of Estonian speakers and the extent of distrust towards them have a fairly solid correlation: \( r = 0.368 (p < 0.01) \) (Ehala and Zabrodskaja 2011: 236). Thus, provided that there is typically a positive correlation between perceptions of illegitimacy and distrust, it would be reasonable to calculate the D-factor as the mean value of these two factors. The relationship between the D-factor and the other components of V needs to be specified, too. It would be reasonable to assume that the larger the negative PSD and the lower the value of D (that is, the more legitimate the situation is considered, and the more trustful the attitudes towards the out-group are), the lower the vitality (see Figure 6.4). In such a situation, the low-status group is unlikely to challenge the existing power relations, as it feels too weak and perceives its low status as legitimate. The smaller the negative PSD and/or the higher D, the higher the vitality, as the low-status group has both the motivation (to establish justice) and the perceived strength to change the power relations. When the D-factor is incorporated, the V formula takes the following form: \( V = U \left( (S_{we} - S_{they}) + D \right) / R \).

It is reasonable to assume that in a case where there is neither perceived discordance towards the out-group nor perceived out-group favouritism, the value of D would be equal to zero, in other words, it would not affect the value of V. The higher the positive value of D, the more it will reduce the negative value of PSD, leading to higher values of V. If D has a negative value (indicating out-group favouritism), it will increase the negative value of PSD, leading to lower values of V.

In sum, vitality factors can be divided into rational (cognitive) and emotional (affective) ones. While the former include perceived strength differential (PSD) and intergroup distance (R), the latter are traditionalism/utilitarianism (U) and intergroup discordance (D). By measuring these factors, we can draw a vitality profile of a group. This profile might help to predict the group’s interethnic behaviour and acculturation orientations.
Russian is one of the minority languages spoken in Estonia. The position of the Russian speakers in post-Soviet Estonia, who represent 31.7% of the population according to the 2000 census (Statistical Office of Estonia), falls into the conflicting and contested narratives. According to the contemporary Estonian nationalising discourse, they are not considered an autochthonous minority. Estonian legislators and language policy makers believe that, as the migration of Russian speakers to the Baltic countries was encouraged during Soviet rule (1940–41, 1944–91) by the central authorities, this group can be characterised as colonisers rather than immigrants, because Russian speakers, in their view, never conceptualised Estonia as a separate country, even though formally Soviet Estonia was regarded as a state in the Soviet Union (on the language situation in Estonia, see Kolstø 1995; Rannut 1995; 2004; 2008; Smith 1998; Verschik 2005; 2008: 25–47). This official position causes tensions with a third of the population of Estonia, who do not see themselves as colonisers.

There have been attempts to raise the status of the Russian-speaking community in Estonia by associating its origin with the liberation of Estonia from the fascist occupation, but these attempts have met strong resistance from the proponents of the official narrative (Ehala 2009). There have also been attempts to define the Russian-speaking community in Estonia as a transitional minority that is in the process of becoming native (Ehala 2008b), but this has not found acceptance either.

While Estonian was officially formally taught in all Russian-medium schools as a subject during Soviet occupation, most Russian speakers remained monolingual, as Russian was considered the language of intercultural communication within the USSR. Despite the fact that Russian was a compulsory subject in all Estonian-medium schools, proficiency in Russian among Estonian speakers varied according to personal needs, occupation, work requirements and region of residence. In the predominantly Russian-speaking north-eastern part of Estonia, proficiency in Russian was crucial for Estonians. In the other Estonian areas, functional bilingualism was characteristic of those Estonian speakers who had to work in the public sector, the civil service and so on.

Radical changes came about in 1989, when the first Language Law (ENSVK 1989: 60) decreed that ‘in Estonia, the traditional territory of Estonians’, Estonian should attain the status of the language of the state, administration and public discourse (Ozolins 1994: 161). In 1991, the Republic of Estonia was restored de facto, with Estonian as the sole offi-
cial language. As a result, competence in the Estonian language among non-Estonian speakers increased from 14% in 1989 to 44.5% in 2000, according to census data (Statistical Office of Estonia). Although the census does not define proficiency and the data are anonymous and self-reported, such self-descriptions can nevertheless be seen as indicators of identity. According to the 2000 census data, younger Russian speakers have a better command of the Estonian language than do their parents. They use Russian when speaking with their parents, but are essentially moving towards using primarily Estonian as they leave school and enter employment (Zabrodskaja 2006).

The following types of variation within the local Russian-speaking community can be established:

1. Regional: the capital Tallinn is a bilingual city, the north-east is predominantly Russian-speaking and the other areas are predominantly Estonian-speaking.
2. Generational: younger people are more likely to know Estonian.
3. Individual: the predominance of Estonian or Russian may depend on identification with Estonia or Russia, proficiency in Estonian, conversational goals, social networks and so on.
4. Internal diversity within the Russian-language community: the willingness and competence to communicate in Estonian may vary between different Russian-speaking groups (for example, the Old Believers who migrated to Estonia in the seventeenth century versus the community that settled during the Soviet time).

Sociolinguistic background information was used as a basis for sample design. Now we turn to the presentation of the methodological paradigm for the current research.

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The sample consisted of 460 Russian speakers selected by a professional survey company from five different sociolinguistic regions in Estonia (see Table 6.1). Questioning was conducted anonymously during the spring of 2008. The data was analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 14.0.

As a result, five vitality clusters emerged (see Table 6.2), ranging from the Medium Low Vitality group, consisting of 10% of the respondents, to the Discordant group, with the highest vitality rate (14% of the respondents). The majority of the respondents belonged to three groups, with stable vitality indices but differing from each other in the configuration
of the measured variables. Although the clusters differ from each other in a statistically significant way, it should be noted that they are abstractions over a continuous set of data. Therefore, the descriptions of the clusters represent a prototype rather than a well-bounded set of similar individuals. Also, due to the form of the survey, the results are strictly synchronic, presenting a snapshot that does not reflect possible shifts between the subgroups. In reality, subgroup boundaries are vague and the sizes of the vitality clusters may change over time.

The maintenance or shift of a group’s language and identity depends, amongst other things, on discursive choices (the choice of narratives, beliefs and value systems) that become accepted in the group’s shared communication space. These discursive choices are constructed on the basis of stereotypical views on characteristic features of both the in-group and the out-group. To obtain insight into these shared discursive features, the quantitative data was triangulated with half-structured interviews having open-ended questions that allowed for differentiated, individual and subjective opinions to be given but also provided a set of responses that could be related to the quantitative data. The interview plan was drafted on the principles of the V-model (see explanation above) and included the following topics: (1) self-categorisation, (2) per-

Table 6.1 Design of the sample selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional concentration of sociolinguistic communities</th>
<th>Proportion of Russian speakers in the area (%)</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural settlements</td>
<td>1–10</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns and settlements</td>
<td>10–20</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Tallinn</td>
<td>30–50</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harjumaa and Lasnamäe</td>
<td>50–80</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns of Ida-Virumaa</td>
<td>80–100</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2 Five vitality clusters (the extreme values for each variable are given in italics)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of the whole sample</th>
<th>Medium Low</th>
<th>Stable Esteem</th>
<th>Stable Integrated</th>
<th>Stable Traditional</th>
<th>Discordant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSD (S_{we}−S_{they})</td>
<td>−0.46</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>−0.21</td>
<td>−0.32</td>
<td>−0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D −0.25 . . . 0.75</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U 0 . . . 2</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 1.0 . . . 2.0</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V −2.5 . . . 3.5</td>
<td>−0.31</td>
<td>−0.15</td>
<td>−0.08</td>
<td>−0.05</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The qualitative research was carried out during the autumn of 2008 by Anastassia Zabrodskaja through four focus-group oral interviews conducted in Russian among Russian-speaking youth from Tallinn and Narva (interviews 1 and 2, respectively), a group of Russian speakers from Narva (interview 3) and another one from Tartu (interview 4). Each group consisted of six people; each interview lasted approximately two and a half hours.

With the methodological discussions presented above in mind, let us now turn to the findings of a combined quantitative–qualitative study on the ethnolinguistic vitality of Russian speakers in Estonia.

**ETHNOLINGUISTIC VITALITY CLUSTERS AMONG RUSSIAN SPEAKERS IN ESTONIA**

In all, there were sixty statements in the questionnaire built on the Likert scale principle, which made it possible to determine the precise frequency of their appearance in the variants’ analysis. For the analysis of data, the statements were grouped into four conceptual groups: (1) PSD, (2) R, (3) U and (4) D. The Cronbach alpha values for all four conceptual groups were higher than 0.7, indicating that the division of statements into these conceptual groups was correct and reliable.

To allow for data analysis, the mean values for each conceptual group were calculated. These values were used to compute the V values for each respondent. As the authors were interested not in the V values of individual respondents, but rather in the V differences between subgroups within the Russian-speaking community, two-step cluster analysis was conducted using the variables PSD, R, U, D and V as input. For a general overview, the characterisation of the clusters is presented in Table 6.2.

**Medium Low Vitality**

The Medium Low Vitality cluster was characterised by a high perceived ethnic weakness of Russian speakers compared to Estonian speakers (PSD = −0.46). The members of this cluster did not perceive any discordance in relations with Estonian-speakers; in fact, their D (−0.03) even indicates a slight favouritism toward the out-group, that is, a
tendency to see Estonian speakers in a very positive light. In terms of their cultural values, this group can be considered to have a slight preference for utilitarianism versus maintaining traditions and heritage culture ($U = 1.04$). The intergroup distance of this group from Estonian speakers was the smallest in all five clusters, but still considerable ($R = 1.57$). All these characteristics led to the lowest $V$ value amongst the subgroups in this sample ($-0.31$).

The following are the characteristics of a typical representative of this group:

- an Estonian citizen ($65\% ; 1.20$),
- a University graduate ($26\% ; 1.86$),
- a private sector employee ($49\% ; 1.63$),
- has an above average income ($21\% ; 2.33$),
- lives in an Estonian dominant town or in the countryside ($60\% ; 2.31$).

Among respondents who expressed attitudes and beliefs characteristic of the members of the group is the 28-year-old Malle, who has been bilingual from childhood and has an Estonian first name. She had her primary and secondary education in Russian. She is married to an ethnic Estonian. Her father is also an ethnic Estonian with some German roots. Her mother is Ukrainian. As she said in the interview, her parents did not hand down to her Russian ‘traditions and values’. She too does not maintain her Russian language and cultural dispositions as both her sons have attended Estonian kindergartens and schools. She lives in the Estonian-dominant countryside. Malle received a Master’s degree from the University of Tartu and has worked as a teacher of Estonian in immersion classes. When Malle analyses what has happened to her, she concludes that she has been Estonianised. She is happy about that and even sees Estonians as ‘better family people’ and wants to be similar:

Perhaps, I have been Estonianised. As early as a couple of years ago, maybe even last year, it was, like, in your soul you feel Russian. As I have been living in such an environment, a calmer environment, so to speak [. . .] My husband is Estonian and I am constantly in an Estonian atmosphere, so I feel that I have become less active, less involved in activities let us say [. . .], do not go out, everything is calmer, so to speak [. . .], more attention to the family than to outside communication [. . .] with people [. . .]. It seems to me Estonians give preference more to the family than to friends [. . .]. I am now also starting to show this. (Interview 3, part 1, question 2, M28)
To summarise, Malle’s narratives and values indicate and illuminate several aspects of the typical member of this cluster: a very small perceived distance from the out-group, a low level of traditionalism and a degree of out-group favouritism. Malle’s acculturation orientation seems clearly pointed to assimilation. This is facilitated by her Estonian-speaking environment and relative socio-economic success.

**Stable Low Esteem**

The Stable Vitality Low Self-Esteem cluster had a considerably higher V value (−0.15) than the Medium Low Vitality group. This cluster’s V value (−0.15) is quite close to zero, indicating that the subgroup in general is maintaining its heritage. What makes this cluster special is that they have a clearly traditional value system (U = 0.89) and a fairly large intergroup distance from Estonian speakers (R = 1.74). They have neutral attitudes towards Estonian speakers (D = 0.06), but perceive them as a considerably stronger group than Russian speakers (PSD = −0.37).

The following are the characteristics of a typical representative of the above group:

- over 60 years old (17%; 1.21),
- retired (21%; 1.31),
- stateless (28%; 1.27),
- university graduate (17%; 1.21),
- income slightly below average (34%; 1.42),
- lives in eastern Estonia (46%; 1.31).

The 62-year-old Elena is a typical member of this group. She was born in Estonia and now is a pensioner. Before that she worked for many years in the education sector. She received higher education in the 1960s in a Russian university. She has Estonian citizenship, but she maintains that she received it ‘only because of my Estonian husband, whose ancestors were citizens of Estonia before [16 June] 1940’ (Interview 3, part 1, self-assessment on background information, J62). Otherwise, her limited competence in Estonian would not allow her to get an Estonian passport. Living in a Russian-dominant town, she has almost no contact with Estonian speakers. This contributes to her perception of the cultural distance with them as large:

Firstly, the history of Russians and Estonians, and the historical gene pool are completely different, the national culture — everything, even cuisine — they have mulgi [the traditional
Estonian dish – mulgikapsas, which is pickled cabbage cooked with pork and barley], while we have Russian cabbage soup, a Russian consumer culture and Russian consumer habits. (Interview 3, part 2, question 14, J62)

Elena is afraid of moving to an Estonian-dominant area where, she claims, ‘my lack of Estonian language knowledge would limit my social networks or might become a barrier in everyday communication’ (Interview 3, part 3, question 21, J62). Both of her children have completed university and are getting on with their, in her view, significant careers in Estonian society; their knowledge of Estonian is close to mother-tongue level. She considers this to be very important as the family lives in Estonia with Estonian as the only official language. Elena observes Russian cultural traditions, feasts and holidays. As she claims herself, the more her children have become integrated into Estonian society, the more she tends to maintain Russian cultural dispositions and language use in her family.

Stable Integrated

The Stable Vitality Integrated cluster has a V value of -0.08, indicating that the subgroup is stable in respect to V. This cluster has an even more traditional value system (U = 0.84) than the previous one, and a similarly neutral attitude towards Estonians (D = 0.05), but it differs from the Stable Low Esteem group in its small intergroup distance from Estonians (R = 1.57, the smallest amongst the clusters) and in terms of a lesser perceived strength differential between Estonian- and Russian-speaking groups (PSD = -0.21). All this means that this group is well integrated into Estonian society, but has positive self-esteem and is maintaining its cultural and linguistic heritage.

Below are the characteristics of a typical representative of the group:

- under 40 years old (64%; 1.25),
- an Estonian citizen (79%; 1.46),
- works in the public sector (34%; 1.17) or a student (13%; 1.63),
- has an average income (68%; 1.26),
- lives in an Estonian-dominant town or in the countryside (66%; 1.61).

Thirty-year-old Aleksander, who can be considered to be a part of the stable integrated vitality group, works as an IT-specialist in a public company. He graduated from an Estonian university and has almost completed a Master’s degree. He is proud of his nationality, traditions and culture:
But I am Russian and I consider myself Russian and I will never change that in my life because I feel proud overall of being a part of a great nation [. . .] Because I can read a huge amount of literature [. . .]; a huge number of ballets of all sorts, Tchaikovsky, Rachmaninoff. I know that I have all this. I can always, when I need to, read, watch [. . .] Take an example from other nationality, such cultural baggage is not found anywhere else. (Interview 1, part 1, question 1, A30)

Aleksander does not show discordance towards Estonians and is very optimistic about the future relationships between Russians and Estonians. What is more important, in his opinion, is that if the Estonian authorities had given Estonian citizenship to all Russian speakers living in Estonia, then the situation would have been just and equal for every person living in Estonia.

Stable Traditional

The Stable Vitality Traditional cluster is characterised by the most traditional value system amongst the subgroups (U = 0.59). This is accompanied by a distinct feeling of discordance towards Estonians (D = 0.17) and the largest intergroup distance from Estonians (R = 1.77). Their V is somewhat lower in terms of their low perceived intergroup strength differential (PSD = (−0.32), so that their overall V index ((−0.05) does not reach a positive value.

Characteristics of a typical representative may be stated as the following:

• 40–60 years old (52%; 1.49),
• a citizen of the Russian Federation (40%; 1.74),
• income below average (43%; 1.16),
• lives in eastern Estonia (50%; 1.43).

The narrative produced by Ignat may be qualified as traditional and has stable vitality. He was born in Cheliabinsk and has been living in Estonia for almost forty years. Having Russian citizenship, he considers himself Russian both linguistically and culturally: ‘I am a citizen, a citizen of Russia, and this is why it is deep down very important to me. I have something to be proud of’ (Interview 4, part 1, self-assessment on background information, I58). He thinks that both Russian and Estonian speakers form groups of almost equal prestige: ‘I think everything is the same, well, maybe except for the upper echelons of power, where there are no Russians’ (Interview 4, part 2, question 14, I58). Ignat has
negative feelings towards the Estonian government, media and politics because they all pay too much attention to the ‘national question [. . .] especially in negative contexts’ (Interview 4, part 6, question 28, I58). The discordance between Russians and Estonians becomes apparent when he talks about the Bronze Soldier relocation.\(^\text{10}\)

**Discordant**

The Discordant cluster is distinct from the rest of the groups in several respects. First, it considers Estonians and Russian speakers to be almost equal in esteem (PSD = \(-0.07\)), they have the highest perceived interethnic discordance (D = 0.25) and a high intergroup distance from Estonians (R = 1.75). Their value system is well balanced between utilitarianism and traditionalism (U = 0.98). All this adds up to a positive V value (0.1), indicating that this subgroup is vital, discordant and possibly ready to challenge the interethnic power relations in Estonia.

Characteristics of a typical representative may be stated as the following:

- under 40 years old (70%; 1.37),
- stateless (33%; 1.50),
- income significantly below average (18%; 1.38),
- lives in eastern Estonia (45%; 1.29).

Here, we would refer to Sergei (age 32) who falls in the category of high discordance towards Estonian speakers. He did not complete his university degree as he was unable to pass the Estonian language advanced level test.\(^\text{11}\) Working for a private company and having a relatively low income, he has some Estonian colleagues, but he communicates with them, as he puts it, ‘in Russian, of course’ (Interview 3, part 3, question 21, S32). A holder of a Russian passport, he would like, if only he could, to have a dual Russian–Estonian citizenship. He feels offended by the Estonian citizenship law and regulations and makes negative generalised statements about Estonians (Interview 3, part 2, question 14, S32 and question 7, S32). The following is an excerpt from his testimony:

> At least for me, they should have given citizenship from the very beginning because I was born here [. . .]: I think that this is enough. Then I would have a completely different attitude towards this country. I received Russian citizenship because Russia was the only country [. . .], because I did not want to be a stateless person, absolutely [. . .]. They were prepared to give it to
me just because I exist, that is, I did not have to prove to them anything or convince them in any way [. . .], for me, it was enough only to be, so that my existence is recognised [. . .]. And it is for that I am very grateful to them. (Interview 3, part 1, self-assessment on background information, S32)

To summarise, Sergei’s insufficient competence in Estonian narrows down his career opportunities and life prospects. His contacts with Estonian speakers remain limited, and motivation to learn Estonian is low. He shows a low propensity for linguistic accommodation and a distinct feeling of discordance towards Estonian speakers and the Estonian state.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The results show that Russian speakers living in Estonia do not form a single unitary category which has a uniform value system and attitudes. Instead, the Russian-speaking community is quite diverse in respect to their beliefs and attitudes. Several different subgroups can be distinguished that differ from each other in a number of parameters. Consequently, it is not possible to talk about or assess the ethnolinguistic vitality of the whole Russian-speaking community in Estonia as a unit, as different subgroups display different tendencies in regard to culture and language maintenance or assimilation. On the one hand, there are subgroups which have a tendency towards social mobility and integration, but not all of these subgroups are prone to language and identity shift. On the other hand, there are subgroups that have a clear preference for language maintenance but, as the quantitative analysis shows, only a small minority (the Discordant cluster, consisting of 14% of the sample) have the potential to challenge the current interethnic status quo in Estonia.

As the study indicates, both linguistic environment and social networks are strong factors of ethnolinguistic identity. The ethnolinguistic vitality of Russian speakers in the towns is higher than in the rural areas, which are either dominated by Estonian speakers or are characterised by tighter interethnic social networks. Qualitative data confirm that Russian speakers’ attitudes towards Estonian speakers are dependent on their educational and professional success. Intergroup discordance fosters the maintenance of traditional ethnic boundaries, leading to a segregative acculturation orientation. Therefore, the ethnolinguistic vitality of those Russian speakers who have an above average income and a university
degree is usually lower than that of those who have difficulties in getting on in Estonian society.

Overall, based on the quantitative analysis, it is evident that the maintenance of the Russian language and culture in Estonia is safe at present (see the relatively high intergroup distance (R) scores and low Utilitarianism (U) scores in Table 6.2 for most of the clusters), although there is some assimilation of Russian speakers to the Estonian majority (the cluster of Medium Low Vitality, about 10% of the sample).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The research leading to these results has received funding from the Estonian Science Fund under grant agreement no. ETF7350 ‘Ethnolinguistic vitality and identity construction: Estonia in the Baltic background’. Oral data collected from the interviews was analysed for the study on ‘Transfer of morphosyntactic patterns in the Estonian-Russian contact setting’ (Mobilitas Postdoctoral Research Grant MJD96).

NOTES

1. The Old Believers (starovery or staroobriadtsy) abandoned the Russian Orthodox Church after 1666–7 in protest against the church reforms introduced by Patriarch Nikon; in order to escape from religious persecution in Russia, they settled on the western coast of Lake Peipus in Estonia.

2. Russian is spoken as the first language by ethnic Russians, as well as by many Ukrainians, Belarusians and members of other ethnicities in Estonia. In the Estonian context, first language is the main boundary feature between Estonians, whose ethnic identity relies heavily on native fluency in Estonian, and the rest. As the number of native Estonian speakers who consider their ethnic identity to be something else than Estonian is negligible, we use the terms Estonians and Russian speakers in this paper as two identity categorisations of the same level, even though the reality is somewhat more complex.

3. For more information on diversity among Estonian Russian-speakers, see Rannut 2008: 155–8; Verschik 2008: 25–47.

4. Cronbach’s alpha shows how great the correlation between different statements present within the same group is. The higher the value’s index is, the stronger the questions are related to one another, forming a single whole to which a general name (a category) can be given. A general rule is the following: the questions relate one to another if the index of Cronbach’s alpha is equal or larger than the value 0.7 (Cronbach 1951).

5. The two-step cluster analysis is a statistical tool for revealing natural groupings (or clusters) within a dataset that would not otherwise be apparent. Unlike the
traditional clustering methods, two-step analysis makes it possible to analyse large data files. By comparing the values of a model-choice criterion across different clustering solutions, the procedure can automatically determine the optimal number of clusters. This makes it possible to explore the data for a best solution by not imposing the number of clusters arbitrarily beforehand.

6. This index shows how many times the proportion of people belonging to this category is higher in this cluster than in the whole sample. For example, for 65%, 1.20 here means that in this cluster, there are 65% of those having Estonian citizenship and this ratio is 1.2 times higher than the whole sample. This also means that in some other cluster the ratio of Estonian citizens should be less than in the whole sample. Therefore, the differences between clusters are large even if the deviations from the whole sample may not seem particularly large.

7. For reasons of confidentiality, all names have been changed.

8. Translation from Russian is mine. In order to indicate a pause, I use [. . .].

9. It should be noted that Estonian adult citizenship is based on the principle of *ius sanguinis*; citizenship is not determined by place of birth but by having an ancestor who was a citizen of Estonia before 16 June 1940 (see Zabrodskaja 2009: 62–3 and the Introduction to this volume).

10. The Bronze Soldier is a WWII monument that became the centre of identity battles beginning in 2004 and was relocated by the Estonian government in May 2007. The relocation was followed by large-scale riots of mostly Russian-speaking youth; see Ehala (2009) for details.

11. Some universities require that advanced level state examinations in Estonian be taken before the final examinations for a bachelor’s degree. See Zabrodskaja (2009) on the language testing system in Estonia.

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CHAPTER 7

Linguistic Performance of Russianness among Russian-Israeli Parents: Child-raising Practices in the Immigrant Community

Claudia Zbenovich

‘SHOW RESPECT FOR A CHILD!’: STATING THE PROBLEM

The concept of Russianness – an expression of certain attitudes and values regarding childrearing on the part of Russian-Israeli parents raising their children – arose after observing a situation in a friend’s house. My friends are Russian-speaking Jews who have lived in Israel for the last twenty years, as have I. A group of adults in my age group – Russian and native Israelis – got together around a table in my friend’s home and there was some lively discussion. Our host’s nine-year old son kept trying to interrupt in order to say something, but the adult company, including his mother, paid no attention to his numerous attempts. Eventually, the boy couldn’t bear being ignored any longer and shouted loudly, addressing his mother: Ima, ti li kawod – ani yeled! (Mum, show me respect – I am a child! (Hebrew)).

The boy, a competent bilingual Russian and Hebrew speaker, used Hebrew to address his mother, when demanding respect, substantiating his demand, and focusing on his status – that of an Israeli child. His choice of Hebrew gave him, intuitively, a sense of confidence to adjust the language to fit his sense of who he is. The guests smiled encouragingly, the boy was allowed to speak, and the general conversation continued. It was apparent that modern Israeli society accepts such verbal behaviour in children. Children in Israel are clearly the focus of attention, they are allowed much leeway, and their active presence doesn’t disturb the adults (Katriel 1991).

At the same time, I saw some Russian-Israeli parents exchange a
subtle look of deprecation: in our experience of childhood, such verbal behaviour was not even a possibility! Indeed, in Soviet Russia, where showing respect for a child was not recognised as an unwritten social law, the attitude to the position and rights of children was explicitly different. Hence, for the Russian-speaking families who are raising their children in Israel within the different context of Israeli traditions of family communication today, child guidance can become a challenging endeavour. More specifically, the commonly held beliefs about the acceptable ways of parent–child linguistic interaction are likely to maintain a disparity for Russian Israelis. The parents obviously bring their cultural assumptions, pertaining to what is appropriate to say or to do, into everyday interaction with their children, and their expectations, consequently, influence the format of communication. Bearing in mind that Russian-speaking parents who immigrated to Israel in the 1990s are the last generation that is still ingrained with the cultural heritage of Soviet Russia, their style of communication with their children provides a challenging site for research. It is essential to examine the parents’ linguistic performance (Chomsky 2006: 102) that refers to their actual use of language as well as to their extra-linguistic beliefs and to observe what are the strategies that the parents develop in speech situations, events and acts that help to realise Russian cultural norms. In this respect, this chapter is guided by the following questions: (1) which culture-specific patterns of linguistic behaviour do Russian-Israeli parents apply to transfer their cultural capital to their children? and (2) how is communication constructed between parents and children, when the latter are the carriers of the conventional Israeli verbal behaviour styles?

DIFFERENT EXPERIENCES OF CHILDHOOD:
METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS

The evidence upon which the answer to these questions is based comes from observation of the conversational organisation of the day-to-day encounters between parents and children. As noted by Schieffelin and Ochs (1986: 164), ordinary discourse is a ‘powerful socialising medium’, conveying crucial cultural information not only through content but through discourse form as well. Since children are socialised to a specific culture in ways of talking that are used by their elders, the research attempts to provide insight into some particular language and communicative practices that Russian Israelis usually recruit to mediate Russian cultural perspectives. The dynamics of cross-cultural and cross-generational communication and, more specifically, the study of
verbal behaviour employed by parents and children within the interaction are, therefore, my concern in this chapter. The research further extends Schieffelin and Ochs’ (1986) language socialisation paradigm to explore how immigration affects the socialisation process of parent–child everyday communication.

In the framework of the immigrant community, multiculturalism is treated as a temporary compromise with the hope that the second generation will narrow down or close the gap to the mainstream (Alba and Nee 1997). In Israel likewise, better integration of new immigrants obviously depends on their readiness to accept Israeli values and the cultural stereotypes of the new homeland. Crossing the cultural bridge to the host society goes hand in hand with the acquisition of a new language. Hebrew proficiency is regarded as a sign of successful acculturation, and the general language policy of the state has been traditionally targeted at the ubiquitous encouragement of Hebrew use with apparent disregard for other languages and the separate cultural identities that these languages promote (Ben Rafael 1994; Spolsky and Shohamy 1999).

Within this general policy, however, as recent research on immigrants has reported, many of the Russian Israelis tend to see Russian culture and language as a major factor in their identity and are determined to preserve this part of their lives (Remennick 2003; Yelenevskaya and Fialkova 2006). They also believe Russian culture to be one of the most important values not only for themselves but also for their children and consider the language as part of it. Most immigrants are influenced by popular beliefs and media stories in Russia, which treat Israeli cultural life as inferior (Niznik 2011).

As a part of their cultural capital, immigrant families have brought with them conceptual models of successful parenting. There is no doubt, however, that the process of childrearing is to a certain extent challenged by the host culture. While Russian–Israeli parents obviously transfer from their culture implicit knowledge of childrearing and goals for the education of their children, they encounter new implicit assumptions, as well as explicit practices concerning childrearing in Israel. In addition, while the adaptation to the host culture reveals itself in the public domain, the upholding of the traditional cultural patterns of raising the children is apparently favoured in (and in that is limited to) the private realm – the home and family context. It is not uncommon that children of this generation – who are for the most part Israeli-born with dominant Hebrew and a different perception of the world as part of their Israeli cultural background – experience tension and even confront their parents’ attempts to instil Russian Soviet cultural norms to the cultural world they live in.
It seems, in this context, that the resources mobilised by the older generation of Russian-Israeli immigrants to preserve their cultural and language universe and employed for passing the cultural capital onto their children are viewed as going ‘against the flow’. It is also evident that the practices of raising children by Russian-Israelis are mostly vivid and could be better examined through the prism of a ‘clash’ within the family dialogues between immigrant parents and their Israeli-born children, who possess the inherent local communicative style.

The gap between two different worlds and experiences as regards generation (late-Soviet and post-Zionist), language (Russian and Hebrew) and culture (Russian Soviet and Israeli) underlies the two sets of assumptions of the parties within the discourse. The inherent cultural variance embodies different ‘cultural translation’ of the agenda by the parties through the conversation and actually constructs two different ways of communication. In this respect, the interpretation of the two experiences of childhood on the basic level of everyday discourse is valuable for the depiction of parenting practices and as such for broader understanding of the aspects of children’s inclusion into the world of their parents.

It should be noted that the linguistic and social motivations of cross-generational interaction have recently been extensively investigated in different cultural contexts. Research on children’s and adults’ linguistic performance in multilingual settings incorporates analysis of acculturation and maintenance of heritage language (Ng 2007; Nesteruk 2010; Haque 2011), linguistic and social meaning of language alternation (Torras and Gafaranga 2002; Gafaranga 2005; Guerini 2006), as well as language preferences in negotiating family values (Zhu 2008). The questions of how multilingual context determines the use of linguistic forms and what are the diverse factors that play a role in research on multilingual communication have also been approached from a broader ethnographic perspective (Saville-Troike 2003; House and Rehbein 2004; Auer and Li 2007).

The sociolinguistic research on parent–child interaction within the Russian-speaking immigrant communities worldwide has focused on psychology of communication (Shulova-Piryatinsky and Harkins 2009) and emotion-related factors in language choice (Pavlenko 2004) and was based on data from parents’ questionnaires and discussions within Internet forums. On the Israeli scene, as far as Russian–Hebrew communication is concerned, the studies focus on language policy models (Schwartz 2008; Kopeliovich 2010) and examine the relationship between family relations and language maintenance (Tannenbaum and Berkovich 2005).

A particular interest of the present chapter is in the investigation of
different interational styles used by parents and children as a reflection of their differing socio-cultural values. Recognising that parents’ expectations and beliefs basically underlie their daily linguistic practices, I looked for patterns that would best explicate the conversational mechanism of the interaction. To identify some particular modes of a childrearing discourse and exhibit its specific characteristics of Russianness, I consequently turned to the close conversational analysis of how participants talk and what aspects of talk they give attention to. More specifically, I have adopted the communicative-pragmatic model of family discourse suggested by Blum-Kulka (1997). The broader methodological approach draws upon and takes inspiration from the modes of discourse analysis to be found in sociolinguistic studies for accounts of socio-cultural process: speech act theory (Austin 1999), pragmatic analysis (Grice 1975) and interactional sociolinguistics (Goffman 1967).

The subjects of research are eighteen Russian-Jewish urban educated middle-class (the intelligentsia) families with parents in their mid-thirties to early forties who immigrated to Israel in the early 1990s. The parents were selected through the snowball technique – the families contacted helped me to find others. More than half of the subjects immigrated together with their families; sometimes three generations continue living in the same apartment, and grandparents actively help with bringing up children on a daily basis. The majority of subjects graduated from Israeli universities and are employed in professional occupations. Their social absorption, acculturation and command of linguistic resources do not contradict their wish to retain their former culture and identity and pass their cultural capital onto their children. Their children are Israeli-born junior schoolchildren between the ages of 6 and 10.

At first, the focus group of four mothers and three fathers was held in a home setting, where I elicited information by interviews conducted in an unstructured and informal manner. The observation was then escalated by allowing the parents to raise their own topics. The group discussion stimulated the families’ recollections and thus produced the initial data and insights gained.

In the next stage, the database for the study was made up of natural conversations, mostly at mealtimes, recorded and transcribed, that serve as the texts for the analysis. The parents were told that the research focuses on the mechanisms of preserving Russian language at home, however they were not informed of the real research interest in culturally and linguistically bound ways of organising communication, family control and language socialisation in immigration at large. At a later stage, I examined the content and dynamics of the interaction, paying
attention to parent–child negotiation patterns, code-switching modes, turn-taking and speaking rights in relation to family hierarchies.

Additional data are interviews with the families on topics of raising children in Israel, issues of host culture and Russian cultural values. The interviews create the broader context that explains data collected through observation of parent–child interactions. The two different levels of data allow the combination of two types of information for the same research objective: to construe the Russian-Israelis’ cultural assumptions in raising their children reflected in the patterns of their Russian linguistic performance.

The parents voiced the importance of introducing their children to the Russian language and exposing them to Russian Soviet cultural norms. At the same time, however, they expressed dissatisfaction at the native Israelis’ manner of childrearing. Asked during the interviews where they differ in parenting styles from native Israelis, Russian-Israeli parents repeatedly mentioned discipline, authority and children’s status in the family (all the topics mentioned have their correspondence in discourse practices employed by the parents). The following excerpts from the interviews reflect parents’ views of the Israeli childhood:

Father 1: Here children do not know what it means to be punished. They are unaware of the phrase ‘it just needs to be done’ – it was unheard of in Russia!

Father 2: Permissiveness, a total absence of authority! Kids here are unselfconscious and they have no sense of decency in front of grownups. In Russia one came across it just among hooligans, but here it’s quite the norm!

In the utterances by Fathers 1 and 2 one could observe discontent with the behaviour of young Israelis along with displeasure as regards the local style of raising children. In the passage from the interview of Father 3, however, a positive attitude regarding the issue is observed, though humour is implied: Father 3: ‘It is nice that in Israel, one doesn’t feel ashamed of the children overtly in public “Don’t discredit me!” – One cannot even hear such a thing, if only because it is not beyond all the bounds!’

The following are passages from interviews with mothers:

Mother 1: Our parents kept a tight grasp on us, but for us as parents here – this is not even a possibility.

Mother 2: There is a cult of children in Israel; however I accept about two-thirds of the local practice.
Mother 3: The attitude toward children is undeniably more liberal and democratic than it was in Russia. The only thing I cannot get over here is that some parents often muddle democracy and anarchy together. However this does not apply to Russian Israelis.

Although some parents share native Israelis’ parenting ideologies and report positively about the conceptually new approach to childrearing in Israel, the topics of liberty and the cult of children in Israel remain central to this discourse. The dominant opinion, however, suggests the gap between the parental perception of the familiar and normative childraising practices as what they should be on the one hand, and, on the other hand, what they are: a reality that is judged to be exceedingly liberal, weird and unreliable.

LANGUAGE CHOICE: THE PRAGMATICS OF HEBREW AND RUSSIAN

Different levels of familiarity with the two languages, Russian and Hebrew, which create everyday discourse, are the underlying gap in the parent–child interaction that was observed. The parents are the main promoters of Russian: judging by the interviews, Russian–Israeli parents would like their children to preserve a full mastery of the Russian language. As part of this, parents continue to speak their native language at home, to guide their children’s verbal comprehension and to supervise the accuracy of their speech. The parents’ desire to instil their native language in their children is evidenced in immigrant parents’ exclusive use of Russian when speaking with children, even if the latter switch to Hebrew in their response.

The patterns of language choice by children vary according to context. In examining bilingualism, broader social context scholars (Gumperz 1982; Auer 1988) have noted that code-switching performs discursive as well as social functions. The essential question regarding language use then concerns the pragmatic outcome of communicating in Hebrew, the children’s dominant language, and in Russian which is dominant for the adults. More specifically, how do parents and children establish their positions in the discourse through language?

No less important is the subject of the children and parents’ meta-pragmatic comments around the encounter. In Blum Kulka’s (1997: 180) terms, these comments relate to all aspects of verbal (and non-verbal) behaviour considered worthy of attention. The explicit ways in which participants discuss verbal appropriateness are important in the bilingual
discourse, since they act as an index for the communicants in regard to linguistic and conversational performance.

The analysis of the following interaction between Ben and his mother illustrates the pragmatic use of both languages. The conversation takes place at mealtime during celebration of Hanukkah. In Israel, this is a holiday that focuses on children, since, according to tradition, during Hanukkah children are given some pocket money.

Participants of the conversation are: mother, Ben, aged 8, and visitors – two adults and two children. The general conversation is taking place in Russian, when suddenly Ben switches to Hebrew.

1. Ben: (in Hebrew) İma, kvar tagidi . . . (Mum, say it already . . .)
2. Mother: Что сказать, Беня?
3. Ben: She axshav higiya ha-zman le-halukat dmey kis! (That the time has come to give the pocket money.)
4. Mother: Да. Дети идите сюда!
5. Ben: Kama kesev tavi li? (How much money will you give me?)
6. Mother: Ata ben shmone – tikabel shmone shekalim. (You are eight years old – you will get eight shekels.)
7. Ben: Shmona shekalim, ki shekel – ze zahar. (Eight shekels, because shekel is masculine.)
8. Mother: Беня, переходи-ка ты на русский язык!\(^1\)

In pursuit of his goal of getting money – a crucial component of the holiday ritual, Ben switches to Hebrew and directs the conversation to the relevant channel: he points out that it is his mother’s turn to speak – (Mum, say it already . . .) in (1), and governs the setting of the thematic frame – that the time has come to give the pocket money – in (3). Eventually, in turn (5), Ben asks the direct question pertaining to the sum of his present – (How much money will you give me?).

The first two exchanges reflect Ben’s willingness to be informed about the missing component of communication, and one could estimate the boy’s pragmatic vigilance and awareness: moves (1) and (3) represent meta-pragmatic comments about the mother’s verbal behaviour as regards the absence of her relevant contribution to the discourse in the context of the Hanukkah evening. According to the Gricean theory of conversation and successful communication (Grice 1975), the maxim of ‘quantity’ was violated: for the current purposes of talk, the mother’s participation was less informative than needed.

Another act of control by the boy refers to the meta-linguistic level of the talk: In his last turn (7), Ben corrects his mother drawing attention to her improper grammatical use of gender of the numeral ‘eight’ (the noun
shekel is masculine, so the correct form is shmona, with the stress on the last syllable).

During the entire conversation Ben speaks Hebrew, and until the final move his language choice is ‘unnoticed’. The mother, according to the holiday ceremony (where children and giving them money are in focus), regards her son’s comments with understanding and invites the children in (4). To respond to Ben’s question about money, pertinent within the holiday frame, the mother eventually switches to Hebrew as well – ata ben shmone – tikabel shmone shekalim (you are eight years old – you will get eight shekels) in (6). She responds in Russian – Беня, переходи-ка ты на русский язык! in (8) only when she finds her son’s meta-linguistic comment face-threatening to the extent that she feels it necessary to code-switch. The mother assumes the violation of politeness formula (of how things are said), and confronts it not only by switching to her native Russian, but also by protesting against further use of Hebrew on the part of her son.

If one considers the code-switching in relation not only to a particular speaker but to the dynamics of the interaction as a whole, Hebrew is preferable for the child in the context of the Hanukkah event, since Hebrew reflects the realities related to the Jewish and Israeli experience (for example, school preparation for the holiday). However, a high level of proficiency in Hebrew can also lead to a power game – the boy turns to this language as a pragmatic resource that allows him to question the very role of his parent as an authority. In this social perspective of a power game and shift of authorities, Hebrew embodies for the child an essential pragmatic function.

Consequently, the language choice figures as the most salient feature (Gafaranga 2005: 291) of meta-control discourse. Meta-pragmatic comments issued by either parents or children manifest the use of the language, dominant and preferable for either party; they serve as a tool on the one hand, for eliciting appropriate ways of verbal behaviour from the communicative partner and, on the other, for establishing the power discourse.

COMMUNICATION MODES: LOGICAL VERSUS ANALOGICAL

With regard to communication, parents and children are in contact with two incongruent communicative-pragmatic systems, each embodied by a culturally specific style of language, typical of either the Russian or the Israeli community. The following conversation allows me to examine the
difference in the communication modes established by a mother and her daughter within the interaction.

The conversation occurred after mealtime and before going to bed. The participants of the dialogue are: mother and Dana, aged 7.

1. Mother: Дана, иди мыться, поздно уже!
2. Dana: Мам... Вымой меня... Я не могу сама.
3. Mother: Ты уже большая девочка, я не буду тебя мыть.
4. Dana: Я устала, ну... устала, я спать хочу, я не могу!
5. Mother: Дана, не привередничай, я в твоем возрасте сама мылась, вытиралась и ложилась спать!
6. Dana: И еще, мам, там нужно душ переключить.
7. Mother: Ты справишься без меня, ну в самом деле!
8. Dana: Там скользко, там в ванной, я чуть не упала там тогда, ну мам.
9. Mother: Ну, у тебя тысяча причин, Дана. Хорошо, начинай мыться, я приду и помогу тебе.¹

This dialogue presents the rhetoric of negotiations. I would like to emphasise two modes of communication represented in the conversation: the analogical mode used by the mother, in that she invokes her own childhood experience, and the logical mode on the part of Dana, whose utterances are grounded on rational substantiation of her arguments.

The mother speaks with the direct command style of control. The simplest directive to act – convincing the girl to bathe herself in (1) – potentially offers little room for negotiation. The mother refers to Dana’s maturity in (3) – ты уже большая девочка (you are a big girl); drawing a parallel to her own childhood, she evokes her own maturity when she was at Dana’s age in (5) – я в твоем возрасте сама мылась, вытиралась и ложилась спать! (at your age I bathed myself, dried myself and put myself to bed). She also appeals to the same level of independence that she expects from the girl in (7) – ты справишься без меня (you manage very well without me), and indirectly expresses displeasure with the possible counter-effect – ну в самом деле! (enough already). The mother’s requirement is based on a clear-cut presupposition that the girl should be independent, and bathing by herself is her own responsibility.

Dana converts the conversation into a negotiation format of argument–counterargument. In her requests that follow her mother’s initial direct command, the girl implements discourse of rational reasoning, and employs plausible arguments of different levels: she refers to her tiredness (4) – Я устала, ну... устала, я спать хочу, я не могу! (I am tired, really... tired, I want to sleep); lack of competence (6) – и еще,
мам, там нужно душ переключить (and also, Mum, the position of showerhead should be changed), as well as to some objective general conditions dangerous for a child (8) – там скользко, там в ванной, я чуть не упала там тогда, ну мам (it is slippery in the bathroom, I almost fell down in there the other day). Such a communication mode engenders a search for an alternative solution to what seemed ‘unachievable’. Eventually, though the final outcome in response to girl’s request was predetermined, the talk serves to turn the unattainable wish into feasible opportunity.

Within this dialogue, it is clear that real negotiating doesn’t occur. However, in general conversations, one of the parties could change their point of view, if convinced of the need to do so. The idea that any incongruences and clashes could be taken advantage of is widespread in the socialisation practices in Israel. In this respect, the modern concept of Israeli communication pertains to negotiation discourse, by which children are allowed and even socially encouraged to argue and discuss as they seek and provide their arguments. It is also believed that the parents’ efforts to explain rationally to their children why the latter’s requests cannot be fulfilled are very important for everyday communication (Blum-Kulka 1997; Katriel 1991). Apparently, listening as to how the arguments are marshalled by the adults (parents or teachers) is a valuable experience *per se* for young Israelis. The argumentation, in turn, could be used on the part of the child to undermine parental authority in order to change their opinion.

Though the negotiation discourse appears to be socially inherent in the Israeli children studied here, the rational talk is not so frequently documented in the speech of their parents. The parents’ modes of communication often echo the common rhetoric of the authoritarian, compliance-oriented Soviet-era parent–child discourse, exhibiting sets of assumptions that are continuously upheld by the generations of Soviet parents. The style of ‘you should do as you are told’ conversation is typified in more explicit and verbally less complex language patterns of control, rarely accompanied by an explanation – why ‘yes’ or why ‘no’ – from a rational basis. The characteristic pattern for acts of control manifests the parents’ preference for a high level of directness, and this directness reflects a positional attitude towards obedience. In addition, short moves in parental talk render adult power more evident.

In short, the Russian-Israeli parents have preserved the directly positional, authoritarian attitude towards the style of communication as their intrinsic cultural capital. I believe that the stance of being outside the mainstream in the context of immigration contributed to the ‘encapsulation’ of such practices stereotyped as a ‘tough Russian style’
CULTURAL FORMULAS AND CLICHÉS OF EDUCATION

The linguistic expression of ‘Russianness’, apart from such areas as language choice and communication pragmatics, comprises the cultural ‘assets’ of parents: ideologies and behaviour stereotypes being consciously taught to the younger generation.

The following exchange reveals the pattern of directly inducing the norms of the etiquette to a child. The participants of the conversation are: Mother, Father and Michael, aged 9, at mealtime.

1. Michael: (laughs, addressing his mother) Ha, ты картошку уронила!
2a. Father: Миш, воспитан тот, кто сделал вид, что этого не заметил.
2b. А когда жуешь, то закрываи рот – и не разговаривай за едой – как это делают . . . здесь.
3. Michael: С закрытым ртом невкусно!
4. Father: Не спорь, когда тебе старшие говорят!

As a response to the son’s initial comment (1) – Ha, ты картошку уронила! (Ha-ha, you dropped the potato!), Father feels it necessary to come to Mother’s defence and to convey a message about what he perceives as culturally acceptable behaviour. His statement with regard to the child’s table manners (2) illustrates several features of the parenting educational style. First, one of the codes of behaviour – воспитан тот, кто сделал вид что этого не заметил (a well-mannered person is the one who pretends not to notice that) (2a) – is taught within a more complex ‘common truth’ discourse.4

Noteworthy is the fact that, in eliciting adherence to acceptable polite conduct from the child, the father addresses the specific normative corpus of Russian cultural knowledge. The father’s implied criticism is maintained by the underlying assumption that his Israeli-born son adequately possesses this – non-local – cultural equipment.

The parent–child hierarchy is further constructed through the affirmative impersonal syntax that frames the father’s speech act of indirect reproach, and his command tone is intensified by the subsequent imperative – А когда жуешь, то закрываи рот – и не разговаривай за едой (When you are chewing, close your mouth and don’t talk during mealtime) (2b) – that directly instructs the child in factual patterns of behaviour. Paradoxically, however, by employing the informal Russian vocative pattern with zero inflection (‘Mish’) when addressing his son, the father both softens the degree of strictness, and indexes the discourse as a private one. The Russified mitigated form ‘Mish’ of the boy’s Israeli
name Михаэль, indeed, is used as an informal address in a friendly setting. As such, the pattern of receiving the cultural capital is associated with the inner domestic and, in a global sense, Russian practice.

In the course of the whole dialogue, the father continues evoking authority, and in his directive (4) – Не спорь, когда тебе старшие говорят! (And don’t argue when adults are talking to you) – he recruits the Soviet Russian rhetorical cliché of an additional ‘weight’ of the statement by means of generalising and impersonalising which is manifested grammatically by his use of plural and third person forms, and lexically by his use of collective noun старшие ‘adults’ when he is speaking about himself. This style acts to emphasise the hierarchy and to accentuate the discursive distance between the members of the family.

Although the father lays down the terms of the authoritarian educational mode, Michael tends to minimise the discursive gap and takes a stance towards coequality as if he were a ‘ratified’ conversational partner – one who is included in the speech event and who believes that some response is anticipated from him (Goffman 1981: 10). In explaining himself – С закрытым ртом невкусно! (with my mouth closed it doesn’t taste good) (3) – the boy circumvents the underlying innate inconvenience of adhering to table manners. Indeed, the Russian cultural ‘prerequisite’ suggests that one should be competent in a number of outward behaviours, rendered ‘well mannered’, in order to produce the appropriate impression. The perspective of such a ‘mannerism’ however is different in Israel, where a stance towards preference for the non-pretentious, simple and sincere style of dugriyut, or directness (Katriel, 1986), of social performance is accepted.

Though the father doesn’t overtly take a critical stance towards Israeli table manners, his disapproval is implied (2b) – как это делают . . . здесь (as it is commonly done . . . here). In this sense, the practice of teaching children etiquette in Israel might have the same appearance as in Russia; however, it acquires an additional implied meaning – dissatisfaction with the host culture’s codes of behaviour and striving to be ‘culturally superior’.

CLOSING REMARKS

In conclusion, I would like to emphasise the view that modern global ‘middle-class’ child-raising practices have recently replaced authoritarian, clear-cut positional styles of parental control by person-oriented, less powerful, however verbally more complex, forms of interpersonal communication (Bernstein 2000; Christie and Martin 2007). Yet, in the
families of Russian-Israelis, the interplay of change and continuity in the communicative performance of parents and children creates a particular type of family dynamics where the perception of the older generation conspicuously does not adapt itself to the discursive reality of the world of Israeli childhood.

In this sense, the everyday interaction of Russian-speaking parents and their Israeli-born children is a valid tool for revealing how immigration affects the socialisation process. Russian language is one of the most imperative ways in which the parents mould their culture, construct social identity and create their community. Moreover, for the parents the Russian language symbolises the succession of the human cultural capital from their generation to the next one. This underlies the reason, why the Russian–Soviet cultural scenario of functioning within the family operates locally in a vibrant way: it is transmitted in the linguistic repertoire and even enforced through language use. Equally important, the conversational fabric of everyday family communication provides linguistic testimony of how the parents hold on to a position of authority. Apparently, in the context of immigration, the enforced appearance of Russianness, where traditional cultural attitudes are preserved and exaggerated to an extent, one could trace as a resource working ‘against’ the mainstream host Israeli culture.

It has been suggested that this phenomenon contextually reveals itself from the perspective of language choice (parents’ main concern), modes of communication (such as use of authoritarian control patterns) and cultural stance (for example, pertaining to the ‘visible pedagogy’ clichés). These practices are incongruent with the socially encouraged centeredness of their children, the second generation of immigrants. In this respect, I would like to address the initial example – ‘Mum, show me respect – I am a child!’ – that emphasises the child’s ratified status. Russian-Israeli children are bilingual and argumentative, they control the dynamic of the conversation and gain more power in their interactions. However, in this way they violate the Russian–Soviet perception of parents about what childhood is and what verbal manner should be adhered to.

It is difficult to predict how this cultural clash in the family will further manifest itself, and how children’s conflicting language and cultural skills will coexist, having been affect by both the families and the wider cultural environment, and going through both confrontation and adaptation. Nonetheless, the everyday communication between parents and children undoubtedly conveys crucial cultural information about broader socio-cultural processes in immigration.

By promoting children’s identification with their Russian roots
through both the explicit content and the discourse form, the representa-
tives of the older generation acquire the social role of agents of Russian
cultural knowledge to their children. Not less important is the fact that,
although the parents’ socio-cultural and verbal practices vary and are
relatively limited in comparison to the host culture, they withstand the
local Israeli discourse on childrearing and possibly undermine meanings
and ideas that the local discourse supports. Bearing this in mind, it is
ever more essential to register what type of dialogue will continue to
develop between the first and the second generations of immigrants, and
which modes of communication will be worked out.

NOTES

1. (1) Ben (in Hebrew): Mum, say it already. . .
(2) Mother (in Russian): What should I say, Beni?
(3) Ben (H): That the time has come to give the pocket money.
(4) Mother (R): Yes. (Calls all the children) Kids, come here!
(5) Ben (H): How much money will you give me?
(6) Mother (H): You are eight years old – you will get eight shekels.
(7) Ben (H): (correcting the mother) Eight shekels, because shekel is masculine.
(8) Mother: Come on, Beni, switch to Russian now!

2. (1) Mother: Dana, take a shower, it’s already late!
(2) Dana: Mum, bathe me. . . I cannot bathe myself.
(3) Mother: You are a big girl, I won’t bathe you.
(4) Dana: I am tired, really. . . tired, I want to sleep, I cannot bathe myself.
(5) Mother: Dana, don’t be fussy. At your age I bathed myself, dried myself and put
myself to bed.
(6) Dana: And also, Mum, the showerhead should be moved.
(7) Mother: You manage very well without me, enough already!
(8) Dana: It is slippery in the bathroom, I almost fell down in there the other day.
(9) Mother: You have a thousand reasons, Dana. Ok, start bathing yourself, I will
come and help you soon.

3. (1) Michael: (addressing his mother) Ha-ha, you dropped the potato!
(2) Father: (a) Mish, a well-mannered person is the one who pretends not to notice
that. (b) When you are chewing, close your mouth and don’t talk during mealtime –
as it is commonly done . . . here.
(3) Michael: With my mouth closed it doesn’t taste good!
(4) Father: And don’t argue when adults are talking to you!

4. The sentence is an abridged reworded quotation from Anton Chekhov’s protagonist
Belokurov: Хорошее воспитание не в том, что ты не прольешь соуса на
скатерть, а в том, что ты не заметишь, если это сделает кто-нибудь
другой (A well-mannered person is not the one who does not spill the sauce on the
table cloth, but the one who pretends not to notice that) (Chekhov 1974: 178). In
Soviet culture, this phrase has acquired the popularity of a proverbial wisdom.
REFERENCES


PART FOUR

Language Contact and the Globalisation of Russian
INTRODUCTION

The title of this chapter, while admittedly utilitarian, is an excellent frame for the discussion of a broad and fascinating topic. In essence, the entire comparison boils down to the specific permutations of the referenced similarities and differences. The similarities have their origin in the assimilation by two speech communities of enormous sociocultural changes that were then reflected in their language. In earlier work (Andrews 1999) I have noted that the many borrowings and other English-inspired lexical innovations of Russian-speaking immigrants to the United States during the 1970s and 1980s, or the group commonly referred to as the third wave, were a precursor of linguistic developments in post-Soviet Russia. On the surface, the similarities are quite striking. The differences, of course, lie in the conditions under which these developments occurred: in the case of Russian émigrés, that of direct language contact; while in post-Soviet Russia, greater exposure to and interaction with the Western world.

For the purposes of this discussion I will use the definition of ‘language contact’ formulated by Uriel Weinreich (1953/1979), the founding scholar of this subfield: two languages are said to be in contact when a given speech community is either actively bilingual or at least regularly exposed to more than one language simultaneously. The vast majority of the third wave quickly became bilingual for sheer survival purposes, and even the relatively few (usually elderly) people who did not become proficient in English still had to deal with the language to the best of their abilities on a regular basis. This, of course, is not the case in
post-Soviet Russia. Certainly there are individuals who use English daily in their professional and/or personal lives, but constant engagement with both languages does not take place on the level of the entire speech community.

In this chapter I will first treat the most obvious differences between émigré and mainstream Russian, pointing out trends and developments that could occur only in a direct-contact situation. These involve changes in prototypes and categorisation that affect not only semantics but also, potentially, morphology and syntax. As a transition, I will move on to a brief discussion of intonation and phonetics. Finally, I will examine lexical borrowings and neologisms. Here, the similarities are many, but very real differences, however subtle at first glance, also distinguish these two varieties of Russian.

**Prototypes and Categorisation**

I have long been interested in categorisation changes in émigré Russian not only as an explanation for so-called language interference, but also as evidence of a deeper cognitive shift. Prototype categories, as developed by the cognitive linguists (for example, Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1987; 1991; Taylor 1989) in the 1980s and ‘90s, are a fruitful paradigm for such investigations. In 1990 (first reported in print in Andrews 1994) I conducted an experiment among third-wave émigrés to test the saliency of the colour words синий (dark blue) and голубой (light blue), both of which are basic-level terms in the standard language. It involved four groups of subjects: non-émigrés living in the Soviet Union; third wavers who had arrived in the United States as adults; third wavers who had arrived as children or adolescents and who had acquired native or near-native English while retaining a full command of Russian; and monolingual English-speaking Americans as a control group for the larger category blue. In short, I demonstrated that синий and голубой remained distinct and basic-level colour categories for the adult émigré group to no less a degree than for speakers in the motherland, while for the younger émigrés there had been a distinct semantic shift: синий and голубой remained as words but were now subordinate terms in a new perceptual category determined by the more encompassing English category blue.

I then began applying such analysis to other examples of semantic shift among younger émigrés. For instance, the prototype of the word дом (house/apartment building) for many of these speakers had become not a multi-storey apartment building typical of urban Russia, but rather a single-family one- or two-storey American house. Therefore, a
sentence like В нашем доме не работает лифт (The elevator in our дом isn’t working) can elicit surprise. Prominent category shifts also occur in verbs of motion. Many younger speakers subsume идти (to go on foot, unidirectional), ходить (to go on foot, multidirectional), ехать (to go by conveyance, unidirectional), and ездить (to go by conveyance, multidirectional), all basic-level terms in the standard language, into a single cognitive category inspired by English to go. The latter, of course, is a basic-level category in English but is superordinate to the four basic Russian equivalents. Similar category restructuring can occur in the transitive verbs of motion, where нести (to carry/take on foot, unidirectional)/носить (to carry/take on foot, multidirectional), везти (to transport/take by conveyance, unidirectional)/возить (to transport/take by conveyance multidirectional), and вести (to lead/take when both parties are walking, unidirectional)/водить (to lead/take when both parties are walking, multidirectional) can be subsumed under a single English category of to take. Another common example is the conflation of спрашивать/спросить (to ask about something) and просить/попросить (to ask/request) on the model of English to ask. As in the case of синий and голубой, a given Russian word is rarely lost entirely. The speakers understand the full range of native equivalents without difficulty but are unable to apply them normatively in active usage. They have become cognitively subordinate terms in new basic-level categories inspired by English.

These types of category changes can extend even to case endings and verbal aspect. In other work (Ėndrius [Andrews] 2004: 127) I have noted that the genitive plural ending -ов for some English-dominant bilinguals has become the prototypical ending, spreading to nouns that normatively have a zero- or -еi ending, with examples such as *учительницев (female teachers), *студенткове (female students), *неделеев (weeks), *соседове (neighbours), *писателеве (writers). This, no doubt, is inspired by the fact that -ов is cognitively more salient than the zero or -еi ending, both of which also occur as stem endings. As for verbal aspect, consider a non-standard usage cited by Glovinskaia (2001: 374–6) in the speech of a first-wave émigré in France: Это *отняло у меня три часа каждый день (That took me three hours to do every day). She notes that while such norm violations occur sporadically even in the motherland, they were far more frequent in the speech and writing of the first wave. This, too, can be explained in terms of prototype theory. For these speakers, under the influence of French passé composé versus imparfait, the notion of a completed action became the overriding – that is, prototypical – feature of perfective aspect in Russian. It could therefore spread even to repeated, but completed, actions, as in this example. Recent work by
Polinsky (2000; 2008) and Isurin and Ivanova-Sullivan (2008) shows that telicity, that is, the conceptualisation of an action as completed, is frequently the single most important factor in the choice of aspect in American-immigrant Russian as well. In essence, the category of perfective broadens because of an adjustment to its prototype.

Usually such changes are confined to English-dominant bilinguals. Certainly very few émigrés who left the motherland as adults would confuse синий and голубой, let alone verbs of motion, grammatical endings or perfective versus imperfective aspect. However, even adults are not immune from restructuring of basic-level categories and prototypes. I have known adult third wavers who substitute жениться for выйти замуж under the influence of the superordinate English to get married, sometimes correcting themselves after a non-standard utterance and sometimes not bothering to do so. Another example I have discussed (Ėndrius [Andrews] 2004: 126) is that of an émigré who, after buying an American-style pick-up truck, used the term грузовик (truck (American)/lorry (British)) when writing to relatives in Russia who did not know English. This is a clear readjustment of the category prototype: in American English, a pick-up truck is as much a central member of the category truck as an eighteen-wheeler or other large load-bearing vehicle that a mainstream speaker would call a грузовик. In addition, Glovinskaia (2001: 374–6) shows that the cited readjustment in aspect was found even among highly educated speakers who had left Russia as adults. Changes of this type occur along a continuum, from the truck example above to confusions of case endings, depending on age at emigration, relative proficiency and dominant language of the speaker. Moreover, Weinreich (1953/1979) maintains that such changes can become regularised features of immigrant languages that survive into the second and third generations. Thus, if the Russian introduced into the US by third-wave émigrés survives into their grandchildren’s time (a question I will return to at the end of the chapter), it could be a version quite different from that of the motherland. The point here is that in this respect, émigré Russian is vastly different from the language of post-Soviet Russia. The developments described above are possible only in a direct-contact situation. Conditions do not allow for such phenomena in the motherland.

INTONATION AND PHONETICS

In other work (Andrews 1993; 1999) I conducted a controlled narration experiment to examine intonational changes in third-wave émigré
Russian resulting from the speakers’ exposure to and immersion in American English. I tested three groups of subjects: Soviet-educated adult émigrés; young adults who had left the Soviet Union during childhood or early adolescence and who had acquired native or near-native English; and monolingual, anglophone Americans for speech samples in English. Rather than use a non-émigré group as in the colour experiment, I relied on the standard treatment of Russian intonation in E. A. Bryzgunova (1980). I noted three major instances of intonational interference, quite generalised in the Russian of the young-adult émigrés but also occurring at least to some extent in the speech of the Soviet-educated group. These included the partial or total replacement of IK–1 in unmarked declarative utterances, of IK–3 in yes/no questions, and again of IK–3 in non-final segments with the intonation contours most typical of American English in these environments. For reasons of space, I will not describe here the various contours or the sociocultural motivations for and consequences of this interference, except to say that it can result in a speech melody conspicuously different from that of mainstream Russian. Moreover, these changes are insidious, because they occur below the level of consciousness. Based on many years of fieldwork, I note that they have become regularised features of third-wave émigré Russian for a large number of speakers, sometimes including even purists who have zealously guarded against other intrusions from English. Once again, such developments are possible only in emigration, in a situation of direct language contact.

In another area of pronunciation, however, Russian in the motherland seems to be growing more like émigré Russian. This concerns the phonetic shape of loanwords from English. As Wójtowicz (1984: 25–40) has pointed out, English borrowings into Russian have traditionally been of three types: (1) phonetic borrowings, in which the approximate pronunciation of the original is maintained, for example, футбол (football), шоу (show); (2) graphemic borrowings, in which the English spelling is transferred, for example, bunker, lump; (3) mixed borrowings with elements of both patterns, for example, кетгут (catgut).4 In the 1970s and 1980s, there was a clear difference between the two versions of Russian in this regard. In mainstream Russian, graphemic and mixed borrowings were more frequent than phonetic ones, because the majority of borrowed words had entered through the medium of the two written languages. In émigré Russian, however, because of its direct contact with English and the mostly oral transfer of borrowings, the phonetic model predominated.

This pattern has started to change in post-Soviet Russian. Not only are many more people studying English and mastering it to a greater degree,
but also interaction with the English-speaking world has increased dramatically. In lists of some current borrowings as noted by Velichko (1995), such as бодибилдинг (bodybuilding), брейн-дрейн (brain drain), ваучер (voucher), джек-пот (jackpot), дилер (dealer), имидж (image), импичмент (impeachment), киллер (killer, contract murderer), маркетинг (marketing), спонсор (sponsor), шейпинг (shaping); or Romanov (2000), such as боулинг (bowling), джоггинг (jogging), ноутбук (notebook), овертайм (overtime), паблисити (publicity), пати (party), пейпер-бак (paperback), пейпер-бак (paperback), плей-офф (playoff), рейтинги (rating), скатты (scouts), токио (talk show), тайм-шер (time-share), тинейджер (teenager), токшоу (talk show), фьючерс (futures), the phonetic model seems to be predominating. The discussion is complicated by the very different phonological systems of Russian and English, a full treatment of which is not possible here. To be sure, there is still considerable vacillation when rendering those English sounds most difficult for Russians, such as schwa before [r] (American English) or long schwa (British English) in words such as sir, nurse, word, earl. Here, spelling transfer seems to be the default. It also remains a matter of dispute whether English /æ/ is closer to Russian /a/ or /e/, and whether to palatalise paired Russian consonants before /e/ in borrowings. However, these two lists of Anglicisms show trends that can also be noted in third-wave émigré speech: (1) the rendering of English vowels based on actual pronunciation rather than graphemic substitution, for example, the first vowel in токшоу (talk show), the second in имидж (image) and both in смол-ток (small-talk), тайм-шер (time-share), тинейджер (teenager), токио (talk show), токшоу (talk show), шейпинг (shaping). Another feature prevalent among émigrés, and increasingly so in contemporary mainstream Russian, is the failure to fully de-voice word-final voiced obstruents in borrowings such as бодибилдинг (bodybuilding), боулинг (bowling), брифинг (briefing), джоггинг (jogging), имидж (image). There are counterexamples, of course, in the same lists. Velichko (1995) gives консенсус (consensus), with the final vowel [u] instead of English schwa; брокер (broker), with no rendering of the diphthong in the first syllable; легитимность (legitimacy) with [e] as a graphemic transfer instead of English [dzh]. Romanov (2000) has тайм-шер (time-share), where the diphthong is rendered in the first syllable with vowel plus [j] but not in the second. There is also аудитор (auditor), spelled with an initial double vowel in imitation of the original spelling, while in this instance the two-letter combination represents
only a single phone in English. Moreover, in the borrowing the stress falls on the vowel [i], unlike the first-syllable stress of English.\(^6\) In \textit{модем} (modem) the current Russian form fails to preserve the diphthong in the first syllable and also has a different stress from the English. Still, the trend seems irreversible. Russian in the motherland is headed firmly in the direction of phonetic borrowings, as in the direct-contact model of émigré speech.

**Lexical Borrowings and Neologisms**

Moving now to the area in which current trends in mainstream Russian mostly closely resemble émigré Russian, consider this sampling of borrowings that I treated in my 1999 monograph on the third wave: \textit{апоинтмент} (appointment), \textit{апрейзл} (appraisal), \textit{бебиситер} (babysitter), \textit{бедрум} (bedroom), \textit{бойфренд} (boyfriend), \textit{гараж-сейл} (garage sale), \textit{джанк-мейл} (junk mail), \textit{дилер-шип} (dealership), \textit{копирaйт} (copyright), \textit{лaйсенс} (license), \textit{лис} (lease), \textit{лоун} (loan), \textit{менеджер} (manager), \textit{пропозал} (proposal), \textit{рил-эстейт} (real-estate), \textit{тур} (tour), \textit{тарки} (turkey), \textit{фул-тайм/пaрт-тайм} (full-time/part-time), \textit{шопинг} (shopping), \textit{шорт} (short [circuit]), \textit{экспериенс} (experience).

On the surface the similarity to contemporary Russian is quite remarkable. Like the English borrowings in post-coup Russia cited previously, they all arose as the speakers confronted and assimilated newly important material objects and/or concepts familiar in the West but previously lacking or of little relevance in Soviet life. Another factor working in both versions of Russian is Krysin’s (1965) principle of linguistic economy: it is often simpler to borrow a single word for a new object or concept if the closest native equivalent is two words or an even longer explanatory phrase. Yoshizumi (2006: 66–7) gives the example of \textit{электронное сообщение} or \textit{электроннaя почta} for \textit{электронный mail}. Krongauz (2008: 21) cites the verbal neologism \textit{емелить} (to e-mail) for \textit{посылать электронную почту} (to send electronic mail). An excellent example from third-wave émigré Russian is \textit{лис} (lease) for \textit{арендинный договор} or \textit{договор об аренде} (rental agreement), where the one-syllable borrowing replaces the six- or seven-syllable native equivalent.

In fact, many of the same words were borrowed in both versions of the language. \textit{Менеджер} (manager), one of the earliest borrowings by the third wave, has become a ubiquitous term in the contemporary Russian business world. Romanov (2000: 8) and Yoshizumi (2006: 53)
both note бебиситер (babysitter) in post-Soviet Russian. Even in these instances of almost exact parallelism, however, there are important differences. The third wave left the Soviet Union before менеджер had become a widespread term, so most speakers use it only in reference to the new American realia. It is one half of a type of semantic doublet noted by Weinreich (1953/1979: 55) in an example from American Yiddish, where лойер denotes a lawyer or attorney in the United States while native адвокат is one elsewhere. Even a third waver who had had a managerial position in the Soviet Union (to the extent that there were such jobs) would not refer to himself as a менеджер when describing his former life there. Rather, he would use an appropriate native synonym like управленец, управляющий, руководитель, администратор, директор. As I shall also discuss below, Krongauz (2008: 56–61) argues that менеджер has undergone a semantic evolution in post-Soviet Russian quite unlike anything in American English and/or émigré speech. As for бебиситер, there has been an additional development in emigration. I have also recorded the hybrid-compound verb бебиситерствовать (to baby-sit) in third-wave émigré Russian, a neologism that would be highly unlikely in the contemporary motherland. However, it is easy to see why certain émigrés have coined it, since they are also familiar with the use of to baby-sit as a verb in English.

Another difference between the two variants of the language is that in post-Soviet Russian, a pre-revolutionary term was sometimes reactivated in preference to a contemporary borrowing. A good example is ипотека (mortgage), a previous borrowing from the French. In third-wave émigré Russian, this could only be the English borrowing моргидж, for obvious reasons. First, émigrés of this period may not have known the word ипотека at all, or at least not its exact meaning. Second, for the many émigrés who purchased real-estate after establishing themselves in the United States, the English term was adopted along with this newly acquired aspect of American realia. A similar comment can be made about недвижимость (real-estate, literally, something unmovable) versus рил-естэйт. While contemporary mainstream Russian has adopted рээлтор (realtor) for a person who sells недвижимость, недвижимость is the preferred word for this type of personal property itself. Despite almost twenty years of the latter as a newly living term in mainstream Russian, рил-естэйт remains the word of choice for third-wave émigrés. Here, the reason is somewhat different from моргидж versus ипотека, since недвижимость is a native Russian word. However, it was very little used and of almost no relevance to the lives of these speakers before emigration, and thus it is easily replaced by рил-естэйт.
The strictly sociocultural factors that encourage the adoption and use of borrowings in the two variants of the language also seem similar at first glance. Krongauz (2008) devotes much of his book to the fashionability of what he calls *glamurnye slova* (glamorous words), the majority of which are recent borrowings from English but which also include certain native words with altered semantics in the post-Soviet period. As he points out, for many speakers the ready use of such terms signals membership or a desire for membership in newly prestigious economic and/or social groups. Yoshizumi stresses this aspect of borrowings as well: they can make the speaker look ‘innovative and modern’ (2006: 32) or ‘westernised’ and ‘progressive’ (2006: 100).

In my monograph on the third wave, I discuss similar tendencies among Russian émigrés: the desire to signal their mastery of the new culture through the adoption and use of English borrowings (Andrews 1999: 59–104). Here the differences between the two versions of Russian are more subtle. For the émigré, the urgency of assimilation was more immediate, and this was reflected in the language. Polinsky (1994: 15) notes certain borrowings that became almost obligatory in third-wave émigré Russian, or else the speaker would face the risk of correction by other émigrés. These include *иншира́нс* (insurance), *ка́рпет* (carpet [to distinguish wall-to-wall carpeting from an area rug]), *ло́ндри* (laundry), *па́унд* (pound [the unit of weight]), and *хаспи́таз* (hospital) and *эри́я* (area [part of a city or town]). A third-wave émigré herself, she reports being corrected repeatedly in émigré stores for using the normative *фунт* instead of *па́унд*. In contemporary mainstream Russian, it is possible to imagine a younger person occasionally correcting a stuffy elder for failure to use a certain fashionable borrowing, but not the widespread, almost universal phenomenon that Polinsky describes.

Polinsky (1994: 27) also offers a list of verbal neologisms that are nearly as prevalent: *а́фордить* (to afford), *дже́гать* (to jog), *драйвáть* (to drive), *иншиура́ть* (to insure), *океши́ть* (to cash), *шапáть* / *шопáть* (to shop). In my own work (Andrews 1999: 81–4) I have focused particularly on *драйвáть* (or its alternative form *драйвить*). First, it is notable for its sociocultural implications, because it underscores the importance of driving in American culture versus its comparative lack of relevance to many speakers’ lives before emigration. Second, it is an excellent example of linguistic economy, uniting into one verbal form disparate native equivalents with respective unidirectional and multidirectional forms: *еха́ть* / *ездить* на машине́ (to go by car), *вести* / *водить* машину́ (to drive, literally: to lead a car) and even transitive *везти* / *возить* кого-то на машине́ (to transport someone by car). The last usage is admittedly rarer, but I have recorded Отдрайв́ мя́н в школу́ (Drive me to school).
There are occasional verbal neologisms in post-Soviet Russian, such as the previously mentioned емелить (to e-mail), signalling that computers are as much a necessity in contemporary Russian life as were automobiles to many third-wave émigrés. However, they are still relatively unusual, probably in part because of their association with Russian youth slang, for example, аскать/askanуть (to ask), дринкать/дринкануть (to drink), where the adoption is stylistically rather than semantically motivated. Where they do occur, they are highly marked, such as this example in a recent article entitled ‘Euro-renovation as a political slogan’ (Трет’яков 2010): Зачем организовывать обслуживание ‘как в Европе’, если можно просто слетать туда, развлекаться и пошопинговаться? (Why have a service economy ‘like in Europe’ if it’s possible just to fly there, have fun and shop?). Here, of course, the author uses the verbal neologism пошопинговаться to emphasise the particular nature of Western-style shopping. This is very different from the neutral шопать or шапать as cited by Polinsky or from бебиситерствовать (to baby-sit), as I have discussed earlier. In the direct-contact model, the ubiquity of shop and baby-sit as verbs in English induces parallel forms in émigré Russian.

To conclude the discussion of what Krongauz calls glamorous words, consider two émigré utterances treated in my monograph (Andrews 1999: 100–1; 80): Я очень экскайтед (I’m very excited) and Я сюда ехала на скорости 80 (I drove here at a speed of 80 [miles per hour]). One can argue that there are semantic motivations for both borrowings. Excited, usually translated as взволнован in bilingual dictionaries, lacks the component of nervous agitation inherent in the Russian word, at least the way it is most popularly used in American English. Rather, it is an emotion somewhere between a simple Я очень рад (I’m very glad) and Я в восторге (I’m ecstatic), and one of the most frequently encountered in colloquial speech. For на скорости 80 one could argue that the speaker borrowed the English numeral along with the new way of calculating driving speed in miles per hour. The point here is that both of these utterances would be unheard of in post-Soviet Russian, no matter how enamored the speaker might be of Anglicisms. They demonstrate that the émigré’s need to prove his or her mastery of the new environment is stronger than any concomitant desire in the motherland to convey innovativeness or a Western orientation via borrowings. The émigré speakers here are virtually shouting: ‘See, I understand this new society and how they describe emotions here. See, I have assimilated to the automobile culture of the United States to such an extent that I even think in English numerals when talking about it.’

In my opinion the two phenomena to be discussed below are the great-
est, if also the least acknowledged, differences between the semantics of mainstream and émigré-Russian borrowing. When a word moves from one national culture into another, it can break free of its original mooring and develop in a way quite unlike that of the donor language. In essence, it becomes the ‘property’ of the recipient language. Krongauz (2008: 29–32) gives an excellent example with the evolution of элитный (elite) and эксклюзивный (exclusive) in post-Soviet Russian. He demonstrates how they have moved far from their original meanings, yielding such phrases as элитные окна и двери (elite windows and doors) or эксклюзивная баранина (exclusive mutton), either of which would be absurd in English. (If I were forced to define ‘exclusive mutton’ in English, I would say that it was the meat of some extremely arrogant sheep.) Krongauz (2008: 32–6) goes on to point out that both words have recently lost much of their expressive power from overuse, and that to pick up the slack, the native words правильный (correct), реальный (real) and актуальный (current) are now often used with an added connotation once conveyed by элитный and эксклюзивный: that is, the ‘correct’, ‘real’ or ‘current’ product to buy or behavior to emulate in order to be part of an in-group.

As for менеджер (manager), mentioned earlier, Krongauz (2008: 56–61) argues that it, too, has lost much of its meaning, especially after it branched into specialised forms like сейлзменеджер (sales manager), аккаунтменеджер (account manager), PR-менеджер (PR-manager). Rather than being a new equivalent of управленец and the like, he maintains that it now essentially means ‘a person who does some sort of job’. However, he acknowledges that it is still a very popular word in current speech because of its association with the new corporate culture.

In émigré Russian this type of semantic evolution is virtually impossible. Because of the direct-contact situation, the general bilingualism of the population, and the dynamic between the minority and majority languages, borrowings almost always remain tethered to their English meaning and scope. It is very difficult for them to break free and develop independently, as in the examples from the motherland above, although there are isolated instances. For example, a third-wave colleague of mine insists that she and her circle of acquaintances use трафик (traffic) only in the sense of a traffic jam (rather than in the usual English meaning of heavy but moving traffic). For them, therefore, Мы попали в трафик (We got into traffic) is the exact equivalent of standard Мы попали в пробку. Even in this, however, they differ from the majority of third-wave émigrés, who use трафик exactly how it is used in English (We got into a traffic jam).

On the other hand, there is a semantic phenomenon in émigré Russian
that is much more active than in the language of the motherland: what Weinreich (1953/1979: 47–53) terms ‘semantic extension’, or the expansion of the meaning of a pre-existing native word on the basis of a foreign model. This is the opposite of the process we have just described above, for here the semantics of the donor language determine developments in the recipient language. Consider, for instance, (1) the expansion of класс (class) to include individual courses taken either on the school or university level, as in Какие у тебя классы? (What classes do you have?) in place of native предметы или курсы; (2) the use of кредит (credit) in the academic sense. In American universities tuition payments and graduation requirements are usually calculated according to credit hours, or the number of hours per week that various courses meet. Thus, we have Сколько у тебя кредитов? for ‘How many credits do you have?’; (3) таxa which in Soviet Russian had the semantically related but much narrower meaning tariff/rate, for English ‘tax’; (4) блок (block) to denote ‘a city block’, replacing квартал. In third-wave эмигрант Russian this sometimes occurred with words that had been of only limited frequency in the Soviet era, such as the extension of апликация (appliqué) for English ‘application’. In this new meaning апликация became a high-frequency word, for the process of establishing oneself in a new country is filled with applications for residency, employment and citizenship. Semantic extension can also affect verbal collocations. Particularly good examples are idioms with the verb брать (to take), mentioned in virtually all accounts of эмигрант Russian, based on the idiomatic usage of to take in English. These are especially common in the public transportation and academic domains, e.g. брать автобус/поезд (to take a bus/train); брать русский язык в университете (to take, that is, study, Russian at the university), but also include other common phrases: брать тур/ круиз (to take a tour/cruise), брать риск (to take a risk).

This process occasionally operates in mainstream Russian as well. The borrowing камера (camera) seems to be extending itself onto standard фотоаппарат in exactly the same way as in эмигрант speech of the 1970s and 1980s. A cursory web search yields advice like Как выбирать цифровую камеру (фотоаппарат) (How to choose a digital camera). It is particularly telling that фотоаппарат is given in parentheses after камеру, for this is precisely the way that new borrowings are often introduced in the press. It also shows that камера has not completely replaced фотоаппарат in this meaning in the motherland, while for most эмигрант speakers it has done so. In any case, semantic extensions of the type described above are much less prevalent in post-Soviet Russia, simply because the language there is not under the same pervasive influence of English that it is in emigration.
Finally, let us turn to what will be the most extreme examples of non-standard language covered in this chapter. In documenting the negative reactions in today’s Russia to current linguistic developments, Yoshizumi (2006: 2–3; 101–3) cites one writer who identifies the ‘degradation’ as coming from two sources: criminal argot and American English. He offers parallel examples from the speech of two groups of young men who want to buy some vodka. From criminal argot: – У кого бабок можно найти на пузырь водяры? Да че тут базарить, в натуре, скинулись по штуке и затарились (What’s up, men – someone said in the first group. – Who has cash for a bottle of ‘water’? Why . . . discuss it, really, let’s put in a buck each (and get some)). And from the group enamoured of Anglicisms: Хей, гайз – ’спикали’ во второй команде. – Мейк анибоди ’капусты’ на боттл? Очень дрингкинг хочется (Hey, guys – someone spokeed (said) in the second group. Does anyone have a buck for a bottle? I am thirsty (I really feel like having a drink)).

In émigré Russian there is nothing remotely similar to the second example, for the constraints of English would not allow it. There is no verbal neologism спикать (to speak), and even if there were, no émigré would use it as above, because to speak cannot replace to say in this environment. Even more so, no émigré would confuse to make [money] with to have [money], as in this citation. Third, no émigré would use a present participle in –ing (дрингкнг) after хочется (to want/to feel like); even if a verbal neologism were to occur here, it would be an infinitive as in standard Russian. All this notwithstanding, if the second example is an authentic or even possible utterance, one might be tempted to conclude that contemporary Russian truly is on the verge of a nervous breakdown. However, it sounds not altogether different from a supposed quote in Alexander Sumarokov’s (1759/1781–2: 274–7) ‘On the extirpation of foreign words from the Russian language,’ written in 1759. Invecting against unnecessary borrowings from French and German, Sumarokov offers a similarly macaronic example: Я в дистракции и в дезспере. Амента моя сделала мне инфиделите, а я а ку сюр против своего ривайля буду реванжироваться (I am in distraction and despair. My lover has been unfaithful to me, and I will surely revenge myself against my rival). In this same tract Sumarokov also asserts that there is no reason to say суп (soup) instead of похлебка; фрукты (fruit) instead of плоды; or туалет (toilet) instead of уборный стол, whereas in contemporary standard Russian the first of each pair is a perfectly ordinary word. In fact, in his complete list of objectionable borrowings we see the panoply of possible outcomes, as noted by Krysin (1965) and others: (1) the borrowing may come to predominate, as with суп versus похлебка (the latter is still used, of course, but is restricted and marked),
or дама (queen) and валет (jack) in playing cards versus края и кхлап; (2) the borrowing is discarded and the native word wins out, such as аманта versus любовница ([female] lover) or мокероваться versus насмеяться (to mock); or (3) both words are retained, but with a semantic distinction, as in modern фрукт (fruit as a food product) versus плод (fruit figurative/scientific); деликатно (delicate[ly]/tactful[ly]) versus нежно (delicate[ly]/tender[ly]) or камера (cell/room) with a specialised purpose versus комната (room [of a dwelling]). The point, of course, is that despite Сумароков’s great alarm and the comical examples he provides in the quote about the wronged lover, the Russian language has done quite well for itself in the 250 years since he wrote this piece. I am confident that it will also survive the current situation.

As for third-wave émigré Russian, however, survival is very much in doubt. In my early work on the topic (Andrews 1999: 158–60), I predicted that this version of Russian would survive into the second and third generations, and perhaps beyond. The third wave is well educated (about three quarters of adults had finished an institution of higher learning in the Soviet Union), literate, and proud of the great heritage that is the Russian language and culture. In those earlier days I also personally knew many families who were doing everything possible to pass on this heritage to their children. With the coming of glasnost’ and, later, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, I also argued that newly free travel back and forth to the motherland would help facilitate the continuation of third-wave émigré Russian and that the influx of new immigrants would reinvigorate the language. I must report, however, that I was overly optimistic. Of course, Russian is still being spoken in the United States by adult third wavers and by the new fourth wave. As for the Russian brought by the third wave, it is not surviving beyond their children’s generation in any widespread fashion. This I attribute not only to the assimilationist pressures of American society, for those have always been a factor, but also to the ever-increasing role of English as the international language of choice. The latter tendency has only intensified over the last twenty years, since the collapse of European socialism and the rise of globalisation. Still, especially with the reinforcement provided by the fourth wave, the third wave may well achieve a greater transmission of Russian to the third generation than was true of the first and second waves in the United States. Whatever its ultimate fate on American soil, third-wave émigré Russian remains a fascinating case study and an excellent example of the similarities and differences between language change in general and the particular type thereof in a situation of direct language contact.
NOTES

1. While the term *apartment house* is theoretically possible in American English for a multi-unit dwelling, contemporary usage vastly prefers *(apartment) building.*
2. Unless otherwise stated all translations are mine.
3. Bryzgunova singles out seven IK, or intonation patterns, in the Russian language.
4. Here and throughout, glosses are provided for individual words. However, when a form is used multiple times in a single paragraph or discrete discussion, the gloss will generally be given only once.
5. As Lara Ryazanova-Clarke (personal communication) notes, borrowings with this root, e.g. *легитимизация* ‘legitimization,’ *легитимизм* ‘legitimism’ and *легитимист* ‘legitimist’, existed in late nineteenth- and twentieth-century Russian. The use of [g] is therefore the continuation of an established pattern.
6. I thank Olga Meerson (personal communication) for pointing out that *auditor* was first borrowed into Russian in the nineteenth century in the meaning ‘inspector/overseer,’ similar to *ревизор*. Therefore, when ‘re-borrowed’ in the 1990s in its current financial sense, it already existed in this phonetic shape.
7. This is a classic example of metaphorical extension in the standard language, where *пробка* ‘cork, stopper’ yields ‘traffic jam’, that is, movement that has become plugged or corked up. I also thank Lara Ryazanova-Clarke (personal communication) for pointing out that the borrowing *трафик* exists in contemporary mainstream Russian in the meaning ‘movement of contraband’, e.g. gun- or drug-trafficking.
8. As noted by Lara Ryazanova-Clarke (personal communication), *аппликация* has now also entered mainstream Russian in the domain of cosmetics and computing.
9. The translations of these two phrases are Yoshizumi’s, with alterations by me in brackets. The words in parentheses are clarifications by Yoshizumi. Note that the register of the translations does not necessarily correspond to that of the Russian.
10. No attempt has been made to render in translation the stylistics of the original, in which there are at least seven outré borrowings.

REFERENCES


INTRODUCTION

When I moved into a room in a university dormitory in Moscow, I was given an inventory – a list of all the objects in the room for which I was responsible. To my surprise, the inventory contained the word карниз, which to me meant ‘exterior window sill’ – at least that was how people in Riga, where I grew up, used it. The window did, of course, have an exterior sill, but it seemed strange to include it in the inventory. It transpired that in ‘mainland’ Russian карниз can mean ‘curtain rod’ – something that I, a native speaker of Russian, never knew.

This was not the last unexpected discrepancy between my lexicon and that of the standard Russian. The word мусорник in Riga is the most common name for a ‘waste container’ of any type. In mainland Russian it simply does not exist. Moreover, it is not present in the dictionaries, whereas in Latvia it is used by everybody, including well-educated speakers.

The divergences turned out not to be limited to everyday speech. Working as a translator, I discovered that the insurance term самориск (lit. ‘self-risk’, US ‘deductible’, UK ‘excess’) exists almost exclusively in Latvian Russian. It is a relatively official term, used by insurance companies, banks and business journalists, but hardly known in Russia, where the same notion is called франшиза.

The more examples I encountered, the more I became sure that these phenomena deserve a linguistic description. It might be useful both for practical purposes – should the need to codify the regional norm arise –
and theoretical purposes – to estimate how far Russian has moved on the scale of pluricentricity.

Pluricentric languages

A pluricentric language is a language with two or more standard varieties, each of which can be ascribed to one centre, usually a country (Ammon 2005: 1536). Examples of pluricentric languages are English (centres being Britain, the USA, Australia etc.), Portuguese (Portugal, Brazil), Swedish (Sweden, Finland) and so on. Russian is not usually considered a pluricentric language. Clyne (1992: 3) mentions Russian as an example of a major monocentric language;³ Ammon (2005: 1541) states that Russian could be included in the list of pluricentric languages, if Russian and Belarusian are considered a variety of the same language. Mechkovskaia (2005: 59) uses the term *polynational* in a similar way and states that Russian as a polynational language is in the early stages of its history. This brings us to the question of what stages this history might have.

Ammon (1989: 90) offers a scale of endonormativity/exonormativity, where a language L in a country C can be considered anything from fully endonormative⁴ to fully exonormative. The criteria are the existence of a codex, or a source of prescriptions (dictionaries and so on), and models (model speakers, model writers and texts generated by them). Ammon mentions the following rough distinctions:

1. full endonormativity (both the codex and the models entirely from within C);
2. predominant endonormativity (the codex entirely from within, the models in part from outside C);
3. semi-endonormativity (the codex as well as the models in part from within and in part from outside C);
4. predominant exonormativity (the codex entirely from outside, the models in part from within C);
5. full exonormativity (both the codex and the models entirely from outside C).

If we compare L in C (Russian in Latvia in this case) to L in country M (‘metropolitan country’, Russia in this case), one more condition has to be met so that positions (1) to (4) can be used at all. While Ammon does not state that explicitly, there have to be differences between codices from within and from outside, as well as between models. Otherwise it can hardly be said that L in C is endonormative.

Bearing this condition in mind, I will argue in the present chapter
that, as it pertains to the lexicon, the Russian language in Latvia on Ammon’s scale is somewhere near position (4), with a slight shift towards position (3). Latvia, in Ammon’s terms, is therefore something between rudimentary centre and semi-centre (1989: 91). It is important to remember, however, that my analysis and conclusions are restricted to lexicon and do not touch upon other language levels. The choice of lexicon as a primary goal of investigation is not random. First, lexicon is often the first domain to be influenced in a situation of language contact (see, for example, Winford 2003). Second, it is also often the first to be codified. Third, quite a few studies have been published in recent years that show that the lexicon of the Russian language is less homogeneous than it is often considered to be, and that many regional divergences from the standard codified norm cannot be viewed as mere errors (see next section for references). The present study is meant to contribute to this line of research, and to expand it, taking it more actively beyond the borders of the Russian Federation.

Regionalisms in Russian

Russian dialectology has always focused more on rural varieties of Russian rather than on urban ones, and urban lexicon has rarely been studied. It would be wrong to say that studies of urban speech are totally absent: see for example a brief list in Akhmetova (2008) and a list of earlier studies in Semenova (1977). However, authors of such studies often focused on vernacular speech (prostorechie), implicitly or explicitly assuming that standard Russian is uniform everywhere.

An explicit statement that this might not be the case can be found in Belikov (2004). Belikov shows that accepting the point of view stated above leads to the claim that even in Moscow, model speakers very often do not know the lexical norm (notable lexical differences exist between Moscow and St Petersburg, and the most authoritative explanatory dictionaries are published in the latter). The same holds true of other Russian cities: speakers of all kinds of social status and education happen to use regionalisms, that is, lexical items used in some regions which are either absent in standard dictionaries, or have different meaning or status. Regionalisms may be found even in texts which are supposed to have the highest possible status such as official documents, including federal legislation (Belikov 2009).

The ideas briefly described above have been actively developed for several years now within the ‘Dictionary of Russian Cities’ project. An important methodological rule accepted by those who work on the dictionary is to verify all the claims quantitatively, using internet
search engines in the most simple cases (Belikov 2006; Akhmetova 2008; Belikov and Akhmetova 2009). This line of research is not restricted only to cities in Russia: Belikov (2007), for example, is completely devoted to ‘foreign Russian.’ However, the Russian language in Latvia deserves even closer attention.

The Russian language in Latvia

In 2000, when the last (at the time of writing) national census was held, the total population of Latvia was 2,377,383. Of the total population, 37% were native speakers of Russian, and 81% claimed knowledge of Russian (the corresponding numbers for Latvian are 58% and 79%). Most of the Russians living in Latvia now are those who arrived during the Soviet period and their descendants. Many Latvian Russians, however, are descendants of earlier settlers, those who arrived while Latvia was part of the Russian Empire or even prior to that. The only official language in Latvia is Latvian (Official Language Law 1999). All other languages, except the Liv (Livonian) language, are considered foreign.

Despite its lack of official status, the actual role of Russian in Latvia is rather close to that of the official language. Apart from being the mother tongue for 37% of the population, it is also often used in communication between Latvians and Russians. There are newspapers in Russian, both national and regional, as well as online news portals and broadcasters. The websites of private companies usually have both Latvian and Russian versions and the same holds true for many state institutions (though they are not obliged by law to produce Russian versions). For example, out of fourteen ministries, three have Russian versions of their websites, and so does the Cabinet of Ministers. Russian versions are usually quite detailed, although the quality of language differs greatly – from nearly perfect to rather negligent. Documents in Russian can in some cases be used by the police and the courts (Dimante 2007: 320). Education in Russian takes place at all levels, from primary to higher. However, in state-funded educational institutions its share cannot exceed a certain limit set by law; the rest of the instruction must take place in Latvian. Teaching materials in Russian are published within Latvia, including Russian–language schoolbooks. Russian–Latvian and Latvian–Russian dictionaries are also being published.

There is no official body in Latvia responsible for standardising the Russian language. It is clear from the above, however, that there are model speakers/writers, and that there is at least some codification, if teaching materials and bilingual dictionaries may be viewed as one. The question is whether there are differences between Latvian Russian
and Russian Russian, which would show that the former’s models and codices do not entirely follow the metropolitan norm. It is possible to predict that some innovations are likely to occur in the situation of a close contact with a superstrate language and a relatively weak contact with the mainland, and that the lexicon would be particularly exposed to the influence.

Some differences between the two Russians relating to lexis, phonetics, morphology and syntax are described in Kuznetsov (2000); Klochko and Liguta (2004); and Dimante (2006). Dimante, and Klochko and Liguta mostly describe those differences which arise in colloquial speech, and label them as deviations from the norm. Kuznetsov (2000: 78), however, provides some examples of regionalisms occurring in more prestigious varieties of language, and asks the question: ‘Is it possible to consider the local views of the norm as the norm?’ offering no unequivocal answer.

In this chapter, I restrict myself to those lexical regionalisms which have a high status in Latvian Russian: those that occur in official terminology and are actively used by professionals and the authorities.

**SCOPE AND STRUCTURE OF THE PRESENT STUDY**

As concerns regionalisms, three important points can be noted. First, regionalisms can be placed on the status scale based on the variety of language to which they belong. For example, the Latvian loanword ри́нда (‘queue’, instead of очередь) can be heard in colloquial speech, but hardly ever appears in newspapers. The Latvian loanword аплиеци́ба (certificate, usually used as an ironic name for the certificate of the knowledge of Latvian language granted after passing the state examination, instead of удостоверение or сертификат) is very common in colloquial speech and rather common in newspapers (although usually in quotation marks), but this word is unlikely to be found in documents, or in high-register speech. Са́мориск (excess), however, is completely unmarked, and can be used anywhere, including official documents. Respectively, ри́нда is placed near the lower end of the scale, аплиеци́ба – higher, and са́мориск near the higher end. Such ‘official’ regionalisms are the focus of my interest. As demonstrated, this phenomenon has received little attention in literature, while it is of importance in understanding the status of Russian in Latvia in relation to mainland Russian.

Second, regionalisms may be divided into those which are names of endemic realia (and have no equivalent in mainland Russian) and those which are not. I will focus on the latter. This opposition seems to be binary, but in fact some cases turn out to be borderline.
Third, speakers might either be aware that the word they are using is unusual, or not aware. In the case of "аплиециба", they almost certainly are – this is an ironic use of a Latvian word, while in the case of "самориск", they most likely are not. The same holds true for most of my examples: they are usually ‘invisible’ to the speakers. It is difficult to substantiate this claim, and this is not a goal of the current study, so it remains grounded on my general impression, indirect evidence from the ubiquitous use of regionalisms and anecdotal evidence from metalinguistic discussions on the web.

The following sections contain a description and a quantitative analysis of twenty-two official regionalisms encountered in Latvian Russian. First, I describe the materials and methods used, then, I present the results, and finally, conduct a concluding discussion.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Sources of regionalisms

Most of the examples come from my experiences working as a translator. The studies mentioned in the ‘Russian language in Latvia’ section, the materials of the Standardized Translation of Latvian Realia Dictionary, and focused analysis of discussions on the internet and different documents in Latvian Russian were also used. Each lexical item which seemed to be a regionalism was subjected to verification, so the resulting twenty-two items are those which passed the tests described in the next section.

Qualitative and quantitative verification

Each lexical item discussed in the paper was checked in at least two ways: on Google, in order to ascertain whether the supposed official regionalism was official in Latvia; and in the Integrum World Wide database, to check whether it was a regionalism. Integrum is a database of the Russian-language media, which includes regional and foreign media as well. While a Google search allows one to see whether a lexical item is indeed encountered in official contexts (such as websites of state institutions, business companies or other model texts), it is not very well suited to quantitative analysis (Kilgariff 2007). I am therefore making an assumption that the frequency of a lexical item in the Latvian press will reflect how common it is in Latvia, and shall rely on Integrum’s output.

Unlike internet search engines, Integrum returns the exact number of
documents in which the query occurred. In order to check the endemicity of a lexical item, one has to find the ratio (R) of the number of found documents from Latvia (LV) to the total number of found documents (T) and compare it with the default ratio. The default ratio would be the ratio (R_c) of the number of all the documents from Latvia (LV_c) to the number of all the documents in the database (T_c). I estimate LV_c as $7.2 \times 10^5$ and T_c as $5.2 \times 10^7$, R_c then being 0.014. If a regionalism does not exist in mainland Russian, or has a different meaning, or has different status (slang, archaic or vulgar, for example), then this should affect its frequency, and R should then notably differ from R_c (see next section for a discussion of what is a notable difference).

`Integrum`'s output is noisy, posing at least four problems for research. (1) Latvian regionalisms may be used in the mainland press as well, for example, in texts about Latvia. This material is ignored and all such occurrences were not included in LV. (2) Due to the search engine imperfection, some documents are included in the output twice (this affects both LV and T, so the effects presumably cancel each other out in most cases). (3) Words which have several meanings (one of them regional) tend to give a less clear picture: if we do not filter out the irrelevant meanings, T is larger than it should be, and R is smaller. (4) In some cases homonymy with proper names can occur.

In order to deal with problems (3) and (4), queries that contained not just the lexical item but also its context were sometimes used. This is reported as ‘query’ in the ‘correction’ column in Table 9.1.13 In some cases, when the output was small (and errors were more likely to distort the final result), a full manual check of all the occurrences was performed to deal with the above described problems (this is reported as ‘manual’ in the same column). All the searches were performed in August–September 2010.

**Statistical verification**

In quantitative studies, the most common way to confirm that the observed results are real and worth noting is significance testing. Significance testing answers the question ‘is the observed effect (likely to be) random?’ This method, however, does not say anything about how large the effect is. Moreover, when we are dealing with language corpora, we actually know that the result is never random, since language is not random (see Kilgariff 2005 for detailed argumentation). Large samples can make effects visible, even if the effects are very small or trivial.

Significance testing for my data (one-sample proportion test with continuity correction) shows that all the differences between R and R_c
are significant ($p < 0.001$ in all the cases). However, it shows the same for very many words which are not regionalisms at all, including the most common words (the conjunction ‘and’, for example). The reason is described above: language is not random, and large samples show that there is some effect. We know nothing, however, about what this effect is, how large it is and whether it is important (since it arises for almost every word, it most likely is not).

One way to deal with these problems is to use another measure – effect size (ES), which shows how large the effect is. In behavioural sciences it becomes more and more common to report ES (APA 2010), and in linguistics this trend is also present (Perry 2005: 224).

Cohen (1988: 181) proposed the following measure for ES when comparing proportions:

$$h = 2 \arcsin \sqrt{\frac{p_1}{2}} - 2 \arcsin \sqrt{\frac{p_2}{2}}$$

In our case $p_1$ is $R$, $p_2$ is $R_c$.

This measure can be larger than 1. Cohen proposes the following very rough guidelines: the effect is called small if $h < 0.20$, medium if $h > 0.50$ and large if $h > 0.80$.

Since $p_2$ is always equal to $R_c$, we know the maximum possible value of $h$ in our study ($h_{\text{max}} = 2.90$). For the sake of clarity, I normalise $h$ and report $h_n = h / h_{\text{max}}$. Cohen’s guidelines then transform to 0.07, 0.17 and 0.28. Note, however, that these guidelines are not meant to be universal. A better guideline might be derived from the fact that when counting ES for various non–regionalisms, I never got $h_n$ larger than 0.10. Thus, in order to be included in the analysis, the lexical item should have $h_n > 0.10$.

RESULTS

The findings are summarised in Table 9.1. To clarify, ‘RU’ is the number of documents from Russia, ‘type’ is a type of innovation. The typology is discussed below, and detailed descriptions are provided for some items. Examples of use are reproduced without any corrections, unless otherwise noted.

Discussing linguistic borrowing, Haugen (1950) distinguishes between importation (reproducing a pattern used in a foreign language by importing it) and substitution (reproducing the pattern by means of the speaker’s native language). Importation results in loanwords, substitution results in loanshifts. Haugen expains that ‘the term “shift” is suggested
because they appear in the borrowing language only as functional shifts of native morphemes’ (1950: 215). A well-known type of loanshift is loan translation, or calque. Haugen also describes another loanshift type (less frequently discussed), namely loan synonym, ‘which only adds a new shade of meaning to the native morpheme’ (1950: 219). A subtype of loan synonym that is important for us is termed by Haugen semantic displacement, ‘in which native terms are applied to novel cultural phenomena that are roughly similar to something in the old culture’ (1950: 219).

Most of the regionalisms discussed here fall under the three categories: loanwords, calques and semantic displacements. I will provide examples of these, and then deal with the cases which cannot be placed in either of these groups.

Loanwords can be considered the most simple innovation type, as in example (1).

(1) ̄REFLEKTAINT IMMATRIKULIRUJETSЯ NA PROGRAMMU OBучЕНИЯ ПРИКАЗОМ РЕКТОРА.14 (website of the Baltic International Academy)

Here, REFLEKTAINT (Table 9.1, no. 15) is a borrowing from Latvian reflektants. This case is noteworthy, since AkadTerm, the terminology database of the Terminology Commission of the Latvian Academy of Sciences (AkadTerm) offers the Russian translation рефлектант for this word. In other words, the regionalism is found at the very heart of the local codex.

Calques are the most popular type, see example (2).

(2) КЛИЕНТУ ЖЕЛАТЕЛЬНО ПОМНИТЬ, ЧТО В ПОЛИС МОЖЕТ БЫТЬ ВКЛЮЧЕН САМОРИСК, С УЧЕТОМ КОТОРОГО КОМПЕНСАЦИЯ ПРИ СТРАХОВОМ СЛУЧАЕ НЕ ВЫПЛАЧИВАЕТСЯ ЛИБО КЛИЕНТУ НАДО БУДЕТ КОМПЕНСИРОВАТЬ ЕГО ИЗ СВОИХ СРЕДСТВ ДО РЕМОНТА ОБЪЕКТА.15 (website of the ‘SEB Bankа’ bank)

The word САМОРИСК (Table 9.1, no. 16) is a calque from Latvian pašrisks, which, in turn, could be a calque from Swedish självrisk, since Scandinavian companies own a large share of the Latvian insurance market. Самориск has two obvious advantages over the mainland’s франшиза: first, it is a compound with transparent semantics produced by the two elements: сам (self) and риск (risk); second, it is not ambiguous, while франшиза can also mean ‘franchising’.

Another type of calquing can be found in example (3).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Vocale</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>LV</th>
<th>RU</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>$h_n$</th>
<th>Correction</th>
<th>Closest mainland analogue</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>абсолвент</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>manual</td>
<td>выпускник</td>
<td>graduate</td>
<td>borrowing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>акцептировать (проект)</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>одобрать,</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Meaning</td>
<td>Type</td>
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<td>399</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>manual</td>
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<td>sports</td>
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<td>sports teacher</td>
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<td>счёт сделки</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>query + manual</td>
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<td>escrow account</td>
<td>calque</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td>0.48</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>n/c</td>
<td>1411</td>
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<td>76</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>none</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>фискальный год taxation year</td>
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<td>товарищ (заместитель)</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>заместитель председателя</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<td>0.96</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>none</td>
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<td>0.46</td>
<td>manual</td>
<td>хабилитация</td>
<td>habilitation</td>
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</table>
Here, the case is different from example (2): the word самориск does not exist in mainland Russian and cannot be understood by its speakers unless explained or clear from context, while присяжный адвокат (Table 9.1, no. 12, ‘sworn attorney’) is understandable. It is, however, never used in mainland Russian (only when referring to Latvian, Estonian or other foreign attorneys), probably due to its redundancy. People say just адвокат (attorney), which is enough: all the attorneys are sworn attorneys. In tsarist Russia, the term присяжный поверенный was used in the same sense.

It is noteworthy that two Latvian–Russian dictionaries (Kalniņa 2002; Kalniņš 2004) translate zvērināts advokāts as присяжный адвокат. This is another example of differences entering the codex, although it has to be noted that these dictionaries are rather the periphery of the codex: they are neither the largest nor the most well-known.

The cases of semantic displacement are more subtle, see example (4).

The word акцептировать (Table 9.1, no. 2) exists in standard mainland Russian in two terminological meanings: chemical (акцептировать электрон – ‘accept an electron’) and financial (акцептировать вексель – ‘accept/honour a bill’). In Latvian Russian, it is used in a wider sense: to approve an application, particularly a construction project. Проект is not the only word that can be combined with акцепт(у)овать/акцепт(у)ование: заявление (application), поручение (errand), ремонт (repair) and others can as well, but проект was chosen as the most salient.

As can be seen from Table 9.1, however, similar examples can also be found in Russia: the financial meaning is being extended, probably under English influence, to other similar contexts. In Latvian Russian the process of semantic displacement, however, went much further.

Some cases cannot be classified as either loanwords or loanshifts as described by Haugen, see example (5):
The word перенятие (Table 9.1, no. 10) exists in mainland Russian and is present in dictionaries. As we can see, however, its frequency in Latvia is much more substantial, showing that the role of this lexical item in Latvian Russian is notably different from its role in the mainland variety. This popularity is explained by it being a literal translation of the Latvian word pārņemšana. We cannot, however, call it a calque, since the word already existed in the language prior to foreign influence. Nor is it a semantic displacement, since no change in meaning actually happens. It is only usage pattern that changes, the word becomes more common. In line with loanwords and loanshift I term this case loan usage. Since mechanisms that lead to frequency change can be different, they are always mentioned in Table 9.1.

For example, годовая декларация о доходах (Table 9.1, no. 4) becomes popular since it is a calque from Latvian gada ienākumu deklarācija. While the expression is perfectly grammatical, it is seldom used in mainland Russian, people say just декларация о доходах (income declaration), R is 0.04 for that item (close to $R_c$, $h_n = 0.06$), or декларация о доходах за такой-то год (income declaration for the year n). Hence, this is a case of loan usage triggered by calquing. An example of loan usage triggered by loanword is таксация (Table 9.1, no. 20): the main meaning of it in modern mainland Russian is ‘forest valuation’. In Latvian Russian, the common meaning is ‘imposition of taxes’, especially when denoting a tax period/year.

The boundaries between calques, semantic displacements and loan usage are somewhat vague. It might, for instance, be argued that changes in frequency are always due to changes in meaning, albeit minor. Notwithstanding this, I think that the general borrowing mechanisms are clear, and I readily acknowledge that cases may be viewed as borderline.

A special type of borrowing, possible due to the long history of interaction between the two societies, are historical restorations, see example (6).

(6) Планируется, что это будет Президент страны Валдис Затлерс, Президент министров Валдис Домбровский и товарищ председателя Сейма, председатель Юридической комиссии Винета Муйжнице. (website of the Supreme Court)
Товарищ (lit. ‘comrade’; Table 9.1, no. 21) in the meaning ‘deputy’ existed in pre-revolutionary Russia when it must have been calqued by Latvian: the word biedrs (comrade) acquired the same meaning. In the USSR, this term was abolished, and the words товарищ and biedrs were both used as a default form of address, which lost popularity after the collapse of Communism. In Latvia, biedrs in the meaning ‘deputy’ was later restored, while its counterpart started to be used in Latvian Russian as well. It would not make sense to search just for товарищ, and товарищ министра returns too many historical contexts, thus, the query товарищ председателя was used.

Interestingly, after the meaning ‘deputy’ disappeared in Soviet Russia, it continued to exist in the Russian language of pre-occupation Latvia, as in example (7)20:

(7) . . . он действительно требует для себя пост второго товарища председателя.21 (Segodnia, 28 March 1925)

We are dealing with a rather rare corollary of language contact here: the almost extinct Russian word was restored in a foreign variety of Russian due to the influence of the Latvian language which preserved it, acting as a conservation medium.

Reasons for innovations

A number of reasons can be provided to explain why the Latvian Russian innovations emerge and become stable, replacing the mainland analogues. The most fundamental reasons, relevant to all the examples, are the influence of Latvian and the general lack of standardisation of Russian in Latvia, which both make the language more open to absorbing innovations. Another important reason, relevant to almost all the examples, is the existence of lexical gaps in Latvian Russian. At the end of the Soviet period, neither Latvian nor Russian had words for many concepts that quickly became of importance. Both languages have filled the gaps, but in the case of Russian in Latvia, the influence of Latvian on the choice of fillers was often more significant than the influence of mainland Russian.

Other reasons for Latvian Russian innovations are more specific. For some items, there may be no good analogue in mainland Russian. Consider продека́н (Table 9.1, no. 13): 22 mainland analogue would be either заместитель декана (long, two-word) or замдека́н (informal). In the case of обхозяйствовать (no. 8), there is no clear analogue at all, while the concept is quite important. As regards сениор (no. 17), the
regionalism is somewhat euphemistic and thus can be considered more polite than the mainland equivalent.

The innovation can be driven by cultural context: some concepts may be less relevant and/or less known in Russia, consider счёт сделки (no. 19; this bank service is indeed less popular in Russia) or народное голосование (no. 6; it is true that referenda happen more often in Latvia than in Russia). The nomenclature systems might differ in the two countries, creating the need for innovation even though there is no, strictly speaking, lexical gap. Consider (no. 22): in the Soviet system, there were two academic degrees: кандидат наук (approximately equal to PhD) and доктор наук (equivalent to, for instance, Dr. habil. in Germany and some other countries). In independent Latvia, the former received the name доктор наук, as is common in the Western tradition, so the need for another name for the latter emerged, producing the new title of хабилитированный доктор наук, lit. ‘habilitated doctor’.

It is remarkable that in many cases innovations better correspond to the one-meaning-one-form principle (see, for instance, Miestamo 2008 for description). Consider счёт сделки (no. 19) and самориск (no. 16): both are semantically transparent, the latter also unambiguous, unlike its mainland analogue франшиза. In the case of no. 11, the Latvian terminology is more regular and uniform than the mainland one.

Finally, it is worth noting that in some cases a similar change can be observed in mainland Russian, as was described, for instance, for акцептировать (no. 2). Together with such borrowing types as restoration, semantic displacement and loan usage, this supports the observation made by De Groot (2008: 209) about Hungarian outside Hungary: the new structure is often (in De Groot’s study, in most cases) ‘not entirely new; rather, it is built on some structure . . . that already existed in the replica language.’

Norm

As has been stated previously, while some entities that can be considered codices of Russian language exist in Latvia (dictionaries, schoolbooks and so on), there is no official standardisation. This leaves the normative status of the discussed innovations open: are they deviations from the standard? How should a translator deal with pašrisks when translating into Russian: choose франшиза (likely to be misunderstood in Latvia) or самориск (wrong according to the official standard and will not be understood in Russia)? Can there exist a codification of Russian outside Russia?

It is interesting to see how, in the absence of standardisation, self-
organisation can go different ways in different countries: according to Integrum data, in Latvia the most popular variants for nos 1 and 22 are respectively absolvent and хабилитированный, in Lithuania preference is given to absolvent and габилитированный (while the scope of the current study is solely Latvia, it should be noted that some of the described regionalisms exist in other post-Soviet countries as well, particularly in Lithuania and Estonia).

CONCLUSION

In the preceding sections, I claimed that there exist lexical divergences between Latvian Russian and Russian Russian, and that they are in no way limited to low-status language varieties, but can be found in the written speech of journalists, lawyers, legislators and other high-status speakers. I provided quantitative evidence to support the claim, showing that there are significant differences between frequency of various lexical items. The statistical criteria I used to ensure that the observed effects are large enough and important left me with a list of twenty-two instances of innovations in Latvian Russian.

These items represent various types of innovations: loanwords, calques, semantic displacements, as well as more exotic cases of loan usage (change of frequency without any change in meaning) and historical restorations (possible due to the rich history of interaction of the two societies: Latvia as part of the Russian Empire, First Republic, Soviet Latvia, Second Republic).

Various reasons for the emergence of these innovations were discussed, from the general ones such as influence of the Latvian language and introduction of novel cultural phenomena, to more specific such as preference of shorter, or less marked variants, or of those which better conform to the one-meaning-one-form principle.

Two of the twenty-two items have also been included in dictionaries, that is, they are not only part of model speakers’ lexicon, but also part of local codices. This also demonstrates that there are differences between codices of the Russian language in Russia and in Latvia. If we return to the scale of pluricentricity discussed in the ‘Background’ section, that means position (4), with a slight shift towards position (3): the models are in part from within Latvia, the codex is nearly entirely from outside. In other words, Russian in Latvia is partially endonormative.

To conclude, I would like to quote Vais [Weiss], who acknowledges that German legal language is different in Germany, Austria and Switzerland, and notes: ‘It is quite possible that a similar split will also
happen in Russian legal language, if for example, it is once again allowed to become a language of legislation and legal proceedings in the Baltic states’ (2009: 258). The main claim of this chapter is that while Russian has not been granted this status, the split has already happened.

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NOTES

1. It is also sometimes called window ledge.
2. Neither mainland Russian nor Latvian Russian is fully monolithic, thus very few statements about lexical units in this chapter are meant to apply to all speakers of a certain variety of Russian.
3. Note that the situation was quite different in 1992.
4. The situation is endornormative if the language standardisation draws on native models of usage; and exonormative if the standards of the language are established in other countries.
5. Available online at http://lingvo.ru/goroda/
6. Liv is a nearly extinct Finno-Ugric language considered indigenous and entitled to special protection.
8. Unless otherwise stated, the translations are those of the present author.
9. Two of them became entries in the Dictionary of Russian Cities.
10. Available online at http://realijas.venta.lv/
11. A particularly useful source was discussion at www.politika.lv/508/did/6084/
12. Available online at www.integrumworld.com/
13. For the sake of brevity, the exact queries used each time are not reported here.
14. ‘An applicant can be matriculated into the course by the Principal’s decision.’
15. ‘The client should note that the policy might include a deductible for which no
compensation is paid, alternatively the client will cover repair costs in advance from his or her own funds.’

16. ‘Article Four of the Law determined that only sworn advocates and sworn advocate assistants shall be allowed to act and practice as advocates in Latvia.’

17. ‘After due consideration, the Riga City Construction Board takes the decision whether to accept/not to accept a construction project.’

18. ‘Right to Take Over of Authorisations’ (translation by the Cabinet of Ministers).

19. ‘It is planned that these will be the President Valdis Zatlers, the President of Ministers Valdis Dombrovskis and Deputy Chairperson of the Parliament, the Chairperson of the Legal Commission Vineta Muizniece.’

20. This possibility was suggested to me by V. Belikov, and the example was found through National Digital Library of Latvia (www.periodika.lv).

21. ‘... he does demand a position of second deputy chair ...’ The example is converted into modern orthography.

22. Hereafter numbers will refer to items in Table 9.1.

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PART FIVE

Globalisation of Russian as Soft Power
 Asserting itself as a confident global player, Russia issued in 2009 a new doctrine of national security for the period until 2020. The doctrine included language among the listed instruments of national security (Strategiiia Bezopasnosti 2009). This highlighted a developing trend by which the Russian language is increasingly used in the promotion of Russian national interests abroad, as a soft power tool packaged for global consumption. The notion of soft power is widely interpreted as an ability of a country to ‘co-opt rather than coerce’ and to ‘shape the preferences of others’ (Nye and Jisi 2009: 18; Nye 2004; 2011). In order to serve these purposes, agents of soft power attribute to the Russian language specific symbolic values, salient among which is the ability to structure an integrative ideology aimed at fostering an enduring sense of identification with Russia. In accordance with this trend and starting approximately from the middle of the first decade of the millennium, a number of state sponsored organisations have been launched with an objective vigorously to promote Russian language and cultural products abroad and, consequently, to establish Russia as a centre of global cultural flow. Perhaps the best-known initiative was the establishment in 2007 by the president’s decree of the Russkii Mir Foundation, aimed at the popularisation of the Russian language across the world. According to the narrative displayed on its web page, Russkii Mir facilitates Russia to become a world linguo-cultural centre of attraction for an imagined vast global russophone network. The intention is to create a new space for a Russian-speaking identity, a network that aspires to integrate Russian ‘compatriots’ (соотечественники) who live outside the mainland, along with a broader range of those who are ‘interested in Russia’
and ‘are concerned about its future’ (‘O fonde’ 2007). Using modern technology, ‘the Foundation seeks to dissolve physical national borders to create more porous, virtual boundaries of national identity, in what might be called a “virtual rusophonía”’ (sic) (Gorham 2011: 24), and to move towards a broader global constituency of influence. In addition to the provision of support for the Russian language, the Foundation is explicit that its goals stretch beyond linguistics. Ranging from ‘forming a positive image of Russia’ to ‘creating an expert support for the humanitarian dimension in foreign policy’, to ‘facilitating the return of Russian emigrants back to Russia’ (O fonde 2007), these are telling items of the organisation’s multifarious task of ‘shaping the preferences of others’. Similarly, integrative objectives have been cited by Konstantin Kosachev who was appointed in 2012 the new head of Russia’s Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo).2 Talking frankly about soft power being the main focus of his organisation’s activities, he noted that ‘reintegration of the post-Soviet space’ is a key area of Russian soft power operations (Kosachev 2012).

This chapter aims to investigate these reintegration trends by examining the russophone cultural flow transported from the Russian metropolis onto the post-Soviet space. Like any power, soft power is constituted in discourses (Fairclough 1989; 1995; van Dijk 1998; 2003; 2005; Weiss and Wodak 2003; Wodak and Chilton 2005; Wodak and Meyer 2009; Flores Farfán and Holzscheiter 2011 and others). Taking a discourse analytical perspective, the chapter deals with the discursive production of such flow.3 It also takes Arjun Appadurai’s framework of the global imaginary combined with Teun van Dijk’s notion of knowledge frame as a unit of discourse organisation, as points of departure. Knowledge frames are understood as generalised schemata that represent socially shared knowledge and other forms of social cognition such as attitudes, values, norms and ideologies (van Dijk 2003: 92). According to Appadurai, the discourses of cultural flows are injected by meanings-streams that vie for the shared imaginaries (1996). Meaning-streams are mobilised through linguistic and other cultural discursive forms (images, scripts, models (the latter terms corresponding to knowledge frames)), which ultimately shape the imagined worlds of ideoscapes – the ideological constructs that are the ultimate targets for soft power activities. The following sections will pinpoint the semiotic mechanisms of constructing meanings and knowledge frames engaged in transmitting integrative semantics – that is the meanings instrumental in representation of the post-Soviet world as a homogenous unity. Finally, the chapter will examine how successful, or consistent, the Russian globalised cultural flow to the post-Soviet states
is. The discourse of the Russian-medium international broadcasting corporation *Mir* is chosen as a case study of a specific form of externalisation of a Russian outward cultural flow. The data used are electronic texts and television programmes produced by *Mir* from 2009 to March 2012.

**A GLOBALISATION APPROACH**

The perspective of globalisation has recently emerged as a new optic for scrutinising Russian linguo-cultural forms. It aims to explain the processes of homogenisation/heterogenisation in the contemporary world while moving away from the simple dichotomies of the postcolonialism paradigm with its division into the oppressors and the oppressed. A relatively new offshoot of postcolonialism (Loomba 1998; Robertson and White 2003; Loomba et al. 2005; Krishnaswamy and Hawley 2008), globalisation studies has recently made a substantial leap into less familiar contexts and locations (Kołodziejczyk 2010; Wilson et al. 2010). Among those are the developing paradigms of the so-called ‘Second World postcoloniality’, albeit problematised at the outset by authors like Vitaly Chernetsky (2007) who argues that ‘postmodernism, postcolonialism, and postcommunism have not been an exclusive property of the First, the Second, and the Third world respectively, but have overlapped and diffused into each other on a great number of levels’ (2007: 265). The post-colonial approach has informed the emerging linguo-cultural critique of the former Soviet Union localities (see for example, Dawisha and Parrott 1997; Druviete 1997; Moore 2001; Pavlyshyn 1992; 1993; Kuzio 2002; Masenko 2004; Chernetsky 2007; Pavlenko 2008: 29; Uffelmann 2011). Much of this work accepts that the post-colonial condition is applicable to the post-Soviet world, and focuses primarily on post-Soviet postcolonialism as a counter-practice of the ‘postmodernism of resistance’ (Foster 1985: x). This view is contested by those who tend to stress that specific modalities of Russo-Soviet control over the former republics require more nuanced interpretations for this configuration. In particular, doubts have been expressed as to whether Russian fully fits into the existing description of a colonial language in relation to the republics of the Soviet Union (Laitin 1998; Smith et al. 1998; Hirsch 2005; also see Introduction this volume). Some authors appeal for the development of a modified version of postcolonialism for this area, including, for example, the recent attention to the thesis of Russia’s internal, or self-colonisation (Kujundzic 2000; Étkind 2001; Étkind et al. 2012), or the notion of mini-globalisation developed by Roland Robertson in relation to the Soviet
phenomenon of the ‘historical empire formation involved in unification of the previously sequestered territories’ (1990: 21).

While the relevance of postcolonialism to the post-Soviet space continues to be debated, the globalisation outlook, as Robertson argues, was triggered exactly by the events in the Second World: it emerged with the ‘geopolitical earthquake’ in the world Communist systems and with the sudden inclusion of the collapsing USSR in the Eurocentric ‘international society’ (1990: 17). This fact notwithstanding and more than two decades after Robertson’s admission, the discussion of cultural and linguistic aspects of globalisation is still skirting the post-Soviet area. A comprehensive critique of Russian language in trans-national contexts is still in the initial stage and requires the development of both theoretical paradigms and empirical evidence in order to align itself with the rapidly emerging field of the sociolinguistics of globalisation (Fairclough 2006; Blommaert 2010; Coulpland 2010; also see Introduction to this volume).

**MIR AND THE COMMONWEALTH**

*MIR* is an intriguing cultural phenomenon which was set up to link together the post-Soviet world and which currently resides in a tension between the nostalgic Soviet past and a utopian global russophone future. It is a multi-state media conglomerate with its network spreading across the countries of the former Soviet Union, excluding Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The station claims to maintain a balance between the inputs from Russia and its ‘near abroad’ by having a board of representatives of the participating countries and branches in nine CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries, however all its editorial policy is devised in Moscow (Kachkaeva 2010).

The evolution of *MIR* over twenty years of its existence reflects the dynamics in Kremlin policy with regard to the former Soviet space. The broadcasting company was created in October 1992 at the dawn of the post-Soviet world order and, reportedly, on an initiative of the Kazakhstan leader Nursultan Nazarbaev (Kachkaeva 2010). The immediate purpose for the operation was to replace the dismantled all-Union media network by a ‘common information space’ intended to stretch across the recently institutionalised CIS. In the first half of the 1990s, Russian authorities had no clear policy for dealing with the rest of the former Soviet Union. At that stage, the CIS envisaged itself not as a means to maintain Russian leadership over the rest of its former empire but as ‘a mechanism to procure a “civilised divorce”’ (Laruelle 2009: 4). As Paul Goble comments, it was therefore conceived rather as a transi-
tory ‘fig leaf’ to cover the gaping hole left by the fallen Soviet colossus (Goble 1992: 64).

The new Kremlin doctrine aiming to recover Russia’s role as the geopolitical centre of the post-Soviet space was linked to Vladimir Putin’s political era. Moscow’s redefined position ‘has made it abundantly clear that the Commonwealth of Independent States is a Russian sphere of influence where the role of other great powers must be minimized’ (Kramer 2008: 4). A new-found purpose necessitated a rebranding of the declining media company – and in 2007, Mir re-emerged in a revamped form. The corporation was generously injected with cash – Putin personally initiated a 50 per cent funding increase for it (Informatsionnoe prostranstvo 2008) – and in addition, the charismatic Radik Batyrshin, the former director of the popular ‘Maiak’ radio station was appointed Mir’s Chairperson (Teleradioveshchanie 2007). Today, Mir is a hi-tech corporation which broadcasts in a digital format and is also available online from a single internet platform combining television, radio and text formats. The company introduced a full schedule of broadcasting (Ufasat 2008) focusing on programmes on socio-political and cultural topics, including local news and documentaries from the participant countries, and from 2011 moved to a 24-hour-a-day operation (Strany SNG 2010; Nikandrov 2011). The station’s internet portal boasts a sleek contemporary design and allows free online access to television and radio both live and from an archive. Since acquiring its second breath the channel has rapidly expanded its reach: while having reportedly attracted an audience of 3 million a day in 2008 (Naralenkova 2008), by 2012 Mir boasted an audience over 70 million (Mir 2012).

The rebranded Mir’s self-descriptions containing its allegiance to the CIS in the style of 1992 as the ‘information space of the Commonwealth of Independent States’ (Informatsionnoe prostranstvo 2008; Nikandrov 2011) may give some indication of the imaginaries it aims to produce. Take the vexed question of on whose behalf and for whom the station produces its cultural content – and one can easily spot an obvious mismatch between the CIS membership of countries, their current status vis-à-vis the project, and the area of Mir’s broadcasting reach. In particular, of those states who in 1992 signed up to the establishment of the common information space, Ukraine went on not to ratify the CIS Charter. Hence it does not consider itself officially a member, although it receives the channel. Georgia was a member of the CIS from 1993 but withdrew in August 2008 just before the Russo-Georgian conflict (Kramer 2008: 3). Nevertheless it is still thought to remain within the Mir agreement. On the other side of the spectrum is Uzbekistan – formally a CIS member but currently not part of the ‘Mir’ project and
receives no programmes. Having joined the European Union, the Baltic
countries are resolutely non-participants of the CIS, but despite that, Mir
beams to the whole of the Baltic territory (Yandex Teleprogramma).
Thus the CIS that Mir persistently claims relevance to appears to be an
unstable construct while the image of the post-Soviet space the station
preserves is rather imprecise and elastic.

This imagined construct emerges at a time when the former Soviet
space continues to diversify as the majority of its countries are develop-
ing various patterns of nationalising nationalism (Brubaker 2000: 13)
and ‘a variety of political regimes, from unconsolidated democracies to
quasi-sultanates’ (Shevtsova 2007: 187). Moreover, the recent Russia-led
integrative trends in developing post-Soviet alliances demonstrate that,
even for the Kremlin, the relevance of the CIS proper is ebbing away.
New configurations are currently emerging, namely the Customs Union
which from 2010 amalgamated three CIS members – Russia, Kazakhstan
and Belarus. In October 2011, Putin launched his presidential elec-
tion campaign by writing an article announcing a detailed plan for the
Eurasian Union, an open membership integration project with the core
group consisting of the three above countries (Putin 2011). As a step to
that, from 2012 the Customs Union has transformed into the Common
Economic Space with a view to moving towards the full Eurasian Union
by 2015 (Liutova 2011; Tovkailo and Liutova 2011).

These developments, though, are not reflected in the descriptions of
Mir’s mission as they continue appealing to the imaginary Commonwealth
– the union of unfading commonality. For example, a company press
release of 2010 defines its task ‘to transform the channel into an efficient
instrument of information politics aimed at the strengthening of the posi-
tive image of each individual country of the CIS and all the Commonwealth
as a whole’ (Press-sluzhba 2010). Whether a positive image of the ephem-
eral CIS may be achievable is another question; however, such narratives
as the above press-release set a direction for construction of the public
imaginary. From the narratives produced or reinforced by Mir, the CIS
emerges as an ideologically defined script, a knowledge frame defined by
the meanings of Russia-centrism and internal cohesion.

DETERRITORIALISED RUSSIAN AND ITS IMAGINARIES

It has been noted that in the contemporary world, the sense of the
national is losing its grip on people’s imagination and the global imagi-
nary fuelled by the vision of the international social elites is on the rise
The concept of the imaginary in the sense of cultural beliefs and models has been broadly developed in anthropology and social theory. Cornelius Castoriadis ([1975] 1987; see also Thompson 1982), interprets the imaginary as the creative core of a society, Jacques Lacan ([1949] 1977; see also Julien 1994) as a fantasy, and for Benedict Anderson and Charles Taylor it is a learned and widely shared cognitive schema (Anderson 1991; Taylor 2004; see also Strauss 2006). In post-colonial thought the notion of the imaginary has been formulated by Eduard Glissant who connects the social and the cultural fields in a broad and overarching way, defining it as ‘all the ways a culture has of perceiving and conceiving the world’ (Wing 1997: 23). Developing an Andersonian approach for the postnational world, Appadurai (1996) unyokes the imaginary from place and theorises it as a global and mass-mediated phenomenon. He places the imaginaries in the centre of global cultural flows, linking the production of globalised subjectivities with the contemporary flow of deterritorialised mass media.

Following Appadurai’s paradigm, the deterritorialised discourses produced by a cultural soft power outlet such as Mir can be seen as configuring and calibrating both the mediascapes and the ideoscapes on the post-Soviet space. Mediascapes, in the scholar’s understanding, are two-prong, referring to ‘the distribution of the electronic capabilities to produce and disseminate information’ and also to ‘the images of the world created by these media’ (Appadurai 1996: 35). The term ideospaces refers to the ‘concatenations of images’ (and elements of worldview, chains of ideas etc.), which are ‘often directly political and frequently have to do with the ideologies of the states’ (1996: 36).

Appadurai points out that modern electronic media facilitate a rapid flow of globalised mediated images and scripts and provide new ways for the construction of diasporic subjectivities comprising imagined selves and imagined worlds (1996: 3). The migratory deterritorialised audiences meeting moving images are at the core of creation of these imaginaries as collective social facts (1996: 4–5). With respect to the post-Soviet situation, however, Appadurai’s notion of deterritorialisation of audiences and discourses requires a further comment. Unlike the classical post-colonial flows of labour migration forming diasporic communities in the West (and a comparable pattern of current inward labour migration from the former Soviet republics to Russian major cities), many Russian speakers living in the former Soviet states have commonly remained in their previously inhabited localities. Cultural hybridity wherever it exists in these spaces is historically conditioned by the Soviet legacy of multinationality, ‘the thoroughgoing state-sponsored codification and institutionalisation of nationhood and nationality exclusively on a sub-state level’ (Brubaker
In contrast to the post-national diasporas, the implosion of the Soviet Union produced a different, post-multinational type of Russian-speaking community which Rogers Brubaker (2000) terms the ‘accidental diaspora’. He explains that these communities occur suddenly and without the participants’ active involvement, and that while ‘labour migrant diasporas are constituted by movement of people across the borders, accidental diasporas [are constituted] by the movement of borders across people’ (2000: 2). Thus, the ‘accidental diasporas’ of the post-Soviet successor states consist of no migrants of classical postcolonialism. Instead, after the break-up, Russian-speaking audiences seem to have been dislocated from the narrative of the national public space, in other words, from Russian hegemonic discourse. If this is the case, then the mediated deterritorialised Russian discourse works upon the imaginary as a mechanism of compensation, a resource for constructing subjectivities and packaging narratives rooted in the memories of homogeneity and common belonging. The Russian language commodified for global consumption, in which the compensatory discourse is articulated, holds together solidarities as it promises to heal the trauma of dislocation, symbolic departure and loss (see Laclau 1990: 44; Norval and Mijnssen 2009). Thus, streamed as a cultural flow to the post-Soviet world, the globalised Russian discourse is called upon to construct in the post-Soviet imaginaries the remedial social spaces, and to form an imagined community which shares meanings, images and knowledge frames, in which the discursive dimension stands in for the spatial one.

THE LINGUISTIC IMAGINARIES OF MIR

A logocentric channel

Mir’s discourse utilises multiple tools for portraying the post-Soviet space as a coherent and unified body, and the channel’s focus on language seems to serve as the prime method of achieving this. For Mir, Russian is not only the sole language of communication, it is also an object of its metadiscursive attention – in other words, language is constantly discussed. In example (1), director Batyrshin comments on the choice of Russian as the channel’s medium, talking about it in terms of a key – albeit a vulnerable – connector:

(1) Нас, прежде всего, объединяет русский язык. Битва за его сохранение как за основу нашего рынка является для нас пряматической работой. (Batyrshin 2008)
Batyrsyn’s succinct statement mirrors bigger tensions occurring in the station’s meta-narrative. Side by side there are two conflicting arguments for Russian: first, the global justification of language as a market force (‘the foundation of our market’), in which he attributes to the language a positive and self confident cosmopolitan potency. The other argument is framed through a war metaphor (‘the battle for its preservation’) in which the military image of a battle constructs the Russian language as open to attack, in need of constant and aggressive protection. This argument, together with its inextricable war imagery, draws on the doxic – that is, accepted as status quo – knowledge frames pertaining to the conventional purist discourse popular in the linguistic culture of the Russian metropolis. These knowledge frames are rooted in the view that language is an immutable fixed code which could be harmed by influence from outside the system (Gorham 2006; Ryazanova-Clarke 2006; Strenge 2012). Batyrshin’s two mutually exclusive arguments frame therefore a metropolitan–global conflict which is inherently present in the linguistic imaginary constructed by Mir’s programme, as will be seen further on in the examples of the channel’s representation of the Russian language.

The station’s enthusiasm for the Russian language is vivid from its schedule, featuring two shows specifically related to language: the game show Знaем русский (We Know Russian), and the educational programme Великий, могучий (Great and Mighty). The formats appear to replicate the practices of the current linguistic culture of the mainland, which boasts a plethora of radio and television shows that aim at preserving Russian normative code by instructing Russians in various ways on how to use their language (Ryazanova-Clarke 2009).

The language game show ‘We Know Russian’ involves hand-picked pupils from the Moscow schools competing for the supposedly best, most flawless knowledge of Russian. The episodes run under didactic mottos: for instance, in the programme from 5 February 2012 it was Alexander Herzen’s words from his book My Past and Thoughts: ‘the main character of our language is the extreme elegance with which it expresses everything’ (Znaem russkii 2012). A typical eulogy for the Russian language such as this, pronounced by the presenter who addressed both participants of the game and the viewers, emphasises the show’s validation of a unitary fixed model of the language, limited to a single, standard variety and of the usage associated with the prestige social groups (speaking with ‘extreme elegance’). Broadcasted to the post-Soviet world, ‘We know Russian’ seems to display little awareness of the fact that the audiences it targets are largely multilingual and highly varied in their competence in Russian. Clearly, the qualities ascribed to the Russian language, that is, ‘extreme elegance’ and ‘ease’, are unlikely to be appreciated by those for
whom Russian is not their first language. Moreover, the flip side of the programme’s metalinguistic message is a depreciation of those who do not attain ‘our language’ at the expected level and are not up to expressing themselves in it ‘elegantly’. The game show allocates to them the position of losers, thus stigmatising ‘Russian with an accent’ as being a marker of the incompetent out-group.

Thus the game show ‘We Know Russian’ ascribes linguistic subjectivity to those both performing and watching the show from the perspective of the linguistic ideology of the metropolis. ‘Our language’ is conceived as a bounded code, an idealised fixity (Bhabha 1983) which is inherent to the native, Russia-inhabiting speaker position and which includes linguistic barriers that construct ‘otherness’. Recontextualised in the globalised context, the knowledge frames of this position are offered for internalisation and sharing to members of the post-Soviet community.

A similar metropolitan fixity arriving from the hegemonic view of language can be detected in the second language programme, ‘Great and Mighty’, whose title borrows from the epithets given to the Russian tongue by Ivan Turgenev in his eponymous Poem in Prose (1882). Turgenev described the Russian language as ‘great, mighty, truthful and free’ (Turgenev [1882] 1956: 507). In contemporary Russian linguistic culture, references to Turgenev’s words habitually drop the object of description – that is, the Russian language. The curtailed variant of the famous phrase points to the fact that the expression has reached the level of normalisation and enjoys the status of unquestionable common-sense knowledge. In fact, Turgenev’s truncated phrase has become integral to the value-laden rhetoric of Russia’s essentialising language cultivation discourse, in which, rather than just the means of communication, ‘the Russian language is seen as a national treasure, an encapsulation of national history and culture’ (Ryazanova-Clarke 2006: 49).

The format of ‘Great and Mighty’ targets especially speakers in the former republics for whom Russian is not a native language. The show’s presenter, a relic of Soviet film glamour – octogenarian actress Elina Bystritskaia – performs the role of a linguistic maven sitting in the studio and lecturing on the ‘proper’ use of Russian. In a February 2011 episode, for example, she explains where to place the stress in the word договор (treaty). Bystritskaia’s soft but didactically firm monologic performance seems to direct a condescending stance towards an audience whose speaking position is assumed to be simultaneously voiceless and erroneous. If the show’s audiences are indeed multilingual global viewers with a low level of competence in Russian, the language material presented in the programme – the stress pattern in the pronunciation of a specific word from the business domain – is difficult to justify. The stress on the
first syllable in договор – the speaking pattern that the programme aims to correct – hardly features among the typical difficulties of non-native speakers of Russian, rather, this is a marker of a vernacular variety of mainland Russian. So Bystritskaia’s lecture simply prescribes a shift from the vernacular to the standard form, and by this, again, promotes the essentialising metropolitan language ideology.

Thus, both programmes about the Russian language construct knowledge of standard Russian at the native speaker’s level to be normative practice for the speaking community in the post-Soviet space, and promote to the global audience metropolitan views with regard to the language’s nature and ‘quality’. The metalinguistic meanings that are manufactured in the above programmes and that aim at the viewers’ linguistic imaginary seem to be fully rooted in the hegemonic language ideology of Russia, which interprets the Russian language within the purist and normative paradigm of contemporary mainland linguistic culture.

**Linguistic practices**

Tensions between the idealised image of Russian as a bounded code and the reality of linguistic performance become apparent when we examine the speech of what is displayed as the ‘CIS linguistic community’ in the programmes that are not concerned with the topic of language. There, the linguistic practices reveal a different kind of global Russian, whereby presenters and participants share a broad variety of repertoires irrespective of their ‘quality’ and correspondence to the prescriptive standard. Linguistic performance of people up and down the post-Soviet space caught by the camera makes use of the fluidity and indeterminacy of the Russian code. A far cry from Elina Byrtitskaia’s instructions, voices from the streets outside the Russian Federation speak in Russian that is variously ‘accented’ and often ungrammatical. Moreover, language spoken in footage from the mainland is validated even though it may also have a flavour of being rather rough at the edges. Example (2) is a transcript of an interview with taxi drivers from the village Kushchevskaia in the Krasnodar region. In the village notoriously steeped in criminal behaviour, the taxi drivers’ speech is punctuated with lexical elements associated with the slang used by street gangs, such as менты (cops), голову раскрыли (split the head open), and the generally used obscenities.

(2) Taxi driver: На той смене трех ментов е...нули осетины.
Interviewer: Где, здесь?
Taxi driver: В ‘Забаве’, но не насмерть, а порезали.
Seemingly, the channel has no qualms regarding broadcasting this highly vernacularised and vulgar Russian language; moreover, since the interview’s audio quality is not good, to make sure all words are understood it is aided by subtitles that spell out every item of vocabulary including those usually deemed unprintable and which appear written with just one-letter ellipses.

In various programmes, language use outside the Russian Federation conforms to an unrestrained, fluid and mixed version of naturalised and domesticated Russian which does not comply with the metropolitan norms and possesses elements of adaptation to local realities. Consider example (3), which is an excerpt from an interview given to a Mir reporter by the deputy head of the Veterans of Labour Association from Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) Karavai Asanaliev.

(3) Asanaliev: Я прямо скажу, что народ обижен на чиновников. Чиновники думают, что народ служит, да, народ должен служить для чиновников, а не наоборот, чиновники должны служить для народа. И вот эти руководители дал... должны рук... организовывать, организовывать, чтоб постоянно у народа, у людей, у простых... простого человека была постоянная бдительность. (Mėr za mir 2010)¹¹

The frequent hedging, lexical repetitions and self-corrections in Asanaliev’s speech may indicate his lack of confidence in speaking Russian. In addition, he uses a local variant of Russian which diverges from the prescribed mainland norms. In particular, on two occasions he uses the genitive phrase служить для чиновника/ народа (to serve the official/the people) in the meaning of the indirect object for which the metropolitan norm prescribes the dative case. From the position of the fixed code, the speaker’s ‘accented’ Russian speech is similarly transgressing as well as his use of stress on the first syllable in the feminine past form of the verb быть – была, for according to the Russian standard prescriptions, it is the final syllable that should be stressed.

To sum up, if the Russian language is a signifier of homogeneity as we see in director Batyrshin’s statement, the linguistic imaginary, which Mir discursively proposes to the viewers across the post-Soviet space, harbours a fundamental disjuncture. Its pattern of meanings reveals an attempt to straddle on the one hand, the conventional normative
metadiscourse of Russian, repatriated from the domain of metropolitan linguistic ideology into the global domain, and on the other hand, the global Russian of real and contingent intercultural communication. The latter contains a number of varieties including a stream of unpolished locally and socially situated vernaculars, be they in Russian or non-Russian localities, which have little to do with the metropolitan prescriptive norms. The Russian global linguistic imaginaries become suspended between the metropolitan fixity, and the less determinant linguistic quality of globalisation.

THE HISTORICAL FRAME

As Andreas Huyssen (2003) posits, transformation of temporal experience and border-crossing memory discourses are today a major form of globalisation. In addition to Russian language, memory narratives enveloped in nostalgia for the Soviet past function as a significant commodity by which Mir claims a global status. In that respect, multiple narratives of Mir ascribe to the varied post-Soviet populations similar positive attitudes and sentimental memories. References to lasting memories from the Soviet period serve as a vehicle of commodification of the past as these mediated meanings and knowledge frames construct and re-enact the imagined coherence of the post-Soviet world. The domain of culture, represented by actors, films and shows famous in the Soviet period, is among the most commonly evoked in the context of Mir’s production. Re-enactment of Soviet experience is especially apparent on the station’s radio channel, whose major content consists of the songs of the Soviet era. The films selected for the television channel also have a pronounced Soviet flavour: in a typical week from 11–18 March 2012, out of the total of fifteen films shown on Mir, eight were made in the Soviet era (Programma 2012).

Discursive orientation to the culture of the Soviet Union is instantiated in the strategy of generalisation used in the description of assumed shared cultural values. This can be seen in example (4) which is an excerpt from a Mir electronic resource story about the Soviet and Russian comedian Gennadii Khazanov:

(4) За его биографией от ‘студента калинарного техникума’ до художественного руководителя Театра Эстрады следует все Содружество. (Gennadii Khazanov 2010)
Here, Khazanov’s appreciation is articulated in the generalised way, by grouping varied people in the metonymic reference всё содружество (all Commonwealth) and globalising the quality of being interested in the actor. Characteristically, the shared knowledge frame related to Khazanov is constructed through appealing to the readers’ linguistic imaginary and evoking the memory of the comedy sketch shown on Soviet television in the early 1980s, in which he assumed a persona of a naïve and timid underdog – a culinary college pupil. The current Mir text has the image of the past played out linguistically through the spelling of кулинарного (culinary) with an [a] – кaлинaрного – instead of the normative [у]. This is an interdiscursive link to the sketch, a reminder of Khazanov’s demotic, non-standard pronunciation of the word, characterised by an indistinction of the ‘u’ and ‘a’ sounds, which marked his character as ‘dull’ and ‘uneducated’ and was then a source of humour. Mir’s [a] spelling triggers in the reader a phonetic memory, the pleasure of which would not exist without the awareness of the Russian metropolitan norm. So the shared nostalgic meaning in the imaginary can only be achieved from the border-crossing position to a metropolitan linguistic subject who appreciates the play on the difference in Russian internal phonetic variables.

Other examples show that nostalgic meanings of commonality may also be constructed through manipulation of the linguistic representation of time-space (the Bakhtinian chronotope). In this case, discursive elements engender temporal shifts in the imaginary, blurring the present, the past and the spatial parameters. Through the ambiguity, the sense of commonality grounded in the historical Soviet discourse is transferred onto the contemporary salient meaning of local belonging, while the temporal divide between the two is backgrounded. Example (5) illustrates this meaning-construction strategy. Here are three excerpts from an electronic text reporting cultural news from Kazakhstan about the commemorative restoration at the ‘Kazakhfilm’ studios of two films produced there forty years ago.

(5) a. Современная молодежь должна знать не только голливудские фильмы, но и свое, родное: красоту степи, быт и историю родины.

b. Большой юбилей двух знаковых картин отечественного кинематографа.

c. В аппаратной советские фильмы обретают вторую жизнь. (Klassika 2010)13

The lexical choices made to describe the films in these excerpts marshal a chain of contextual local equivalents: свое, родное – красота степи,
быт и история родины – отечественный – советский (our own, native – the beauty of the steppe, the way of life, the history of the motherland – of the fatherland – Soviet), which yield ambiguity of temporal and spatial indexes. The use of the attribute советские (Soviet) rather than казахские (Kazakh) to refer to the films in question is, again, a strategy of generalisation which actualises the meaning of commonality of the past, while the modifier отечественный (кинематограф) (cinema of the fatherland) yields a more ambiguous range of reference. To illustrate, отечественный is unspecific enough to be able to plausibly relate to Soviet, Kazakh or even Russian cinema; moreover, it is not limited by the temporal constraints. Hence the indeterminate linguistic signification helps to connect in the imaginary the time of the now and then, and the space of here or there, removing any boundaries between them. When it comes to mentioning Hollywood films, they are contrasted to the localised reference to the steppe iconic of the landscape of Kazakhstan. However, the phrases свое, родное (our own, native) and история родины (history of the motherland) serve to redirect the narrative back into the area of non-specific signification. Both ‘own, native’ as well as ‘motherland’ also ooze indeterminacy allowing the meanings to be interpreted within any of the possible knowledge frames and to shift across temporal and spatial dimensions. Thus without a heavy imposition of sense, blurred signification may work as a subtle lexical vehicle of commodification and globalisation of the Soviet past. Thus, the commodified and nostalgically hued past narratives of the cultural domain produce the shared imaginary marked by the semantics of homogeneity which is achieved through a variety of elements such as generalisation, inducing the metropolitan linguistic subject position, or the increase in indeterminacy, among other techniques.

THE COSMOPOLITAN FRAME

Narratives based on the homogenisation of Soviet memories compete for the audiences’ imaginary with the discourse articulating the global topics common to other parts of the world. Examples from two Мир programmes dealing with such topics, namely work migration and pop music, will demonstrate this trend. The first programme entitled Добро пожаловать (Welcome) is aimed at potential work migrants intending to find employment in Russia. In its opening sequence, tools of visual geography are recruited to complement the verbal elements in coding the imagined unity. The computer-generated footage demonstrates a contemporary map of the Russian Federation onto which the broken
parts – the current post-Soviet independent states – are attached one by one until the whole map of the Soviet Union is reconstructed. Over that imaginary space flags of the post-Soviet countries are then superimposed forming a harmonious circle. The footage is completed with the words appearing over the map and the flags, saying:

(6) простые люди, рабочие руки, жизнь без границ, открытые границы, добро пожаловать. (Dobro pozhalovat’ 2012)

The picture evokes and blends together a variety of images and emotions: nostalgia for the Soviet community, a visual implementation of a desire to restore the Soviet Union, and a sense of global modernity with the dissolved borders. In this model of homogeneity, the post-Soviet space is re-imagined and reframed as a new variant of the USSR, a globalised hybrid in which the Soviet semantics serve as a dominant code in the articulation of the cosmopolitan theme.

Words proclaiming a post-Soviet world without borders equally carry blended meanings. They seem to appeal to the global values of equality and opportunity, however, on closer examination, the frame of cosmopolitan modernity becomes rather fragile, revealing asymmetries in the representation of relations between the nations. The slogans linguistically divide participants into the categories of host and visitors: ‘Russia’ is assigned an invariably privileged position of host, the implied agent of uttering the welcoming performative. At the same time, other post-Soviet countries are grouped within the category of visitors: they are welcomed but simultaneously depreciated by being referred to by the noun phrase ‘ordinary people’. They are further reduced in status through being metonymically represented by their useful parts – ‘working hands’ – and functionalised through stressing their role as to bring those hands to Russia. The movement in the world portrayed as open is thus unidirectional, from the ‘provinces’, back to Russia, confirming the inequality of positions.

A space for global cosmopolitanism in the imaginary is also claimed by the pop music show ‘Hit-express’ which discusses music trends in the CIS, inscribing them into the stylistics related to the theme of world pop culture. Similar to the format of music shows across the world, the programme presenter Lipa demonstrates music video clips from ‘all over the CIS’ and chats with the invited musicians. The show constructs cosmopolitan meanings which first of all can be read from the studio design executed in the theme of international travel. The interior of the broadcasting room is made to resemble an airport departure lounge with
suitcases artistically scattered around. The glass-panelled walls expose the bustle outside an airport building: one can see how planes are parked, loaded with luggage and taxied to a runway. Lipa is also stylised to fit the air travel theme. Sitting at what looks like an airport control counter signposted ‘Gate 45’, she has a headphone and microphone piece into which she makes an announcement fashioned in the language of global nomadism, speaking metaphorically of ‘departure’, ‘take off’, ‘delays’, and ‘VIPs’:

(7) Вот и сегодня Хит-экспресс отправляется без опозданий с полным комплектом рубрик и вип-гостем на борту. Так что идем на взлет.15 (Igra slov 2011)

The transit point of the airport has been noted to represent a liminal space most evocative and emblematic for the intercultural reality of contemporary life (Simpson 2008: 1). Highlighting the airports’ centrality to the manifestation of cosmopolitan semantics, Iyer conceptualises them to be ‘the new epicenters and paradigms of our dawning post-national age . . . the bus terminals of the global village’ (1995: 51). The multimodal discourse of ‘Hit-express’ encapsulates the concept of the ‘global village’ as it celebrates and instils in the post-Soviet imaginary a homogeneous hybrid subject belonging to several places and cultures at the same time. In the episode of 4 February 2011, the three members of the pop band ‘Igra slov’ (The Play on Words) construct two types of cosmopolitan knowledge frames – one is the cosmopolitanism of the CIS type, while the other has worldwide parameters. To illustrate, in a gesture embracing the homogeneous identity of the CIS, they respond enthusiastically to Lipa’s request to sing along in Kyrgyz, which they have no knowledge of, to a clip whose words appear on a display with no translation. But even more happily, they perform identities of members of the global music band community when they talk in an excited tone of voice and interrupt each other about visiting Sicily to film their own new video clip, and describe its plot in the international stereotypes of ‘Sicilian mafia’ and ‘hot girls’.

On a closer look, global articulations in ‘Hit-express’ appear incomplete without the hegemonic meanings flowing from the Russian metropolis. For example, it transpires that the fact that the song and video clip by ‘Igra slov’ are dedicated to Alina Kabaeva – a former Olympic champion, a member of the United Russia party cum media personality and, as Russian papers allege, Putin’s mistress – has something to do with the musicians being invited to the show. Example (8) demonstrates that the topic of Kabaeva and the clip dedicated to her are positioned as item
number one in Lipa’s introductory monologue on the show. This is the use of the discursive strategy of singularisation foregrounding specific information, in other words, making sure it is perceived as salient:

(8) Они [члены ‘Игры слов’] посвятили трек Алине Кабаевой, прокатили весь СНГ на [лодке-]банане, а потом доставили в целости и сохранности на берег на белых катерах. (Igra slov 2011)16

In continuation of this strategy, Lipa’s speech is emphatically flattering to Kabaeva: in example (9), the latter is valorised through the segmentation of her name into a separate sentence, and through references to her beauty and fame saluted in a universalised way, ‘up and down the country’. Lipa’s passage about the Kabaeva clip and of the mere fact of her appearing in it also contains an exaggerated expression of approval and excitement encoded in the raised pitch delivery and the use of modifiers шикарно (glam) and сногсшибательно (out of this world) stylistically associated with the domain of glamour and high life, and the markers of the state of ‘being lost for words’.

(9) Поговорим про другую красивую девушку, известную на всю страну. Алина. Вот когда я услышала песню, это конечно было шикарно. […] мне кажется, что вот сейчас, в этот период времени это вообще как-то типа сногсшибательно . . . – заполучить такого персонажа в свой видеоролик. (Igra slov 2011)17

It has been noted that expression of admiration for people and animals associated with Putin is inscribed in the phenomenon of Putin mania, which by the time of the programme had been well institutionalised in Russia (Cassiday and Johnson 2010). The performance of marvelling at the athletic beauty Kabaeva lends credibility to the image of the Russian leader being a ‘glamorous, elite sexual item’ especially widespread during his second presidential term (Goscilo 2011: 31). So, the knowledge frame built around Kabaeva facilitates the incorporation in cosmopolitan discourse of the imagery and stylistics pertaining to the domain of Putin’s cult residing in the discourse of Russian authority packaged in celebrified narratives.

To conclude, both programmes produce cosmopolitan meanings and knowledge frames for the post-Soviet imaginary which indicate a modernity that stretches within and beyond the CIS. They speak the global language of youth music, glamour and intercultural nomadism.
and discuss problems shared by developed democratic unions. However Mir’s multiple images of globalised homogeneity of this type are either rooted in the ‘golden age’ of the Soviet past or inject into the meaning streams the hegemonic values of the dominant Russian discourses.

NEGOTIATION OF THE LOCAL

Led as it is by its vision of post-Soviet globalisation, Mir’s discourse seems to get rather fractured when it stumbles over the articulation of the local. It has been argued in relation to other parts of the world that the intensive dialogue between local, national and transnational forces in various ex-centric spaces produce a hybrid, or ‘glocal’, culture (Robertson 1992; 1995; Giulianotti and Robertson 2006). Robertson (1995) explains that the concept of globalisation encapsulates transportion of the original local culture to the new context and the subsequent production and reproduction of local identities. Ambivalence is usual for globalisation, and in the Mir case, depictions of non-Russian localities produce confusing meanings, suspended between advocating homogeneity and heterogeneity, and frames that at times slip into a neo-imperial matrix. In a number of our examples, manifestation of the local through the discursive strategy of ethnisation appears to disturb the flow of the semantics of homogeneity. Take, for instance, Example (10) which is an excerpt from a news report from Kyrgyzstan titled Киргизские модницы выбирают современную этнику (The Kyrgyz fashionista choose contemporary ethnic style) that tells the story of the success of Kyrgyz globally recognised fashion.

(10) С недавних пор работы кыргызских мастеров можно приобрести даже в Европе и Америке, рассказывает корреспондент МТРК “Мир” Ксения Стрельцова.18

(Kyrgyzskie modnitsy 2010)

Following the classical glocal modality, the beginning of the story blends the theme of the popularity of Kyrgyz fashion industry across the world with the theme of the local. But even though the global scale is asserted, it is immediately linguistically depreciated with the employment of the pragmatic marker даже (even). The marker cues the text producer’s belief that the quality of what is described in the proposition is beyond what is construed to be a normal, or expected, state of events. As a consequence, what started in the title as the confident framing of Kyrgyz fashion is disrupted by a superior viewpoint, by which Kyrgyz-made
goods are in fact expected to be inferior to those in demand in Europe and the US, construed in the text as the standard of approval.

Further on, the local adaptation of the global develops a discursive tension at the point when the text displays an evident shortage of tools to sustain the articulation of global meanings. The cosmopolitan discourse of global chic dissolves in the narrative of the bounded local, characterised as ethnic, traditional and unchangeable. What is described in the initial part of the article in terms of cutting-edge fashion that is in demand in prestigious world places, is finally defined unequivocally as nothing more than the Kyrgyz national costume, clothes steeped in ritual which are sought after basically in local ethnographic settings (example 11).

(11) Ручная вышивка, этнические узоры и украшения – традиционному стилю в Кыргызстане всегда отдавали предпочтение. Модельер Мадина Тапаева более 15 лет шьет национальные костюмы, а спрос на них все так же высок. Без традиционного наряда не обходится ни одно торжество.19 (Kyrgyzskie modnitsy 2010)

In Example (11), discourse focuses on the temporal qualities highlighting length and stability manifested in the items всегда (always), более 15 лет (more than fifteen years), and on the repetition of habit expressed by the expressions: все так же (as ever, all the same), не обходится без (cannot do without). These resources form a system of meanings signalling the sense of immutable time and circumstances, and ultimately, attribute to the local subjects wearing the clothes little dynamic towards homogenising modernity. As a result, the discursive attempt at appropriation of global semantics dwindles as we are finally told that the locals always prefer the traditional style and as ever attend celebrations wearing the same ethnic dress.

Robertson (1995) admits that during the glocalisation process various forms of the creation of particularity are intensified, such as the invention of local culture and traditions. In this scenario, in an opposition to ‘the other’, local identities are accorded ‘more historically profound, distinguishing meanings’ (Guilianotti and Robertson 2006: 172), and the nostalgic ‘ideologies of home’ are invented and promoted, as indeed may be seen in the narrative about the Kyrgyz fashionista. This means that when Mir adopts a glocalisation frame for narrating local stories, this disrupts the channel’s general orientation to restorative, miniglobal meanings suggested for the post-Soviet imaginary.

Other examples evidence that assertive glocalism may be completely
removed from the depiction of the local. To illustrate, consider an episode from the programme ‘Territoria KG’\textsuperscript{20} relating to Shamanism in Kyrgyzstan and broadcast on 20 September 2009. It constructs the local subject, a former comrade and compatriot of the viewers, within the Orientalist paradigm with its emphasis on an exploration of the ethnographically portrayed ‘other’ and on highlighting the subject’s cultural difference (Said 1978). In the episode, local habits are presented as an alien object of study, fascination and control. Moreover, in a classical Orientalist fashion, localism is gendered: Shamanism is represented as a female occupation and is described through the voyeuristic male gaze. The Kyrgyz shaman woman is depicted as starkly different from a European: dressed in full-body-covering white robes, her head and shoulders are fully covered by a hijab. Fervently handling her shamanic beads, she is shown in a near-trance state. Her language performance is another marker of ‘otherness’: to use Carolyn Boyce Davies’ expression, subaltern woman’s speech is represented as non-speech (in Spivak 2005: xx). At that point, the programme’s language switches from Russian to Kyrgyz – the shaman is shown speaking her local language in a fast and incoherent manner with no translation provided. In contrast, the narrative describing and explaining the local culture is delivered in fluent Russian by a poised, calmly mannered man who looks and is dressed like a European. The narrator is thus constructed as the position of the norm, observing the local habit from the outside. Thus the localities of the globally framed post-Soviet world are sometimes depicted as alien peripheries, harbouring otherness, as non-Russian speaking and (therefore) lacking civilisation.

To sum up, \textit{Mir}’s depiction of the local ‘other’ produces a variety of meanings and hues for the imaginary, ranging from the semantics of the confident glocalism model to that of the Orientalist neo-colonial frame. But the local seems to be disruptive as the regularly occurring representations of local as foreign get into conflict with the station’s discourse that produces and reproduces the knowledge frames of global homogeneity.

\textbf{THE DELICIOUS POST-SOVIEET WORLD}

Food has been described as a unique signifier symbolically linked to power relations (Counihan and Esterik 1997). As Barthes ([1961] 1997: 26) put it, ‘food has a constant tendency to transform itself into situation.’\textsuperscript{21} Examination of the cookery programme \textit{Вкусный мир} (Delicious World), dedicated to the various national cuisines (кухни разных народов) of the former Soviet Union, may therefore provide a deeper
insight into how, for Mir, the power between the new states as well as the meanings of the homogeneous and the foreign are mapped across the post-Soviet imaginary space.

Episodes of the show provide historical excursions into national food habits, supply recipes for national dishes and give real-time cooking demonstrations. The term народы used in the programme for nationalities is a strikingly vague ethnographic term which allows the show to include in their ‘food geography’ both the former Soviet countries and the ethnic regions of the Russian Federation, symbolically appropriating various national groups through food and downplaying the difference between the independent and federal territories such as Chechnya, Komi and Tatarstan.

Space in the show is metaphorically represented as food and commoditised through the frame of cooking and consuming. According to Mir’s discourse, space can have taste, be tasty or have various degrees of tastiness – this can be seen in example (12) which is the utterance of an anchor at the start of each episode:

(12) с каждым днем наш Вкусный Мир становится все вкуснее и вкуснее; Я сегодня приглашаю вас в увлекательное путешествие по вкусному миру национальных блюд. (Vkusnyi mir 2012)

Thus, SPACE IS FOOD serves as an underlying conceptual metaphor upon which the programme knowledge frames are built. Metaphors are often resorted to for making sense of something new, requiring explanation (Kövecses 2010). Here, food, the source domain of the metaphor, is used for the conceptualisation and explication of the more complex and less clear target domain – a territory. For example, in keeping with the logic of construing nations as gastronomic units, the Russian attitude after the 2008 war with Georgia to the disputed status of breakaway regions of Georgia – Abkhazia and South Ossetia – is reflected in the programme’s episodes devoted to the cuisine of each of these individual regions, separately from the show about Georgian cooking. The cookery of South Ossetia is nevertheless discursively united with that of Russian North Ossetia under the homogenising category of Ossetian cuisine, thus symbolically including it in Russian territory and erasing any difference (Osetinskaia kakhnia 2009). Markedly, Russian taste is seen to be a collective normalised ‘us’, through whose gaze and taste the ‘foreign’ food is invited to be experienced. Consumption at the zero point of the metropolis equals appropriation, but the boundary between the more and the less foreign among the appropriated is complex and disrupted.
As in the programme ‘Welcome’, the demarcations between the in- and out-groups are drawn here by the division of roles into the ‘hostess’ (хозяйка) and the ‘visitors’ (гости). The programme anchor, the young Russian blonde introduced as ‘the charming Anastasiia’ is the face of the in-group. Anastasiia the ‘hostess’ rules over a Moscow-based kitchen which looks expensive, trendy, well equipped, in short, cosmopolitan. The ‘visitors’ arrive to her kitchen from various parts of the post-Soviet space to teach Anastasiia to cook and to treat her to their gastronomic delights. The Russia-centric role distribution between the localised ‘guests’ and the normalised ‘host’, and the complexity of the in-group belonging are linguistically articulated, as in example (13) which is Anastasiia’s directive addressed to the cook from Kazakhstan:

(13) чувствуйте себя как дома, но не забывайте, что вы в гостях. (Vkusnyi mir 2010)

The plot involving ‘hosts’ and ‘visitors’ absorbs the matrix deeply rooted in Soviet-era cultural forms, which depicts visitors from all over the vast USSR travelling to Moscow in order to excel in their ethnic skills for the pleasure of consumption by the metropolis. Among numerous cultural products in which this model was epitomised is the utopian topography of the Moscow Exhibition of National Economic Achievements, which was meant to be a demonstration of excellence, originally agricultural, brought to the capital from the national regions. The exhibition’s famous centrepiece was the 1959 Friendship of the Peoples Fountain, in which around a golden sheaf of wheat are positioned fifteen gilded maidens, each symbolically representing one of the Soviet Republics. The nationalities that the fountain figures stood for were portrayed through defining elements of national costume and local pieces of agricultural produce in their hands, manifesting that the SPACE IS FOOD metaphor was inscribed in Soviet-era visual rhetorics.

However, borrowing from the historical frame today does not fully help to map spaces in the style of Soviet miniglobalisation. Away from the imagined CIS, Russia’s political relations with various countries on the post-Soviet map have been varied, some of them having been tarnished by tensions and hostilities. This seems to correlate with the level of proximity and distance constructed in the culinary discourse of the show. To illustrate, let us examine the episode of 22 January 2011 about the national cuisine of Estonia, one of the problematic neighbours for Russia. Contrary to the programme’s established pattern by which cooks are residents in the respective regions, Estonian food is prepared by three Muscovites. This means that all participants in this programme
are ‘hosts’, some pretending to be guests. In terms of the symbolism of the ‘food geography’ imaginary, the ritual movement from the periphery to the metropolis is thus disrupted. The narrative delivered by the voice-over about the cooks problematises the meanings of coherence, foregrounding their rather tenuous link to Estonia, thus disconnecting them from the space in question. To illustrate, for the twenty-something guest Iuliia, her Estonian connection is her early childhood summers that she used to spend in Tallinn with her grandparents. Another cook – the elderly Helve – is outwardly ethnic: in addition to her Estonian name, she is dressed up in an Estonian costume, to which a medal is pinned. The voice-over explains that she received the medal for teaching at a Moscow Sunday school for children ‘having some relation to Estonia’. While Helve represents an Estonian identity through her dress and medal, her linguistic performance in example (14) constructs a different identity which has a salient Russian orientation.

(14) a. Anastasia: Замечательно, а что у вас за костюм такой красивый, и орден?
b. Helve: Да, и орден. Это у меня национальный костюм района Ярва-Яани, эстонский такой. Их около тридцати и больше.
c. A: Ой, здорово! Какой у вас красивый акцент, потрясающий.
d. H: Я пятьдесят лет живу в Москве . . .
e. A: Ну . . . все равно, акцент остался, да?
f. H: Ну . . . остался.
g. Iuliia’s Father: Я хочу добавить, что орден дали за то, что она так активно работает с московскими эстонскими детишками, и ведет воскресную школу.
h. A: Ой, замечательно. Ну, наверняка вы хорошо разбираетесь в эстонской кулинарии.
i. H: Да, но не лучше, чем они.
j. A: Да ладно, не поверю.25
(Eстонская кухня 2011)

The above excerpt from the kitchen conversation demonstrates that both Helve and Anastasiia apply distancing strategies vis-à-vis Estonia. In move (14c), Anastasiia brings up the subject of the Estonian accent in Helve’s Russian, construing it as a marker of her Estonian identity alongside other items of her cultural identification – namely her costume and the medal. By complementing both Helve’s attributes – her dress,
and her accent – Anastasiia distances the cook as she localises her and categorises her as ‘other’. Unexpectedly for her role in the programme, Helve is not too keen to co-operate with Anastasiia’s strategy though: in her turn (14d), she blocks the compliment by admitting that she has lived in Moscow for fifty years and shifts her self-categorisation from the out-group to the in-group. Moreover, in turn (14f), Helve demonstrates no wish to continue the topic of her Estonian accent, while Anastasiia tries to develop it further. Helve accepts the proposition that her speech is accented, but her curt style, hushed tone and the use of hedging manifested by the particle ну (well), followed by a pause, indicate reluctance. In (14i), Helve continues to distance herself from Estonians, evidenced in her use of the personal pronoun они (they) in the reference to the ethnic group she is invited to represent. It is apparent that rather than bringing Estonia closer to the in-group, all speakers displace the country, imagining it as a far-away place, with which connections are severed by time. In the present, it is symbolically preserved by reiterative practices: not only cooking but Iuliia’s retrieving her memories of childhood and Helve’s occasionally putting on her national costume and recycling stories to children.

So despite the express intention of ‘Delicious World’ to bring Estonia into the imaginary realm of post-Soviet homogeneity, the linguistic performances of the programme’s participants and the voice-over pull the narrative in the opposite direction, constructing the sense of the country’s foreignness. Thus the show which has a phantom rootedness in the Soviet utopian cultural model of miniglobalisation produces more complex and conflicting categorisations and demarcations of the post-Soviet local and its relation with the metropolis.

**CONCLUSION**

Analysis of the data from Mir programmes and texts of its electronic resources has demonstrated that the semantics of homogeneity constitute an integral part of the deterritorialised Russophone meanings and knowledge frames working as soft power in the construction of the post-Soviet collective imaginary. The variety of discursive forms discussed in the chapter may be seen as roughly falling into three broad types of globalisation semantics, which are mutually conditioned and interconnected. The first is the historical model, which is similar to Robertson’s miniglobalisation and which is rooted in the discursive remnants, images, models and knowledge frames of the Soviet-era narratives and other cultural forms. These are either openly borrowed and transposed into the contemporary
imaginary, often for the purpose of invoking nostalgia, or perpetuated in a subdued, implicit way. The second type is the ‘imagined greater CIS’ version of commonality. This type of homogeneity constructs a ‘CIS’ ideoscape, a ‘Ptolemaic’ Russocentric model of the post-Soviet universe. This model downplays the diversification of the independent states and the difference between the CIS and the post-Soviet states, while at the same time assuming the Russian metropolis and the Russian language to be major pulling forces of the imagined union. The third type of the coherence knowledge frame is the ‘Galileo model’, in which borrowing from the outside world is predominant: it filters into the post-Soviet imaginary the meanings-stream of global homogeneity created within the context of the wider world order. The frame implicitly acknowledges that the current independent states are a segment of the cosmopolitan world connected by supranational problems and cultural practices.

However, Mir’s multimodal discourse also demonstrates that the delivery of the semantics of homogeneity through all three knowledge frames is constantly disrupted. The station’s narratives are conflicting and fluid, and subject positions are often uncertain. It seems that both the self-narrating localities and the centrally presented descriptions of ‘accented’ localisms produce ‘otherness’, revealing post-colonial or, possibly, neo-colonial hierarchies and imbalances. The three discursive knowledge frames suggested for the post-Soviet imaginary compete, intertwine and superimpose. Ultimately, however, the globalisation image of the deterritorialised horizontal ‘global village’ of cosmopolitan post-national Russian speakers gets infused with the hegemonic discursive meaning-streams invariably linked to the ‘Ptolemaic’ Russian metropolis.

NOTES

1. Here, the term cultural flow is used in the sense elaborated by Ulf Hannerz as a social organisation and ‘distribution of meanings and meaningful forms over people and social relationships in the world’ (1992: 23). In the contemporary globalised world, the flow of culture is assymetrical, the stronger flow being a hegemony, from the centre to the periphery (Hannerz 1996: 60). On transcultural flows also see Pennycook (2007).

2. Rossotrudnichestvo was established in September 2008 under the jurisdiction of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

3. Media communication being inherently multimodal (Busch and Pfisterer 2011: 436), the chapter also construes the cultural forms within the paradigm of multimodal discourse, in which verbal language interprets reality in combination with other social semiotic modes such as image, sound and gestures (Kress and Van Leeuwen 2001; Kress 2010).
4. President Dmitrii Medvedev’s public statement openly articulated this priority: ‘Our objective is apparent: for us, the relationship with the CIS is the major priority of the international relations’ (Medvedev 2009). All translations from Russian are mine.

5. ‘First of all, we are connected by the Russian language. A battle for its preservation as a foundation of our market is for us a pragmatically oriented work.’

6. For a discussion of linguistic culture see Woolhiser in this volume.

7. At the time of writing this chapter, the ‘Great and Mighty’ programme has been taken off Mir’s schedule.

8. In November 2010, the village Kushchevskaja shocked the nation when a family of twelve people, including four children, were brutally murdered by a local gang which, as it was also found out, was amalgamated with local government. This became a symbol of epidemic lawlessness in provincial Russia (Schwirtz 2010).

9. ‘– The other shift, the Ossetians f...cked up three cops.
– Where? Right here?
– In ‘Zabava’ café, did not kill, just knifed. The first had his head split open, the second had the shit beaten out of him, and the third was stabbed in his leg with a bolt.’

10. For a discussion of the postcolonial relationship between the naturalised and the local languages, see for example, Vilela (2002).

11. ‘I’ll be straight: the people are upset about the bureaucrats. The bureaucrats think that the people, the people serve . . . that people must serve for the bureaucrats and not vice versa, bureaucrats must serve the people. So these leaders must lea . . . must organise, organise so that constantly the nation, that the people have, the ordinary person has constant vigilance.’

12. ‘All the Commonwealth is following his biography from the “student of culinary school” to the artistic director of the Variety Theatre.’

13. (ga) ‘Contemporary youth must know not only Hollywood films, but what is our own and native: the beauty of the steppe, the way of life, and the history of the motherland’; (gb) ‘a grand jubilee of the two markedly significant pictures from the cinema of the fatherland’; (gc) ‘In the editing room, the Soviet films get a second life.’

14. ‘Ordinary people, working hands, life without borders, open borders, welcome.’

15. ‘Here again today “Hit Express” departs without delays with a whole set of rubrics and a VIP guest on board. So we are ready to take off.’

16. ‘They [members of “The Play on Words”] dedicated a track to Alina Kabaeva, took the whole CIS for a ride on a banana [boat], and after that, delivered everybody safe back to the shore in little white speed boats.’

17. ‘Let’s talk about another beautiful girl known to the whole country. Alina. Just when I heard the song, it was certainly glam. [. . .] It seems to me that right now, in this period in time, to manage to get this kind of personality into your video clip . . . I say, this is kind of . . . out of this world.’

18. ‘Recently it has become possible to purchase Kyrgyz craft work even in Europe and America’ – says the reporter of the ITRC Mir Ksenia Strel’tsova.’

19. ‘Hand-crafted embroidery, ethnic patterns and decorations – in Kyrgyzstan, preference has always been given to the traditional style. The seamstress Madina Tapaeva has been sewing national costumes for more than fifteen years but the demand for those is as high as ever. No celebration can be without traditional clothes.’
20. The programme has been discontinued by the time of writing this chapter.

21. Original emphasis.

22. ‘The delicious world with every day is becoming tastier and tastier; today I invite you to an exciting journey around the delicious world of national dishes.’

23. ‘Feel at home but do not forget that you are a visitor.’

24. The Exhibition was first opened under Stalin rule in 1939 as the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition.

25. ‘Anastasia: Cool, and what is this costume you are wearing, and a medal? . . .

Helve: Yes, the medal too. Here I have the national costume of the Järva-Jaani region, kind of Estonian. There are more than thirty altogether.

A.: Oh, cool! You have such a beautiful accent, smashing!

H.: I have lived in Moscow for fifty years . . .

A.: Well . . . so what, the accent remains, doesn’t it?

H.: Well . . . it remained.

Iuliia’s Father: I would like to add that they have given her the medal for working so actively with the Moscow Estonian kids, and she also runs a Sunday school.

A.: Oh, smashing. Well, surely you know Estonian cookery well.

H.: Yes, but no better than them.

A.: Come on, I will not believe that.’

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