The project aims to connect two different philosophical approaches to normativity: the non-naturalist approach, whereby judgments such as 'I ought to X' are sui generis and irreducible to judgments about the natural world, and the experimental philosophy approach, which joins philosophy with empirical psychology, in an attempt to understand how normative judgment is actually realized by the human mind. I intend to combine these two strands by suggesting a working hypothesis: The human mind must have a specific capacity for normative thought, which is not reducible to other capacities, and whose conceptual materials and outputs (judgments) are in some sense distinctive. I will articulate my research in three sub-themes: 1) Is there any empirical evidence supporting the idea that normative thought is a distinctive capacity? What can explain such autonomy? The study of psychopathologies provides relevant empirical data. Psychopaths are often described as having a malfunctioning capacity of normative judgment, while they seem to retain other cognitive skills, e.g. mind-reading. If this is the correct philosophical diagnosis of such individuals, then normative judgment could indeed be independently impaired, thus lending credibility to the thesis of autonomy. I will also suggest that what makes normative thought special is a unique blend of cognitive and emotional capacities that constitute the normal psychological role of normative concepts. 2) Is there a single mechanism behind the variety of normative judgments we make? Here the opposing monist and pluralist options will be discussed, trying to argue that the autonomy of normative judgment also points to a positive answer to the question. 3) Does normative cognition actually operate via rules, or on a case-by-case basis? Here the debate between generalism and particularism will be analyzed and assessed in the light of the empirical findings of psychology regarding the role of principles in moral understanding.